Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

793.00/12–2050

The Chargé in China (Rankin) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

secret
official   informal

Taipei, December 20, 1950.

Dear Merchant: The Department’s telegram 466 of November 27, regarding alleged Nationalist attacks in Wenchow Bay, and our telegrams 711 of November 28 and 805 of December 15 on the same subject,¹ remind me of our exchange of letters a, year ago (mine of December 9, 1949, and yours of January 20)² regarding resistance activities. On rereading my letter I see no reason to modify any of the statements it contains, but it would seem that the time for more aggressive—perhaps even overt—action has now arrived.

The Wenchow Bay operation of November 20 last was evidently a “guerrilla” affair. I doubt that Nationalist planes were involved and any participation by a naval vessel presumably would have been incidental or unintended. As to the planning and leadership of the operation, the Ministry of National Defense here in Taipei may or may not have been directly involved. Their official repudiation of responsibility may well be technically justified. Probably our Departments of State and Defense would deny any knowledge of or responsibility for various guerrilla activities in South China. I wouldn’t know.

The fact is that here in Taipei a committee exists which is supposed to supervise, support and coordinate resistance movements on the Mainland. The Chairman is the Chief of Staff, General Chow Chih-Jou, although in view of his manifold responsibilities it seems doubtful that he could give more than cursory attention to the matter. As a rule, very little is said here about the details of guerrilla activities, and responsible Government officials have expressed to me the opinion that even less should be said. The statement attributed to Major General Lu Wei-hsiang (mytel 805) is therefore rather unusual.³

My impression is that the Chinese Government actually is extending a minimum of support and encouragement to resistance movements on the Mainland. The Wenchow Bay affair seems to have been typical of what little is being done. As you know, the Nationalists hold several small islands along the China Coast, of which the only important one is Chinmen, near Amoy. The others, which include Shang Ta Chen and Hsia Ta Chen, are for the most part lightly held and sparsely populated. They have long been resorts of smugglers, and the same methods are in use today. Small vessels transport arms and supplies from Formosa or the Pescadores to these islands, whence the guerrillas or their representatives transfer them elsewhere in still smaller craft. Tangible aid from Formosa at present seems to be limited almost entirely to the resistance groups having access to these islands.

While Senator H. Alexander Smith was in Hong Kong just over a year ago, he interviewed a number of persons in my office. Also, he and Mrs. Smith stayed at our house during part of their visit, so I saw a good deal of him. Before leaving, the Senator asked my views as to what should be done in the Far East. I protested that I had been in Hong Kong only a few weeks, but Ventured to sum up the consensus of informed opinion, among those whom he had interviewed, somewhat as follows:

1. The United States should draw a line against further Communist expansion in Asia. This did not mean that we should announce and define such demarcation, with the effect of inviting the Communists to undertake aggression against states which were excluded and at the same time daring aggressors to step over the line. It did mean that we should persuade all concerned that any further aggression would be highly dangerous to the perpetrators. Meanwhile, the United States should make secret but substantial preparations to extend military assistance, including direct armed support if necessary, at such points and under such circumstances as would be most effective.

2. Our informational program in the Far Fast should be greatly expanded and intensified. While the Communists have conquered China largely by the psychological warfare in the fullest sense, we have as yet barely scratched the surf ace in this field.

3. A highly qualified group should be set up to study and report on the possibilities of supporting what remains in the way of anti-Communist forces on the China Mainland. A year ago it seemed premature to implement such support on an effective scale, if only because strong influences in the United States favored recognition of the Chinese Communist regime and presumably would have blocked any action which might have interfered with a rapprochement. But it was obvious that we ought to be ready if and when the time should come.

It seems clear to me that the time is now. Surely no responsible Americans can retain illusions about the Chinese Communists who are killing thousands of our men in a war of wanton aggression. And only a fatuous optimist can fail to appreciate the extreme gravity of the danger which confronts our country. At the time of Pearl Harbor, and subsequently during World War II, I never entertained a doubt but that we should win. This time I am only certain that we can win through if we exploit to the full every method which promises to help our cause. One of these is the effective support of resistance movements inside the Iron Curtain, and particularly in Communist China.

But we cannot expect to show significant results if we embark on a program of this kind with one or both hands tied behind us. No holds are barred in this game. We must make full use of the potential, facilities in Korea, in Japan, in Formosa, in Hong Kong, in the Philippines, in Indo-China, in Thailand, in Burma. These must be coordinated, so that we can take well timed action, as needed, in Manchuria, in Kwangtung, in Yunnan. It probably will be necessary to have a coordinating authority somewhere out here in the Far East. There is the question as to what cooperation can be expected from the British and others, and particularly how the probably unequaled potentialities of Formosa can be utilized. The latter undoubtedly can be most fruitful in obtaining intelligence, in supplying operatives for the Mainland, and in flying arms, supplies, leaflets, etc., to guerrilla bases in connection with “routine reconnaissance.” One of the notable weaknesses of present guerrilla operations in China is the virtual absence of supply centers, with the minor exception of the few islands already mentioned.

Finally, if we are to exploit this program fully, we must be prepared to come out in the open at least to the same extent as the Communists. Clandestine operations are all very well, but they are necessarily restricted in size and therefore in effectiveness. By all means, let us operate secretly as far as possible, but when occasion requires we must not handicap ourselves. Certainly we cannot afford to overlook the psychological effect of making known our active sympathy with anti-Communist resistance movements. This probably will require a high policy decision, and the sooner the better so that we may be prepared for any eventuality.

I understand that a good deal of preparatory work has been done during the past year along the lines mentioned above. Now is the time to go into action on an effective scale and to show results. Formosa seems to offer the most immediate opportunities, yet there are no evidences of activity here on our part other than for a certain amount of clandestine intelligence work, punctuated with the occasional swish of a cloak and gleam of a dagger. With none-too-obvious American assistance, for example, raids of varying magnitude could be mounted against the South China Coast from Formosa. Properly planned and carried out, such raids could relieve the pressure on Indo-China and perhaps even Korea. Lines of communication could be cut and valuable intelligence obtained, while opportunities would be afforded for selected officers and men from Formosa to join guerrilla groups, bringing with them money, supplies, arms and other equipment.

When Hanson Baldwin⁴ was here the other day he questioned me on the prospects for supporting resistance operations on the Mainland. I replied, in effect, that it seemed to me a most promising field. However, I went on to say that such operations were so foreign to normal American ways and thinking, and our past record in such activities had produced such questionable results, that I doubted whether the United States would implement an effective campaign of this kind in China. In part, my reply was in the interest of discretion, but my doubts are real nevertheless. Unless we do it well, it would better be left undone. We must not expect to succeed unless our hearts are in it.⁵

Best wishes for the holiday season.

Sincerely yours,

K. L. Rankin

1. None printed.
2. Neither printed.
3. Telegram 805 had transmitted the text of a news story from Taipei on a statement by Major General Lu Wei-hsiang, “commander of strong guerilla unit in Eastern China” but presently in Taipei, who gave details of the Wenchow Bay raid in which more than 2,000 Communist troops were allegedly killed (793.00/12–1450).
4. Military editor of the New York Times.

5. Mr. Merchant’s reply, dated January 23, 1951, expressed general agreement with the views expressed by Mr. Rankin. It read in part as follows:

   “I fully agree with you that time is important, and that if efforts are to be made to embarrass the Communist regime, to divert its attention and energies from other fields, and to weaken to it with the maximum effect, early implementation of a well-considered program is required.” (793.00/12–2050)