Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

756D.00/7–2150: Telegram

The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Secretary of State

secret   niact

Djakarta, July 21, 1950—5 p. m.

92. Deptel 72. Question propriety request Netherlands Government for my intervention toward achievement peaceful settlement Ambonese revolt against sovereign state Indonesia. If instead of domestic revolt this were issue between two parties RTC agreement normal procedure would be for one or both parties appeal to UNCI. Question, as to whether Netherlands should ask formally for UNCI intervene Ambonese situation on basis noncompliance RUSI with provisions RTC agreement on right self-determination has been subject considerable correspondence between Netherlands Government and High Commissioner Hirshfeld. Latter told me night 19th that when delivering to Hatta note of July 15 (see Gocus 873¹ on question self-determination and field of authority of UNCI in connection therewith, he told Hatta on his own initiative this would be last Netherlands note on this subject. He said he promptly telegraphed his government that he had “confirmed to Hatta this would be last Netherlands note this subject”.

In my recent cablegrams reporting conversations with Hirschfeld I have indicated his reluctance endeavor push case for Netherlands against RUSI on ground that move toward unitary state was violation RTC agreement. He has consistently held that best interests of Netherlands as well as Indonesia and peace-loving nations would be served by supporting moderate Government of Hatta. He has been conscious of damage not only to Netherlands prestige but also to Hatta as negotiator of RTC agreement that has come from activities of reactionary Netherlands officials both military and civil. He has doubted that Netherlands Government could make good case against RUSI if above matters should be taken before SC. He is keenly aware that RUSI could disclose facts before SC which would embarrass Netherlands Government tremendously. I am amazed that officials of Netherlands Embassy Washington entrusted with such responsibility as asking our good offices in this matter would either be ignorant or profess to be ignorant of such matters as involvement of Netherlands military officials in Soumokil affair. My feeling is that Netherlands Government should avail itself of UNCI services if it considers Ambon incident international affair for which RUSI responsible. Department is of course aware of attitude UNCI premises. I have not participated in UNCI discussions and have not seen Dow’s cablegrams until filed.

I visited Hatta night 20th. I asked for details re Ambon situation. He confirmed landing on Burn Island (see Embtel 79²). He said leaders there were friendly to RUSI and no fighting took place. He said plan is to land on other neighboring islands in move to blockade Ambon. Said military action against some 1500 armed men Ambon would be undertaken if efforts towards peaceful solution fail.

I reminded Hatta that when member of GOC and of UNCI I had occasionally volunteered to be of service in special circumstances, I told him I regretted setting up of new state being hindered through Ambon affair and threatened bloodshed. I asked if there was any way at all in which I could be helpful. I told him I was making this approach personally and secretly to him on my own responsibility and without instructions. He replied he would appreciate my endeavoring influence British Ambassador Kermode arrange for Malayan Airways plane be made available under charter to take unofficial RUSI peace mission to Ambon. He said KPM had agreed with RUSI Senate President Pelapessy who is one of leading Ambonese in RUSI, to charter steamship for this purpose. Hatta said would much prefer plane to save time and hasten settlement. I promised speak with Kermode. I mentioned I had no official plane here at present NA being in Manila with Beechcraft for overhauling and possible exchange for C–47. Hatta agreed with me that use of US Air Force plane could not be undertaken unless I procured approval of my government and unless his military advisers concurred. Furthermore, it would be necessary, of course, to find out whether Ambonese revolutionists would permit landing. It was agreed this question should not be raised for present.³

I asked Hatta if he desired UNCI intervene in Ambon question. He definitely opposed this. Again UNCI correspondence covers RUSI attitude toward such intervention.

I left Hatta feeling any attempt intervention by me alone or in cooperation with UNCI at instance of Netherlands Government would not be welcomed. I did pot, of course, give slightest hint we had been approached on this subject. I am anxious be of any possible service in connection with Ambon matter and volunteer gladly to undertake exercise of good offices if peace mission fails and if situation may develop in such fashion that RUSI governor might see fit call on me prior launching attack Ambon. I feel very strongly, however, Netherlands Government itself has large responsibility for unfortunate development in east Indonesia particularly Ambon and does not come to us with clean hands. When I asked Hatta if he knew source of support and financing of revolution Moluccas, he said no question but that old line reactionaries in Holland were responsible and were using NNG in connection their operations.⁴ I feel this group will become increasingly active as time for settlement NNG question approaches. If we are to be at all helpful in achieving an amicable arrangement on that vital question, we must refrain now from committing ourselves in favor of either party to dispute and from being used by either improperly.

Visited Kermode morning 21st. Asked him re plane. He said Shell Company had originally approached local Malayan Airways agent for charter of plane for several points including Ambon leaving impression this was for their own business. Agent informed Singapore headquarters and also Ambassador and furthermore learned charter was really for use of plane by peace mission. Ambassador has been approached subsequently by Lemeina and Pelapessy and also by Hirschfeld. He will recommend approval of plan only if Hatta will approach him and give guarantee of responsibility on part RUSI Government and if Netherlands Government will likewise give guarantee responsibility to London Government.⁵ He said Hatta had not yet approached him. I will perhaps see Hatta or Lemeina soon. Have no further recommendations make Department this time.

Cochran

1. Not printed.
2. Not printed; in it Cochran reported that Defense Minister Jogja had confirmed the landing of RUSI troops on Burn Island on July 14. According to Jogja the troops had encountered little opposition, and further landings on the islands surrounding Ambon were planned with the aim of blockading the island. (756.56356D/7–1950)
3. In telegram 97, July 23, from Djakarta, not printed, Cochran reported further on the situation on Ambon. He stated that information was difficult to obtain directly and often conflicting, but there seemed to be about 1,500 determined and deeply committed troops on Ambon. The RUSI Government was considering sending Lemeina again to the island to negotiate, but that beyond this no definite plan was being prepared by the RUSI Government. (756D.00/7–2350)
4. In telegram 114, July 24, from The Hague, not printed, Ambassador Chapin added his view on the source of support for Ambon, stating that there were pro-Ambonese organizations collecting funds in the Netherlands and that many individuals wished the Republic of South Moluccas luck. (756C.00/7–2450)
5. In telegram 97, Ambassador Cochran also reported that the RUSI Government had been unable to give Kermode the guarantee, so Lemeina was attempting to find out if a steamer could be used.