Subject: Discussions with Prime Minister Menzies of
Australia—Question of a Pacific Pact.1
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of
Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)
top secret
[Washington, July 27, 1950.]
Pacific Pact
While no commitments should be made with respect to the United States
attitude toward a Pacific Pact, it is believed that, should Mr.
Menzies raise the question, the opportunity should be taken for a
full and frank exchange of views. Mr. Menzies should be told that
this Government has an open mind on the question but has not as yet
seen how the many problems connected with a Pacific Pact can be
satisfactorily solved. The suggestions of Mr. Menzies would
therefore be welcome.
There is given below a brief statement of what United States policy
has been up to the present and the reasons therefor. There is then
given a series of questions with regard to a Pacific Pact which are
suggestive of the type of problem upon which the views of Mr.
Menzies would be helpful.
The present most authoritative statement of United States policy
toward any form of Pacific Pact is stated in MSC 48/2, which says:
“The U.S. should make known its sympathy with the efforts of
Asian leaders to form a regional association of
non-Communist states and if in due course such an
association eventuates, the U.S. should be prepared, if
invited, to assist such an association to fulfill its
purposes under conditions which would be to our
interest.”
[Page 122]
This rather cautious policy was based upon the realization that up to
the present the formation of any such regional organization has been
difficult because of the wide diversity in the area of political
organization and development, the lack of a tradition of cooperation
and a sound economic basis for large-scale mutual trade and the
suspicions with which the weaker nations of Asia view the stronger.
In addition it is recognized that the peoples of Asia are suspicious
of the West and any cooperation extended by the U.S. to a growing
regionalism must be done in a manner which will not excite further
suspicions of our motives.
India, one of the most important of the Asiatic countries, and one
whose influence extends throughout the Pacific, has made it clear
that it will have nothing to do with any pact which is military in
nature or specifically directed against Communism. This reluctance
to become involved in the cold war by India and other Asiatic
nations which do not believe themselves directly threatened by
Communist aggression was largely responsible for the failure of the
recent Baguio Conference called by President Quirino of the
Philippines, to agree on a South East Asian Regional Union.
Nevertheless, in spite of the above factors it is probable that the
Communist aggression against South Korea has served to hasten the
day when the true nature of the Communist threat will be recognized
by those Asiatic nations now unable to believe the truth. It may
therefore be expected that there will be a growing demand for the
formation of some type of Pacific or Asiatic Pact.
There are many questions to be answered before making any commitment
to take part in any such Pact or Union.
Problems of membership immediately arise. Who will be asked to join?
If only white countries, will not the rest of Asia cry White
Imperialism? If both white and colored countries, do not the white
countries have to assume an undue burden? Is the Pact to be confined
to Pacific Ocean countries, the U.S. and the British Commonwealth,
or will it include the smaller countries on the mainland of Asia? If
the latter are not included, will it not encourage them to believe
they are not important to the West and thus make them easier victims
of the Communists? Will the formation of a Pacific Pact in addition
to an Atlantic Pact create an irresistible cry for a Middle East
Pact? Can we afford all of these? And what about Japan? Will it be
invited to join? If so, on what basis? If not, will it not encourage
Japan to lean more toward her strong Communist neighbors?
In addition to questions of membership there immediately arise
questions of purpose. As indicated above, India and some of the
other Pacific or Asian powers have been reluctant to join any Pact
or Union which is military in character or specifically directed
against Communism. President Quirino of the Philippines stressed in
his invitations
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to a
Pacific Pact conference that he had in mind an organization which
would confine its activities to political, economic and cultural
cooperation. Even so there was but scant enthusiasm for his
proposals. Therefore, what should the purpose be? If outright
opposition to Communism, would it not mean that in effect the U.S.
would be carrying the major portion of the burden? If the Pact is a
defensive pact, how is it to go into operation? Will it be on the
order of the Atlantic Pact or only a consultative pact?
The above questions are only a few of the many which could be asked.
They indicate the complexity of the problem and it is believed
furnish lines for profitable discussions.
