751G.00/9–550
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
personal
Dear Dean: I take the opportunity afforded by Chip’s1 immediate departure for Washington to send to you by him this letter setting forth our reaction to the course of action outlined in the Department’s telegram No. 1111 of September 1.2 This letter will allow me to comment more fully than would have been the case in a telegram.
There is full agreement here with the Department’s appraisal of the current situation in Indochina and our objectives there. There is also full agreement with respect to the desirability of reaping the maximum psychological benefit from action to be taken by the French toward the formation of an indigenous National Army. There seems to be nothing in sight at the present moment which offers the basic political (to say nothing of military) advantages equal to those to be derived from the creation of a national army in Indochina, even though the constitution of a considerable force will not be fully realized in the near future. This is a project fully in line with the March 8 accords and one on which there is basic agreement within both the French and Vietnamese Governments. Furthermore, there seems to be no other course which would on the one hand provide a basis for French withdrawal of their own forces, which are so badly needed for the defense of the European continent, and on the other serve to give outward and visible expression to Vietnamese nationalist aspirations. The propaganda benefits should be utilized to the utmost and at the earliest possible moment in view of the present stalemate. Lastly, the major decision should be made and announced before the expected autumn offensive of the Vietminh.
[Page 876]I do, however, believe that we cannot approach the French along the lines suggested in the Department’s telegram until we are in a position to give them a definite answer as to how much, if any, U.S. financial assistance in forming such an army will be available. As the Department indicated, the French request for such aid is an obvious corollary to such an approach. Pleven has personally begged me more than once for an early reply so that he and Moch can proceed with planning. Conversations with them in the absence of a more definitive reply than that the matter is under “active consideration” would be pointless at a time when we should strike hard and fast, whatever we do.
It occurs to me that the meetings in New York should offer a more logical opportunity to introduce the ideas outlined in the Department’s telegram since the Department would presumably be in a position to give to the French some definite indication of its reaction to the French request for aid. Since the time element is of importance, this would provide the earliest action in this regard.
In this connection, Woodie Wallner is returning on consultation this week. He is familiar with my views and with the Paris end of the Indochina situation, and I think you would find him helpful both in Washington and in New York in discussion of this and other problems relating to Indochina.
I am sending a copy of this letter to George Perkins.
With all good wishes and warm regards,
Sincerely yours,