Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

IO Files

Minutes of the 40th Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

secret

New York, November 15, 1950—9:15 a. m.

[Here follows a list of the 47 persons present.]

Formosa (US/A/C.1/2266)

Mr. Allison explained that after yesterday’s Delegation meeting, the Staff and Mr. Dulles had discussed further the composition of the proposed Formosan commission. The British had indicated to us their opposition to the inclusion on the commission of either the United States or the United Kingdom on the theory that the whole purpose of this resolution was to lower the temperature in Peiping and to constitute a reassurance to the Chinese Communists. They felt that the inclusion of the big powers might have the opposite effect. We had not agreed to this viewpoint but did not press our view upon the British. We had discussed the matter with the Department, and informed them of the seriousness of the situation, since the British might not serve as co-sponsors of the resolution if the United States were included on the commission, and we had stated the staff view that this was a matter of too great importance for the United States not to be on the commission. Mr. Rusk had discussed the matter at a high level within the Department, and as a result, several definite conclusions had been reached. In the first place, it had been decided that the United States should be a member of the commission. In the second place, it had been decided that the Delegation should endeavor to persuade the British to accept membership on the commission. In the third place, it had been agreed that the inclusion of the Soviet Union on the commission, if this issue were raised, should be opposed on the grounds that it had not been an active participant in the Pacific war and therefore would not have the same interest as the other proposed members of the commission. Sir Oliver Franks, the British ambassador, was being called into the Department this morning, and these views would be communicated to him. Mr. Allison said that Mr. Dulles had also discussed this subject with Mr. Younger¹ last night.

Mr. Dulles said he could not add very much. He had gotten the same impression as that reported by Mr. Allison, namely that the British were afraid that the inclusion of the United States and the United Kingdom would, at the very least, increase the present tension with the Chinese Communists, which they wanted to minimize to the greatest extent possible. They thought that if we both went on the commission it would give credence to the view we desired to be sure of the result of the commission’s work.

Ambassador Austin asked Mr. Allison whether he had talked with the member of the Japanese Parliament who had visited the Mission yesterday. The Ambassador noted that he had expressed great curiosity about Formosa. Mr. Allison replied that he had not seen the Japanese gentleman but observed that the final disposition of Formosa would be in the Japanese peace treaty or by some other international action. It had been assumed that in any peace treaty Japan would renounce all its claims to the island. Ambassador Austin wondered whether the Japanese were building up hopes for eventual return of the island to Japan. Mr. Allison did not believe this feeling was widespread in Japan. When he had been there last summer with Mr. Dulles he had seen no evidence of such sentiment, although the Japanese did entertain hopes with respect to certain other islands.

Senator Lodge asked what the situation would be if no resolution were adopted on Formosa. Mr. Allison explained that the situation would be very much the same as it was now, but the passage of a resolution would give an aura of international sanction to what had been a unilateral act on our part in stationing the Seventh Fleet so as to neutralize Formosa.

Mrs. Roosevelt² wished to know, as a matter of information, what the status of an agreement like the Cairo Declaration was when a government changed in the meantime, as had been the case in China. She wondered whether it rendered such an agreement null and void. Mr. Allison said this was a legal question to which he did not have the answer. However, he could say that our war-time statements were generally considered to be statements of purpose which had to be implemented after the war. In this connection he cited an article in the State Department Bulletin in which Mr. Byrnes had referred to President Roosevelt’s understanding of the situation in approximately these terms. It seemed to Mrs. Roosevelt that the situation had changed entirely when the Chinese Government changed. It would be different if we still had free relations with the new Chinese Government. Until such a time she wondered whether it was appropriate to take the Cairo Declaration into account in a United Nations document.

Mr. Tate,³ speaking of the legal question involved, said that ordinarily agreements were not abrogated by changes of government; certain agreements were even carried through after a war. If conditions changed so that agreements could not be carried out, then there was reason for trying to get a modification of the agreement. In the case of Formosa, we solemnly pledged that Formosa was to go back to China. He thought this pledge still stood.

For Ambassador Austin, the question was whether in this particular resolution we should give color and substance to the Cairo Declaration by a recital of the facts involved therein. After all, the dominating force in Formosa today was Nationalist China. He wondered whether we could not recite that fact in the preamble.

Mr. Dulles returned to the meeting and said he had just talked with Mr. Rusk again on the telephone about the Formosan question. The Department continued to feel strongly that the United States should be a member of the commission. It did not share the British concern as to its bad effect on the Chinese Communists, who would do what they had planned, regardless of events. Their activities so far reflected long-range planning.

Senator Cooper asked to what item on the agenda this resolution would be addressed. Mr. Dulles explained that the agenda item was entitled “The Question of Formosa” and had been submitted by the United States. Senator Lodge asked why the item had been placed on the Assembly’s agenda in the first place. Mr. Dulles explained that it was because we wanted to make the matter of Formosa and its disposition a matter of United Nations treatment like the Italian colonies. Mr. Cohen⁴ suggested that it was not only this desire, but also a recognition of the fact that there had been very considerable resentment in the countries which were our allies at not only our unilateral action but also our overall policy with respect to Formosa. He referred in this connection to a London radio report last Sunday which indicated that nearly the entire British press reaction on Formosa, whether from the Eight or Left, was unfavorable to United States policy. It seemed that we would not escape the problem if nothing at all were done on Formosa.

Mrs. Roosevelt thought that the purpose of the submission of the agenda item was to make Formosa a United Nations question rather than a question where the United States was simply acting upon its own policy. We were, in fact, getting international approval of our good faith in acting unilaterally in the first instance. Mr. Dulles agreed that the main purpose was to make Formosa a matter for action by the United Nations. He went on to point out that the United States was in an extremely difficult dilemma in Asia. On the one hand, we had to assert our resources with strength in certain areas. When we did that we were accused of resuming imperialistic policies in Asia. We had to take what precautions we could to reassure the peoples of Asia that our power was not being asserted purely from the national viewpoint, but that it was in the interest of the United Nations and of international peace and security in that part of the world for the United States to pursue its present policies. On the other hand, in order to avoid suspicion in this area and to be able to accomplish what the military felt was necessary in the area with a minimum of repercussions, submission of the item to the United Nations seemed to be the best course of action. Mr. Dulles still thought it was the wise thing to do, although he admitted that this course was fraught with difficulties and uncertainties.

Ambassador Austin raised certain questions respecting the text of the resolution. He did not feel that the text set up the issue as it really existed. It did not reveal clearly the claims of the Nationalists, and in his opinion, it seemed to be slanted toward turning over Formosa to Communist China, He did not believe that was the purpose of the resolution, however. Mr. Allison commented that the purpose of the resolution was to find language which would not slant the resolution in any direction. It was intended to be objective. The purpose of the resolution was to postpone decision on the substantive aspects of the question until a report and recommendations were received from the proposed commission.

Ambassador Gross felt compelled to disagree with Ambassador Austin’s comment that the resolution was slanted. He regarded the text as well balanced. He knew from what Ambassador Tsiang had told him that he felt Formosa should not be raised as an issue at all. The question how and when Formosa should be restored to China was a very difficult one. Both Chinese Governments would like to see something in any resolution referring to the Cairo Declaration and its statement as to the ultimate disposition of Formosa. These viewpoints could not be taken into account without mention of the Cairo Declaration. The second paragraph of the preamble simply showed the nature of the dispute between the parties.

Ambassador Austin asked whether there would be any objection to the insertion in the appropriate preambular paragraph of a phrase stating that the Nationalist Chinese now occupied and administered the island of Formosa. Ambassador Gross said he would not object to it. However, he thought the Nationalists might, since the phraseology would imply that they did not have sovereign rights in Formosa, and he believed that probably this phrase would create more difficulties than the present language. Mr. Allison commented that its inclusion would ensure that we would have no co-sponsors for our resolution.

Mr. Ross⁵ was somewhat concerned by the first paragraph referring to the Cairo Declaration. He thought this set the problem in historical rather than legal terms. The average man in the street might well interpret this paragraph as slanting the resolution toward the restoration of Formosa to Communist China. That paragraph, in his opinion, would make it necessary to explain why we were not doing just that. It was perfectly clear that both Chinese Governments felt Formosa should be a part of China. He believed the interests of China must be conceived under present circumstances as being the long-run interests of the people of China. He was also troubled by the second paragraph which seemed rather negative. The fourth paragraph made the first reference to the future of Formosa. He questioned whether we ought not to try to turn the resolution around and state our objective first—the interests of China and the people of Formosa. Mr. Ross referred to Mr. Dulles’s analogy between Formosa and the disposition of the Italian colonies. He thought there was a real difference in this case, however, since the General Assembly had a greater sense of the emergency of the situation. The Assembly might feel that the establishment of the proposed commission was not altogether satisfactory. The fifth paragraph he found rather namby pamby. It was only a recommendation that there should be no armed attack. There was no reference to any sanctions. He thought the resolution might at least authorize the commission to report to the Security Council or the General Assembly any information as to the threat of such an armed attack.

Mr. Allison said that in general he would like to agree with Mr. Ross, but he did not think, as a matter of practical politics, the changes which he suggested could be made. As regards the suggested reference to the Security Council, the Department had originally suggested a provision to this effect. That provision had been objected to by everybody outside our own Delegation. Mr. Allison emphasized that one of the chief purposes of this resolution was to meet very different points of view among various governments, to reduce the possibility of public friction between the United States and its chief allies, and to delay any final settlement for the present in the hope that as time went on, and the motives of the Chinese Communists became more clear, our friends would take on more and more our own attitude with respect to this situation. He agreed that the draft resolution was far from perfect, but we could not maintain our purposes and the support of our friends with any other draft.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that the basic reason for this text was to take the sting out of our present position in Korea so that its effect would not be so bad on the peoples of Asia. If that was not a legitimate objective, we could take Formosa today and do what we wanted with it. That was not considered to be sound tactics. He was fully in agreement with that policy. We could not have it both ways. We could not say it was bad for us to take Formosa by force and then believe that we could get the benefit of United Nations coverage without taking into account the feelings of other members of the United Nations, whose views had to be taken into account. Our desired result would flow from this resolution, he felt sure, but we had to proceed gradually. If we wrote a resolution setting forth our ticket in detail, it would prejudge the case, and we would immediately run into great difficulties. That was the reason why he did not think it wise to write these purposes into the original text. With proper handling in the commission, the United States views and intentions, which were eminently reasonable, would receive the support of other countries. We would destroy our influence and chances for support in the United Nations, however, unless we went to other countries on this problem and stated frankly that it required consideration, that we had no detailed program, but that we wanted them to consider it, along with us, with open minds. Otherwise, we would get nowhere.

Ambassador Jessup thought we should take account of the fact that Formosa had been put on the agenda by the United States. It had been our experience in the Assembly that if we retained the initiative in guiding the discussion, we were more likely to direct a solution along lines appealing to us than if we left the matter to the initiative of others. If we failed to submit this resolution, he believed we risked the adoption of a much less favorable resolution—even, for example, a resolution suggesting that Formosa be turned over to the Communists. He added that in the general Far Eastern situation, time was working on our side. The British position moved constantly toward our position. The policies of the Chinese Communists were bringing this about more and more. If we got a commission established, thereby buying time, he believed we would find that, before the commission reported, very much of the present opposition to our policies would be dissipated, and we would gather strength in the commission for our point of view. He also thought we needed a text which would attract co-sponsors. This text was the result of such negotiations, he understood. Mr. Dulles noted that we had consulted only with the British.

Senator Sparkman did not find any difficulty in the major portion of the resolution, but his first reaction was that the first paragraph started us off on the wrong tack. We announced there something which people would generally construe as the belief that Formosa would have to be turned over to Communist China. He thought it would be better to re-write the preamble without any implication that Formosa was to go to the Chinese Communists. He knew this was not intended, but we were playing with a very dangerous situation as the first paragraph was now drafted. Mr. Allison thought the third paragraph threw the question wide open. The first paragraph simply noted the past statements on Formosa; the second dealt with the present situation; while the third paragraph opened up the question which the commission was to consider.

Senator Sparkman said that he received many letters saying that the Administration was simply waiting for the elections to be over to allow Communist China to come into the United Nations. According to these correspondents, a second thing we were waiting to do was to turn Formosa over to Communist China; the third was to recall General MacArthur. It seemed to him that the general public would think we were moving on the second phase right now if this resolution were submitted. Mr. Allison felt that if there were any inference at all in the first paragraph, it would be that Formosa would go back to the Republic of China, which was the Chinese Government which the United States recognized. Senator Sparkman pointed out that the other co-sponsors would take a different position. He still did not believe this language reflected accurately our position on China.

In answer to a question from Ambassador Austin, Mr. Dulles indicated that the phrase, “Republic of China,” was the historical term used in the Charter to apply to the Nationalist Chinese Government. In this connection he referred to Mr. Vishinsky’s proposal, in connection with the Syrian-Iraqi resolution adopted with the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, to change the phrase, “Republic of China,” to “People’s Republic of China.”⁶ He thought there was no misunderstanding as to the government to which this term applied.

Senator Lodge understood the dilemma in the Far East. On the one hand, we were trying to prevent ourselves from being overrun and, on the other, not to subject ourselves to charges of imperialism. He referred to the fact that last January he had publicly expressed his opposition to the suggestion made by Senator Taft and former President Hoover that the United States should take over Formosa for the very reasons which Mr. Dulles had mentioned. There was nothing further from his mind in the present case than that the United States should write its own ticket. However, he did not believe we should have a resolution for the sake of getting co-sponsors which at the same time would frighten away the American public, since, after all, in this government, public opinion was of primary importance. He believed the first paragraph made the resolution entirely unacceptable to the American public, and he would have to withhold his approval from the resolution for that reason.

Senator Cooper referred to his remarks at the previous meeting on the lack of emphasis in the resolution respecting the interests of the Formosan people. The text of the preamble, in his opinion, seemed to imply that when the dispute between the two contending governments was decided, Formosa would be turned over to either the Nationalists or the Communists. He wondered whether there might not be grounds for a new decision, either upon the basis of our security, or the interests of the people of Formosa which had not been considered. He referred to the President’s statement at the time the Seventh Fleet had been stationed in Formosa, when our position had been tied fully to the Korean war. We were now extending that declaration of the President to provide for the complete alienation of Formosa from China. He wondered whether that might not ‘increase the embarrassment of our position since our Allies had appreciated the original security reasons behind our position in Formosa.

Mr. Dulles referred to the various remarks expressing concern at the reference to the Cairo Declaration in the resolution. The Nationalist Chinese had made the most insistent and urgent plea that we keep as close as we could to the Cairo Declaration. Otherwise, they contended, this resolution would be fatal to the interests of the Nationalists. The Delegation certainly would wish to pay attention to the Nationalists’ views since they had indicated that they could not cooperate with us unless the resolution took the Cairo Declaration as its starting point. Their position was that the Cairo Declaration stood, and that final action on the disposition of Formosa was simply being deferred. It was important to maintain good relations with the Nationalists. If the reference to the Cairo Declaration were dropped, we would immediately antagonize them. As regards the independence of the people, the present language was inserted in an effort to meet the same concern that we were not giving the whole problem a new deal and were not implying that an independent state of Formosa should be created, to be alienated permanently from China. Mr. Dulles said that if there were a choice today, he would feel an independent trusteeship for Formosa was the best solution, but at this stage we could not commit ourselves definitely to that solution. He thought that this resolution would be interpreted in some quarters as an attempt to restore Formosa to the Communist Chinese. Any resolution not susceptible of that interpretation would be a resolution bad from the standpoint of the Nationalists and the co-sponsors. The resolution, in its present form, was written just as much to meet the Nationalists’ views as anything else, and in that respect, the Nationalists and the Communists alike desired reference to the Cairo Declaration. We had experienced great difficulties with the Nationalists on this point. Mr. Dulles recalled that the British resolution had started out with the statement that whereas the population of Formosa was predominantly Chinese, and whereas Formosa was traditionally Chinese territory, etc., which language would be even more difficult. We were steering an extremely difficult course in this case. If we should decide to submit our own resolution without seeking co-sponsorship, he then believed we would wish to re-phrase this resolution to some extent. However, if the Delegation agreed it was desirable to have co-sponsorship, he thought it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make any appreciable changes in the present text.

Mr. McKeever⁷ wondered whether Senator Sparkman’s points might not be met by reversing the order of the first two paragraphs. Mr. Tate said that he had intended to make a suggestion along the same line. The first paragraph might then contain a recognition that the two parties claimed the right to administer Formosa as a result of the Cairo Declaration. The second paragraph could refer to the threat of an armed attack; this would set the problem first in terms of the present conflict and second, the threat to the peace.

Ambassador Austin said it was apparent to him that there was strong disagreement within the Delegation, both with respect to the general policy and the text of the draft resolution. All seemed to agree that the resolution was slanted. The Ambassador reviewed the various disagreements which had arisen in the Delegation and inquired whether in this situation it was not wise for the Delegation to request reconsideration of the text of the draft resolution.

Mr. Dulles admitted that our position was very difficult. Formosa was simply one part of our whole policy on the Far East. In his opinion, it was hardly fair to ask the Assembly Delegation to deal with Formosa as a separate matter. He suggested it might be better to report back to the Department the different views expressed in the course of the meeting and let the Department decide whether to treat this subject as a matter which under the law could be one on which the Delegation would be instructed as to how to proceed. It was his guess that the Department would feel, because of the interdependence of this matter with other issues, that it was hardly fair to the Delegation to act independently on this. He personally shared many of the views and concerns expressed by other Delegates and agreed they should be taken into account if this subject were to be dealt with as a matter which was not interlocked with other matters in the Far East. He thought it was best to inform the Department of the Delegation views, to see to what extent these views could be taken into account and then to remove rsponsibility from the Delegation, if the Government itself, desired to introduce such a resolution.

Ambassador Austin said he had always found the Department very considerate of the Delegation’s views. We could ask the Department for its opinion on reconsidering the text of the resolution, or at least re-writing the first paragraph, and inform it of the basis for this request. If the Department still desired to put forward a resolution, the Delegation could make clear its view that from the standpoint of public opinion, nothing should be included which would give an erroneous impression that the resolution was slanted in a certain direction.

There was no objection to the suggestion that the matter be submitted to the Department in this way, with a request for as early an answer as possible. Mr. Dulles observed that the matter might arise in the Committee this afternoon.

1. Kenneth Younger, Minister of State, was a British Representative to the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
2. Mrs. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a United States Representative to the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
3. Jack B. Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, was Legal Adviser to the United States Delegation.
4. Benjamin V. Cohen was an Alternate United States. Representative to the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
5. John C. Ross, Deputy United States Representative in the U.N. Security Council, was also an Alternate United States Representative to the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
6. For documentation relating to the Uniting for Peace Resolution, see vol. ii, pp. 303 ff.
7. Porter McKeever, Public Information Officer, United States Mission at the United Nations, was Information Officer of the United States Delegation.