794A.00/12–1950: Telegram
The Consul General at Hong Kong (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State
1568. Re Depintel December 7, 7 a. m.1 ConGen inclined believe British overemphasized adverse effect on Asian opinion resulting from our refusal turn Formosa over to Chinese Communists and fail to give sufficient weight to effect of such action on Chinese themselves. There is certainly not inconsiderable body Chinese opinion Hong Kong and elsewhere which would be dismayed and disheartened by surrender of Formosa. Regardless of direction in which predominant [Page 605] Asian [leaders?] of opinion may lean on this question we feel effect of any type of appeasement of Chinese opinion including Chinese Communists themselves should be considered of overriding importance. Support by rest of Asia of our objectives in UN is obviously desirable but it is rulers of China who today represent dynamic force in Asia and who have already demonstrated by initial defeat UN troops that they dispose of most powerful army in this part of world with possible exception USSR. To yield under pressure and appease them with Formosa or any other concession would simply further confirm Chinese Communist belief in effectiveness of their present policy, dangerously increase their contempt for our military capability in Far East and greatly strengthen and embolden elements in CCP who advocate intimate alliance with USSR.
Peiping would be encouraged to proceed immediately with further aggressive plans in Southeast Asia. Psycho advantage gained by pro-USSR group and corresponding damage to position of moderates in Peiping regime an anti-Communist China within an outside China would be incalculable particularly enormous unorganized group anti-Communist Chinese who would feel abandoned. Surrender Formosa would only further [convince?] Chinese Communists of value close cooperation USSR and far from weaning them away from Soviets as some have suggested would be more likely strengthen bond.
Asian opinion which holds that Chinese should be placated and refrain further aggressive action if appeased with Formosa and recognition is based we believe on erroneous conception of nature Chinese Communists and their degree commitment to Soviet plan world domination. Do believe so long as Communism gaining ground Asia there is no hope whatsoever that Chinese Communists will be satisfied to sit back and attend own internal problems. Their public pronouncements on coming liberation Asia and leading part to be played by CCP therein should be taken seriously as representing their future program. Not until thus far victorious advance of Communism in Asia can be checked will there be any conceivable hope of convincing Chinese Communists it is not China’s advantage to hitch their wagon to Russian Star. Since Chinese Communists are playing chief role in Communist aggression in Asia today, advance Communism can hardly be checked except by exerting sufficient military, economic and political pressure against Chinese with view either to displace present leaders China or decisively demonstrate to them that fighting Russia’s battles can in long run only bring disaster to CCP and China. If there ever was time when concessions could alter view of Chinese Communist leadership, that time long since past. Mao has packed bit in his teeth.
Sent Department 1568, repeated information Taipei 198.
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Not printed. This telegram summarized the discussions on the Far East during the first two Truman–Attlee meetings. For the minutes, see vol. vii, pp. 1361 and 1392. With regard to Formosa, the telegram stated in part as follows:
“Under no circumstances would we agree to turn over Formosa as condition for settlement [in Korea]. Brit said Asians now thought we were wrong about Formosa and that our proposed position would further alienate them. We replied that we did not think we should pay price for Asian opinion.” (700.00(S)/12–750)
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