Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

611.97/2–450

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)¹

secret

[Kuala Lumpur,] February 6, 1950.

Notes on Conference at Commissioner General’s at Bukit Serene, Johore Bahru—5:00 and Dinner, February 6, 1950

Mr. Langdon,² Mr. Gibson³ and I drove out to Sir Malcolm Mac-Donald’s⁴ house at Bukit Serene. The attached list⁵ of British officials were also there. We sat around on the veranda where McD has periodic conferences with representatives of the various groups in Malaya. After tea, McD began the conversation with a general survey of the problems of the area as they see them. It seemed to me there was a great deal of concentration upon Malaya as the focal point, all of the analysis of the other countries ending up with its bearing on the possibility of the British holding out in Malaya. As indicated by the British reports which we had already seen, McD stressed their view that Indochina was the key area in so far as the communist movements are concerned. He described its strategic position in regard to the other countries in the usual way. He spoke of the favorable impression which he had received during his visit.⁶ He then went on to analyze the problem confronting the French and the possibility of their withdrawal along the lines of the British Defense Co-ordination Committee, Far East Joint Intelligence Committee, Far East Forecast of Possible Military and Political Activities of the Chinese Communists in South East Asia, 1950–1952 of November 10, 1949.⁷ He mentioned the contacts which they had established with the French. (We had already learned that a British officer serving with the French in Indochina had just been brought back wounded in an ambush and that some French officers are serving with the British here.) He suggested that the British might be able to help the French with some small arms and that perhaps the US could help with transportation equipment. The second area of greatest danger is Burma. At the Commonwealth Conference⁸ they had reached agreement on Commonwealth financial assistance to Burma and the response had been very gratifying. Australia, Pakistan and India had agreed to chip in. New Zealand had subsequently found it impossible to do so. Their latest reports indicated that the Burmese might be willing to accept the financial aid but only if there were absolutely no strings attached to it. McD painted a rather gloomy picture based largely on the unwillingness of the Burmese to accept any advice or assistance. He thought that it was essential that someone should persuade Thakin Nu⁹ to mediate the troubles with the Karens. However, they seemed to feel there was no particular need for restoring peace and kept putting off mediation in the expectation that they would soon win a great military victory and then be able to arrange the terms as victors. They were already committed to the principle of autonomy for the Karens and agreement should not be too difficult if the parties could be brought together. He was inclined to believe they were reaching a point to which the UK would really have to step in and take a very firm line on this point. If these troubles were not settled there would be increasingly acute failure of rice production and the economic condition created would make Burma fall easily to the communists. Mr. Benham and Mr. Sterndale-Bennett¹⁰ interposed to explain that, while some rice had been coming out because it was not involved in the civil war area, the saw mills were closed, timber was not moving and there was the barest trickle of petroleum products coming out. In regard to Siam, McD did not take quite so gloomy a view but felt that if Indochina or Burma fell to the communists, it would be very easy for them to sweep over the Thais who were most unlikely to resist. At the present time, the Prime Minister¹¹ has been showing more courage and determination. The report in the newspaper to the effect that they might close the Russian Embassy in Bangkok, while not confirmed, was in line with his new policy. This is an action which the British had been suggesting to the Siamese Government for quite a while. McD did not have much to say about Indonesia commenting merely on their economic difficulties which require considerable outside assistance. Coming back to Malaya, McD pointed to their vulnerability in case Indochina and Siam fell but said that both politically and militarily they believed they could hold even under those circumstances. However, their difficulties would be enormously increased if their present cooperation with the Siamese police on the border were terminated and agents were freely smuggled across from Indochina.

Rounding out the whole picture, McD suggested the necessity of UK and US laying down a line which we would be prepared to hold. His general thinking was the line along the southern Chinese frontier, but he was not very specific as to how far they would be prepared to go to hold that line and admitted the danger of making a broad declaration if we were not prepared to back it up.

I asked him whether their thinking was really confined to SE Asia or whether they would agree that one should broaden out the area for purposes of planning to include the possibility of the over-running of southern Korea, the actual situation in China, the difficulties in the Philippines, and the situation in India and Pakistan.¹² I also asked whether he did not think that much more extensive and efficient cooperation could be established between our two governments and with the French. I mentioned that while there had been various examples of cooperation, e.g., in Singapore,¹³ on the whole our governments had not considered the situation apparently serious enough to warrant the kind of close coordination which existed in war time. In regard to the extent of the area, McD agreed but he and his associates shied away from any real consideration of the Chinese question. He remarked that it would be foolish to bank on the development of Titoism and that we must be prepared to face a communist China for many years. When I called his attention to the fact that he had discussed only economic, political and military methods and had not mentioned the whole field of propaganda in which the communists were so successful, he agreed and thought that our present line about the Soviet encroachments in Manchuria, etc.,¹⁴ was particularly useful. So far as India is concerned, he feels convinced that Nehru¹⁵ is wholly on our side and that if real trouble came would join us much more rapidly than many people expected. He said that it was not at all clear what would happen if Nehru were out of the picture.

In regard to further cooperation between the governments, he enthusiastically agreed and suggested there might be a beginning with a joint conference of British and Americans perhaps in Singapore or perhaps elsewhere. He suggested that it need not be at any very high level but that some sort of joint meeting for exchange of information and planning would be very useful. Mr. Langdon suggested that especially if we also included the French in such a conference but even if we did not, there was great danger that the Asian states would feel that the Western powers were ganging up on them. He inquired if it would not be better to have a meeting to which the Asian states would also be invited. McD admitted that this was a danger which would have to be met and suggested that it would certainly be better to limit the meeting to the UK and US since the inclusion of France and The Netherlands would have bad repercussions. He thought that carefully planned advance statements as to the nature and extent of the conference would not arouse Asian susceptibilities. He did not commit himself on the desirability of a meeting with the Asian states.

On the economic side, Mr. Benham gave a very clear exposition of the rubber problem as it involves the relation between raw rubber and synthetic, and stressed the usual point that unless the price of rubber were sustained at a reasonable figure in free competition with synthetic rubber it would have a devastating effect on the economy of Malaya. McD stressed the grave danger which would arise if the communists controlled the rice producing areas and tried to put on economic pressure by controlling rice exports. In this connection they have been studying the question of drawing on American rice. He has taken up with London for discussion with Washington reports that American rice producers are planning to shift into other products. He talked also about the desirability of trade relations with SCAP and said that this also had been taken up with London for discussion via Washington. He had not raised these issues when he met the West group¹⁶ since it was too large and social a gathering at which he met them.

McD suggested that it might be very useful if the US would appoint some single official such as a High Commissioner to deal with the area as a whole. He mentioned this as well as the proposed UK–US conference as a means of giving assurance to the Asian states that the UK and US were prepared to back them up. He emphasized several times the absolute necessity in this area of showing strength. He believes that this is the only way in which the Siamese particularly but also the other SE Asian states can be stimulated to resist communism. Discussing the question of the Chinese communists in all of these countries he described the very strong measures they are taking in Malaya to restrict communist activities. For example, in connection with the sale of Chinese victory bonds they issued an announcement that their purchase was illegal and violators would be prosecuted. He said this was an immense relief to the local Chinese who could point to this as an excuse for not buying. The regulations invoked for this purpose are those having to do with foreign exchange but under questioning they admitted they could probably do nothing to stop local sales if the proceeds were kept in Singapore to finance CCP activities in Malaya. I asked about their views on the recognition of the Peking Govt¹⁷ and he admitted that in terms of the effects in SEA they had underestimated the difficulties. They are obviously looking forward with a good deal of apprehension to the establishment of communist consular officers in Malaya and elsewhere. McD indicated that they expected to stall off these arrangements for some time and even indicated he hoped it might be postponed indefinitely. He agreed that in many of the countries it was a great problem to reach these Chinese and persuade them but it was less difficult in Malaya since so many of them had been here for generations and did not have such close family ties with China. Again he emphasized his view that the thing that mattered was a showing of strength on the part of the Western powers. If the Chinese were sure that these various countries would be held and would not fall into the hands of the communists, they would cooperate. Their present attitude of wavering or of conversion to the communist cause is based principally on their fear that the UK and the US will not stand firm.

In a discussion of the situation in Malaya itself, McD began by stating rather broadly that their policy was approved by the Malayans who felt that they were moving along satisfactorily. I told him that from my conversation with Dato Onn¹⁸ I felt that he did not take this position and McD agreed and somewhat modified his statements. He stated with vigor that they were way behind on what they should be doing in education and agreed that they had not yet moved nearly far or fast enough in training local administrators who could take over when the time came. In regard to the time of a turn over McD spoke rather generally in alternatives of 5, 10, 15 or 20 years. He of course pointed to the special problem created here by the mixture of the racial communities.

At dinner there were 26 people (see attached list)¹⁹ present including the high British officials, the Regent of Johore, Dato Onn and a scattering of representative Chinese and Indians, and the Commissioners of Australia, India and Ceylon.

At dinner I asked McD about his talks with Pearson²⁰ on the Kashmir question.²¹ He said that Pearson had been impressed with the strength of the Pakistan case which he had not previously appreciated probably because he had heard more from the Indian side. Pearson does not believe that the McNaughton Plan or any other such suggestion will bring about a solution. He thinks the only possible solution would be through a personal meeting of Nehru and Liaquat Ali Kahn.²² I understood that no particular effort had been made to bring about such a meeting. McD himself was unable to comment on the nature of the personal relations between the two men.

After dinner McD announced that we would have a general discussion around the table during which anyone could ask me questions or I might ask questions in return. Since the questions did not come forward readily, I asked a question which I had put to McD during dinner with an inquiry whether it would embarrass him for me to raise the point. I said that in making statements against imperialism in some other countries I had been asked by the press whether I considered British action in Malaya today as an example of imperialism, and I said “No.” I inquired whether every one around the table would agree that I was correct in this answer. Although McD had told me privately and had told the group that the discussion was to be utterly frank and that no one should mind having his toes stepped on, he seemed a little apprehensive as this discussion opened and the faces of the Governor and the British military chiefs were interesting. Dato Onn took the lead in opening the discussion saying that he did not consider that the situation here was satisfactory. He went back and reviewed the history of British acquisition of Malaya and their policy of importing cheap Chinese and Indian labor. He argued that if they had brought in instead Indonesians they would have created a homogeneous population. On this point, Adm. Sir Patrick Brind²³ undertook to argue with him in a restrained way but Dato Onn with some bitterness argued that the whole British policy had been inspired by their desire to exploit the natural resources for their own advantage. One of the Indians from Singapore asked me rather belligerently whether there was any difference between capitalism and imperialism to which I replied that there was a very considerable difference since capitalism includes a completely domestic system of economic activity not involving necessarily any international aspects in the sense of control of other countries. The Ceylon Commissioner²⁴ spoke rather strongly about the history of his country and the changes brought about by independence. His main point was that under British rule they had been forced to give up rice production in favor of rubber and had thus become dependent on imports of food. This was one of the first things to which the independent government addressed itself. He nevertheless expressed their gratitude to the UK which they said was evidenced by their electing to stay in the Commonwealth. Later in the discussion when the UK was being attacked, he interposed in their defense. K. C. Lee²⁵ joined in the discussion by asking me about Russian action in Manchuria. Two or three other Chinese participated in the discussion, generally in terms of support of the British against the position of Dato Onn. When one of these Chinese had made a statement, Dato Onn burst out with the exclamation, “That is utter rot.” He and the Chinese after dinner were having it out rather strenuously with the Chinese trying to explain away his statements. The same Indian mentioned above said he wanted to put to me the point-blank question whether the US was going to help SE Asia and what help it was going to give. This led Gen. Harding²⁶ to say aside to Mr. Langdon that, if that was the attitude, he was going to pull out all of the British troops tomorrow. In reply to this question I spoke of the general problem of the emergence of independent states not only in this area but elsewhere in the world pointing it up with a description of the problems arising in the UN discussion of the disposal of the Italian Colonies.²⁷ I attempted to soften the attacks on the British as they apparently did not wish to join in the argument but attempted to avoid getting into the position of defending their cause against the Malayan viewpoint.

During dinner at which I was sitting between McD and Dato Onn, I had a considerable discussion with the Dato on various development programs particularly in agriculture. I mentioned the examples of the improvement of the sweet potato in our JCRR work in China and the successful introduction of hybrid corn in Mexico. He apparently had not been familiar with this type of development and drew McD into the discussion to ask whether more of that agricultural experimentation could not be done in Malaya. McD also did not seem to be familiar with this type of idea but agreed it should be done. Dato Onn suggested that experiments should be carried on with the use of tapioca which he felt could be introduced more widely as a rice substitute. He felt that in spite of the difficulties, it should be possible to train the tastes of the people in terms of a broadening of the diet. He asked whether there were any methods which had been tried for this purpose, and I mentioned feeding programs in schools and state institutions as possibilities. I also asked Dato Onn whether he thought birth control offered any solution of the population problem. He said that the Mohammedan religious objection to it was very strong. At my request he inquired of one of the Indians down the table what the Hindu reaction was. The Indian reply was that they had no religious objection to it. Dato Onn pointed out that Malaya is underpopulated but in general even aside from the religious question doubted whether such a program could be carried out.

Philip C. Jessup

1. From December 15, 1949, to March 15, 1950, Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup conducted a 14 nation fact-finding tour of the Far East. For Ambassador Jessup’s oral report to the Secretary of State and other officials of the Department, March 23, see p. 68. The Jessup party was in Malaya from February 4 to February 7.
2. William R. Langdon, Consul General at Singapore.
3. William M. Gibson, Special Assistant to Ambassador Jessup during the trip. Gibson, Consul at Hanoi until January 1, 1950, was assigned to the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs at the conclusion of the mission.
4. Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia.
5. Not printed.
6. Sir Malcolm MacDonald had visited Indochina in November 1949, conferring with French and Vietnamese officials.
7. Not found in Department of State files.
8. Reference is to the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the British Commonwealth of Nations, at Colombo, Ceylon, January 9–14, 1950. Documentation on the Conference is in Department of State file 741.022.
9. Prime Minister of Burma.
10. Economic Adviser to the Commissioner General and Deputy Commissioner General for Foreign Affairs, respectively.
11. Field Marshal Pibulsonggram.
12. Documentation is scheduled for publication in volume v .
13. Consul General Langdon regularly attended meetings of the British Defence Coordinating Committee, Far East, and reported to Washington on the proceedings.
14. For information on this subject, see pp. 256 ff.
15. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India.
16. Reference is to the mission headed by Robert W. West, Deputy to the Under Secretary of the Army, and Stanley Andrews, Director of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture. The mission visited the Far East in February and March 1950 to investigate the possibility of Japanese participation in the economic development of Southeast Asia.
17. The United Kingdom recognized the People’s Republic of China on January 6, 1950. For documentation on the United States position on the recognition question, see pp. 256 ff.
18. The memorandum of Jessup’s conversation with Dato Onn bin Ja’afar, Secretary General of the United Malays National Organization, February 5, is not printed (611.97/2–450).
19. Not printed.
20. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.
21. Documentation on the Kashmir question is scheduled for publication in volume v .
22. Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Pakistan.
23. Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Station, British Royal Navy.
24. Mr. M. Saravamuttu.
25. Presumably Lee Kong Chian, a leading Chinese merchant in Singapore and head of the Lee Rubber Company.
26. General Sir John Harding, Commander in Chief, Far East Land Forces.
27. Documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in volume v .