890.00TA/2–1750: Telegram

The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State

secret

160. For Merchant from Butterworth. View imminent departure Griffin mission1 and indications in Department 95 of February 10, [Page 739] noon2 that firm decision may be in process of being taken re military and other aid to Indochina, I thought you might like to have my impressions from conference discussions3 and talks with Thailand Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during which Stanton, Jessup and I pressed hard for recognition.

It is transparently clear that Asiatic neighbors of Indochina consider Bao Dai a French creation and a French puppet; despite current and anticipated actions of support by US and western powers they prepared sell his regime short, if status Bao Dai remains undrastically modified; even if such changes made promptly, he must exert effective leadership comparable to Ho’s.

We should realize that ECA and military aid from US, just as recognition by US, do not constitute “missing components”. While absence of ECA and military aid, just as lack recognition, would prove disadvantageous, under present circumstances they are not of primary importance and will not constitute decisive factors. Conference found Gullion’s analogy with Greece far from persuasive and, in fact, dangerous delusion.4

“Missing component” is further action by French which would place Vietnam in category of independent states.

Accordingly, Griffin mission should receive very precise and careful instructions prior to departure and it would be my recommendation that no ECA or military aid be committed to French Indochina unless France gives requisite public undertakings re further steps leading to status similar to Indonesia. Current French intentions seem epitomized by Parodi’s statement to Gullion (intel February 7, 7 a. m.)5 that “French Parliament could not be told Indochina accord ratified February 2 of only passing value and it would do more harm than good kindle unrealistic appetites in Vietnam which would necessarily be disappointed.” Question, therefore, is what are the realistic nationalist appetites which will not be disappointed. [Butterworth.]

Stanton
  1. On February 23, the Department of State announced that it was dispatching a special mission to study the requirements of Southeast Asia with respect to possible United States technical assistance. The mission was headed by R. Allen Griffin, newspaper publisher and former special assistant on the China Aid Mission of the Economic Cooperation Administration, 1948–1949. The Griffin Mission visited Indochina from March 6 to March 16. For documentation on the mission, see pp. 1 ff.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Reference is to the Bangkok regional conference (see footnote 3, p. 698, January 20), which was attended by Assistant Secretary Butterworth.
  4. The views presented by Chargé Gullion at the Bangkok Conference were presumably similar to those contained in the analysis of the Indochina situation transmitted in telegram 334 from Saigon, May 6, p. 802.
  5. Not printed, but see telegram 585 from Paris, February 6, p. 721.