751G.00/9–850
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State
Subject: Foreign Ministers Meetings—Indochina, Summary of Points Raised by Saigon and Paris concerning French Defense Measures.
At the suggestion of Ambassador Jessup I am listing below a series of specific points made in recent telegrams from Saigon, Hanoi and Paris in the thought that you may wish to refer to them either separately with Schuman or in one of the small closed meetings with both Bevin and Schuman.
Both Paris and Saigon have emphasized the fact that there are two questions of predominant importance now facing us concerning [Page 877] Indochina. Without a decision on them, a consideration of other lesser points is largely academic. They are: (A) A decision as to whether the British and ourselves are prepared to participate actively in the defense of Indochina in the event of overt or covert Chinese invasion. If so, to what extent and under what circumstances? (B) To what extent are we prepared to finance the formation of National Armies in the Associated States? The Vietnamese, French and we are agreed that this step comes closest within present limits of practicability to meeting our objectives. Pleven has mentioned a sum of 200 billion francs ($570 million odd) as the sum required over a two-year period.
Other points are as follows:
- 1)
- Advisability of replacing General Carpentier as Commanding General of French Union Forces in Indochina. Saigon and Hanoi both regard Carpentier as less qualified to carry out any plan for the formation of a Vietnamese National Army than General Alessandri, present CO., French Union Forces in North Vietnam. Note: Carpentier is generally opposed to the formation of a National Army and specifically opposed to arming a native militia on grounds that they cannot be trusted. Alessandri has a long Indochinese background and enjoys, with Pignon, the cooperation and respect of the Vietnamese to an extent not accorded to any other Frenchman.
- 2)
- To apply all possible pressure on Bao Dai to return to Indochina immediately together with his family and thereafter to emerge from his oriental seclusion and assume a more active role as Chief of State. The maximum we might hope for from Bao Dai is that he be persuaded to take active field command of the Vietnamese National Army.
- 3)
- Fully publicize the agreements concluded at the Pau Conference, primarily in Vietnam and the rest of Asia.1
- 4)
- Urge the French to impress upon the Vietnamese Government the need for more effective tax collections. In this connection U.S. assistance through our present economic mission or otherwise is available.
- 5)
- Urge that High Commissioner Pignon be authorized to release small arms in so far as available to the provincial governors for use in arming native militia and village chieftains in defense of the area recently liberated from the Viet Minh, particularly in the Red River Valley of Tonkin.
- 6)
- Submit once more to the French the thought that the turning over of the High Commissioner’s palace at Saigon to Bao Dai might serve as a beneficial symbolic gesture.
The above points are supplemental to those emphasized in other documents on Indochina prepared for the Foreign Ministers Meeting.