Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

357.AA/10–950: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (Doolittle) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

Djakarta, October 9, 1950—4 p. m.

480. Gocus 906. As chairman of week, I called on Dr. Roem at 12:30 today to press for answer to UNCI’S letter October 6 (Gocus 905¹) appealing for cease-fire. Roem informed me that letter would be delivered to us, probably in course of tomorrow. I asked him if he could give me idea of contents, to which he replied that Indonesian Government did not feel able accept UNCI’S offer as Indonesian Parliament was seized of matter and was very incensed over Prime Minister Drees’ telegram to Prime Minister Natsir.² I told Roem that Drees’ telegram had nothing to do with UNCI’s decisions in matter; neither had Commission been influenced by other Dutch authorities or self-styled representative of “South Moluccas Republic” in Hague who had also addressed telegrams to us; that Commission could give him categorical assurance that any action which it took would not imply recognition of South Moluccas as legitimate governmental body. I stated I could ony regret that Indonesian Government had not seen fit to utilize Commission which was presently stationed here at request of parties to Hague RTC and asked him to suggest what further steps we might take to be of assistance; that we had hoped when Indonesia was admitted into UN that it might consider that persuasion was better than coercion; that UNCI had refrained from exercising its right under HRTC of suggesting a plebiscite in any territory where it believed expression of opinion was necessary in hope that this matter would be settled without recourse to arms.

Dr. Roem, in response to earlier question as to progress operations on which Defense Ministry has been silent, with exception of one short and non-committal communiqué, told me operation was going well, that they hoped to finish it within few days and that when UNCI would be called upon to assist in repatriation Ambonese soldiers now in camps in Java and Indonesian Government would proceed with its plans for autonomy of region. He suggested I have talk with Dr. Leimena, who had recently visited South Moluccas, including Amboina, and that he would, at my request, endeavor arrange meeting with him today.

As foreseen, situation remains unsatisfactory and our future course of action is not clear. One such possible course would be to report back to SC that our efforts have failed and request instructions. This, I believe, undesirable for reasons obvious to Department. In my personal opinion, this situation is heritage of Commission’s several months inaction which have lost its influence which is now difficult to regain.

In spite Roem’s presumable optimism, there is information to effect operation not going well on Amboina. APRI’s troops have not only riot advanced, but have been driven back again slightly. However, other contenders also in bad situation, without food and without ammunition. Therefore, they may be forced surrender in near future, but also once again have proven they are best fighters in these islands. Strangely enough, our observers report no undue agitation in camps to date. Most of them are now unarmed and they may have decided discretion is better than valor without means of showing it. As long, however, as active military operations are still going on, Commission would be unable get to Amboina, but it will propose immediately that firing has ceased that it proceed therefor on-spot observation and to ascertain needs of population who were reputed to be not only short of food, but to be lacking in medical supplies.

Department pass The Hague.

Doolittle

1. Not printed.
2. On October 3 Drees had sent a telegram to Natsir, stating that he was deeply shocked by the military action against Ambon. Natsir’s reply on October 5 related the history of the Ambon situation since April and stated that it was an internal problem which the Government of Indonesia had regrettably to resolve by force. A summary of Natsir’s telegram was transmitted in telegram 464, October 5, from Djakarta, not printed (357.AA/10–550); no copy of Drees’ telegram has been found in Department of State files.