Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

FMACC Files: Lot 54D5¹

Country Report Prepared in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs for the Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (Bruce)²

secret

[Washington, undated.]

Military Assistance Program for Indochina for Fiscal Year 1951

A. U.S. political and economic objectives in Indochina.

The principal U.S. political objective toward Indochina is to insure the existence of governments in the three newly formed states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia which represent the legitimate nationalist aspirations of those Indochinese people who do not desire to see Communist-oriented governments in Indochina.

The U.S. has made strong representation to the French Government to extend liberal terms to the three newly formed states to indicate not only to the Indochinese people but to the neighboring Asian countries and to the world that France is the friend and supporter of legitimate nationalism and recognizes that the era of prewar colonialism is ended. At the same time, the U.S. recognizes that the inherent weakness within the new states does not permit, for reasons both of external and internal security, that French military forces could be withdrawn from Indochina at the present time.

U.S. economic objectives in Indochina are directed toward the support of a program of aid and technical advice which will permit the three newly formed states to establish economic stability and to thereby lessen the danger of communism in the area. At the same time, economic stability in Indochina will assist in the rehabilitation of metropolitan France and therefore contribute directly toward a lessening of U.S. aid to metropolitan France.

1. Both the political and economic objectives in Indochina are extremely important to not only the U.S. position of lessening Communist expansion but urgently necessary towards that end.

2. Special problems of internal security.

a. A political solution is required since it has been demonstrated during five years of French military effort that a military solution alone cannot succeed. The political effort must, however, be backed up by a continuing police-type military action which will enable non-communist oriented governments to maintain themselves in power. Economic problems of rehabilitation must be dealt with concurrently in order to wean away from communist leanings the peoples of Indochina.

b. The Governments of the three new states are willing to work toward the solution outlined in “a.” above, but without outside support are unable, due to lack of trained administrative personnel, lack of experience and lack of military strength, to withstand communist aggression, backed up by Chinese Communist or by Soviet assistance.

3. The special problems of maintaining external security rests strongly on the Army of the French Union which has the responsibility in time of emergency or war of maintaining the area against external aggression.

a. Since the Army of the French Union now in Indochina, which includes upwards of 50,000 Indochinese, has been unable during the past five years to effectively stabilize the area against internal communist guerrillas under the direction of Ho Chi Minh, it is obvious that the same forces are unable to protect Indochina from either an invasion by mass of Chinese communist armies or by an increased indigenous communist army which is supplied from outside sources. The solution, therefore, to protect Indochina from either of these threats must rest with military and economic aid from the non-communist oriented countries of the world.

b. The Governments of the three new states appear to be willing to contribute toward non-communist defense of the area but are unable to contribute more, in a general way, than they now supply.

4. Because of the internal weaknesses of Indochina, none of the three new states is in a position to assist other countries in the area which are friendly to the United States, to maintain security.

B. In order to achieve U.S. political and economic objectives, it is recommended that both military and economic aid be given to the Governments of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, plus assistance to the Army of the French Union, which will remain the responsible agency for defense.

1. Assistance furnished to the armies of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would, it is planned, contribute toward combating communism both within Indochina and against an aggressor. Since the over-all control of military measures would rest with the Army of the French Union, it may be assumed that military aid would be used to achieve U.S. objectives.

2. A military solution would effectively contribute toward appropriate political and economic solutions although U.S. or foreign military and economic assistance would be played up by the communist propaganda agency as a demonstration that U.S. aid was being used to further French colonialism. Therefore, as much aid as possible should be given directly to each of the three new states in order to overcome this propaganda.

3. The three new states cannot improve their military strength without injury to their economies except that additional manpower (without equipment) could be supplied.

4. On the assumption that the anti-communist efforts will be successful in this area, then security needs from their own resources might be supplied to a certain extent by the three new Governments but would probably continue to require for some time direction by local French authorities and probably small amounts of assistance from France.

C. The general nature and extent of proposed military assistance is now being studied by French and Indochinese military authorities, and will be supplied to the U.S. through channels already established.

1. The nature and purpose of U.S. military assistance to Indochina would be psychological, to establish U.S. abhorrence to further communist expansion in Southeast Asia; political, by strengthening the non-communist governments of the three states; and practicable in that both the political and psychological effects are in full accord with U.S. policy for Southeast Asia.

2. While the extent of assistance is as yet unknown, it is expected that it will be more than token and would include material aid and other assistance available only from U.S. sources.

3. Timing.

a. It is essential that military aid begun in 1950 through the French be continued during fiscal year 1951 in order to continue to contain communist aggression in Southeast Asia which has already begun.

b. If aid were not supplied during fiscal year 1951, it appears that communist aggression would successfully swallow up not only Indochina but threaten the remainder of Southeast Asia.

4. The probable duration of proposed military aid is uncertain because of the unknown factors concerning communist plans for the area. However, it is obvious that the more quickly aid can be given the more quickly the threat can be stopped. The slower the aid is in arriving, the more prolonged the effort must be.

D. 1. U.S. political involvement in Indochinese affairs would be expected to be concerned only with advice to France as well as to the three new states and to continuing efforts to orient the neighboring Asian countries towards a non-communist solution for the area.

2. Economic involvement would depend on the successes of both political effort and military aid but should not be expected at this time to include long-term economic assistance.

3. The consequence of withdrawal of military aid before a planned termination date would allow communist domination of Indochina and Southeast Asia.

E. 1. The recipient Governments will welcome U.S. military aid.

2. Adjacent countries will welcome U.S. military aid if it is combined with French assurances that such aid is supplied and utilized for the purposes of maintaining countries whose Governments represent the legitimate nationalist aspirations of the peoples of Indochina and not to reimpose French colonialism control. U.S. military aid should be expected to have a violent reaction from the USSR and satellite countries. However, there does not appear to be any political Asiatic consolidation of opposition against the recipient countries and to the United States except from Communist China and from North Korea whose positions are already quite clear.

1. Files of the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee and its successor, the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee, 1949–1950. For information on the operations of FMACC, see volume i.
2. This report was one of five studies on Far Eastern countries transmitted by Deputy Assistant Secretary Merchant to MDAP Director Bruce on February 16. For documentation on United States economic land military assistance to the Far East, see pp. 1 ff.