Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

IO Files

Minutes of the 39th Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

secret

New York, November 14, 1950—9:15 a. m.

[Here follows a list of the 48 persons present.]

Formosa (US/A/C.1/2266).¹

Mr. Allison stated that Formosa constituted one of the most controversial problems, not only in our own country, but also among our friends in the United Nations. The easiest way to illustrate this controversy was to indicate that of the nations most concerned with the Pacific war—the thirteen states on the Far Eastern Commission—six recognized the Chinese Communists. He pointed out that it had been agreed at Cairo and at Potsdam that Formosa should be Chinese. Pursuant to these agreements, the Chinese army had taken the surrender of the Japanese on Formosa, and China had maintained administrative control over the island. It was now the headquarters of the Nationalist Government. He referred to the President’s decision to use the Seventh Fleet to neutralize Formosa at the time of the Korean crisis.

As a result of this decision, Mr. Allison explained, the Department had believed it important for Formosa to remain neutralized, if at all possible. While he did not wish to go into the question of the strategic importance of the island, he observed that there was some controversy on this point from the defensive point of view but no disagreement as to the importance of keeping Formosa out of the hands of any potential enemy of the United States. In the past, Formosa had been used as a base for aggressive operations. We did not want it to be used as such again. There was also a problem of the native population of Formosa—some 7,500,000 people. Their rights had not been fully considered in the past. He noted that when it had been agreed at Cairo to return Formosa to China, it was a different China which was involved.

Mr. Allison stated that the United States had four main objectives in Formosa. First, it desired to neutralize it from a military standpoint. Second, it desired to avoid the necessity of taking publicly, at this time, a rigid position on the substance of the final and ultimate solution of the Formosan problem. The basis for this position lay in the divergencies of the views of our friends on this matter. Third, we wished to provide a mechanism for more thorough study of the Formosan problem and for exchange of views on its solution. In the fourth place, we were anxious to ensure that the ultimate solution of the problem should be peaceful. These objectives were not easy to achieve, nor would they be accomplished quickly.

Mr. Allison drew the Delegation’s attention to the draft resolution contained in document US/A/C.1/2266 and explained its provisions. The preamble gave the background of the problem in terms of the Cairo declaration, the present conflict over the right to administer Formosa, the situation in the Far East, and thus outlined the problem. Thereafter, the operative section proposed the establishment of a commission to study the problem and submit a report to the General Assembly containing recommendations for the future of Formosa and the Pescadores. It further recommended that pending this study there should be no attempt to change the status of Formosa by force, and it requested all governments in authority to act in conformity with this recommendation and to render every possible assistance to the commission in the performance of its tasks. He noted that, while there had been some feeling that a date should be set for the report from the commission, in the end it had been decided to leave the timing indefinite so that the commission itself would decide when to make its report. This commission also would hear all parties to the case.

Turning to the possible membership of the proposed commission, Mr. Allison said that the Department had suggested two factors should be taken into account: first, adequate representation of Asian states; and second, the proper proportion between countries recognizing the Communist Chinese regime and those which had not done so. It was difficult to follow both these injunctions literally. However, the working group had devised a tentative list. We had to consider, among other things, whether the United States and the United Kingdom should be included on the commission or whether it should be entirely made up of smaller states. It was the staff opinion that the United States should be on the commission because this matter was too important for us to permit it possibly to go by default. If both the United States and the United Kingdom were included, there might be a move to add the Soviets and France, although the USSR had taken the position that the Assembly should hot discuss Formosa at all. Our present slate included that [the?] United Kingdom, India and Pakistan as the three recognizing states, and the United States, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia; as the non-recognizing states. The views of the Department on this slate had not been received.

Mr. Allison said that it was contemplated that all the above states would sponsor the resolution, together with at least one Latin-American state, perhaps Greece and Belgium, and one or two others if it appeared useful to broaden the sponsorship. It was felt, however, that the membership of the commission should be limited to those countries which were readily seen to have a direct interest in the Pacific area. Sponsorship, on the other hand, could include a wider group, representative of all areas in order to obtain broad support for the resolution.

Mr. Allison explained that we had been in close touch with the British on this resolution. The British had discussed and informally approved this draft, although we did not yet have general approval from the British Commonwealth, Canada being most skeptical, and Australia most enthusiastic. There were some indications that India would support a resolution along these lines. The British had assumed that the big powers would not be on the commission, but were willing to consider this possibility.

Mr. Allison asked the Delegation whether this resolution met the immediate objectives which we had in mind, taking account of the fact that we were not trying to arrive at a final solution, but merely to maintain the status quo on the Formosan situation. He also wished to have the Delegation’s views regarding the composition of the commission, particularly the inclusion of the United States. Finally, he would like to receive views with respect to the sponsorship of the resolution.

Ambassador Austin asked whether part of our position would be to oppose debate at this time on the substance of the Formosan question. Mr. Allison explained that the Department did not wish to have the substance discussed. We had talked this over privately with our friends. The British also did not want discussion since we had different positions, and had agreed upon the importance of confining the present discussion to methods for its further consideration.

Ambassador Austin inquired as to the view of the Chinese Nationalist Delegation and Ambassador Tsiang on this matter. Mr. Allison indicated that the Chinese Nationalists were much concerned about two matters. In the first place, they were concerned that this sort of action might make it easier for waverers to withdraw recognition from the Nationalists and transfer it to the Communists. Debate on the Formosan issue might cast doubt upon the status of the Nationalists. In the second place, the Nationalists did not like the fact that neutralization of Formosa meant that they would have to resign themselves to taking no steps to regain their position on the mainland. Both of these were real problems; we would not be able to satisfy the Nationalists completely on them. Yet this resolution did give the Nationalist Chinese an advantage for a temporary period. It ensured them against armed attack and gave them that much more time to strengthen their own internal position.

Mr. Dulles² wanted to assure the Delegation that Formosa had been discussed fully between the State Department and the Defense Department, and there was agreement as to the present adequacy of the resolution from the standpoint of our military program in the Far East. Assistant Secretary Rusk had discussed the matter in detail with Under-Secretary of Defense Lovett. He also observed that a top secret letter had been sent from the Secretary of State to the national Defense Department covering various agreements made with respect to Formosa.

Mr. Dulles went on to say that he had discussed this matter with Ambassador Tsiang. He had made clear to him that regardless of what happened, no further binding commitments could be made by any government to the Nationalist Chinese on the subject of recognition, and that, regardless of whether the United Nations treated Formosa as a subject for international concern, in the case of the United States it would not be a reason for withdrawing recognition, nor would we encourage anyone else to think it was a basis for changing his present position on Nationalist China. He had also told Tsiang, as regards the activities of the Chinese Nationalists, that the only thing which would be suspended would be open armed attack, and that neutralization would not prevent covert activity and communication with the friends of the Nationalists on the mainland. He also had noted that any other course might extend the war so that we would have to fight the Chinese Communists on a total basis. After all, our position would always have to take into account any change in circumstances, such as extension of military warfare.

Ambassador Austin asked whether the draft resolution represented the policy of the Delegation. Senator Lodge³ asked where there was any statement in the resolution to the effect that it would be abrogated if the general situation in the Far East should change. Mr. Dulles assumed that new General Assembly action would be taken if anything of that nature happened. He would cover this point in his speech.⁴ He certainly thought that before the United States used Formosa as a base, or encouraged the Nationalists, there would have to be fresh United Nations action. Any activities now of the United States in the Far East, he understood, could be based on Okinawa, Japan and the Philippines. In answer to a question from Senator Lodge as to whether this proposal had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Dulles said that he did not know, but since it had been fully cleared with the Secretary of Defense, he supposed that it also had the approval of the Joint Chiefs. Senator Lodge observed that if this resolution were approved, it would assume we were not going to have a war with China. He hoped that was right. Mr. Dulles said he would not want to introduce are solution implying on its face that we would want war in the Far East.

Senator Lodge remarked that it was still not clear to him just exactly what we would like to have happen to Formosa. Mr. Dulles said he could provide one answer to this question, but he was not sure that his answer would have the weight of authority. He thought there was no agreed solution at the moment which could be said to be the policy of the United States. He personally had in mind several objectives for our action in Formosa. First, we should effectively neutralize the island; second, we should consider the development of some measure of local autonomy for the people of Formosa, who had always been in a constant state of unrest and oppression, no matter who rules Formosa. In the third place, there should not be any abrupt change in trade relations between Formosa and Japan, where there were two highly complementary economies. Those three things, he believed, the commission would have to take into account. The actual framework of the final solution would, of course, depend on the evolution of conditions throughout Asia. What happened in China would be important. Possibly a temporary United Nations trusteeship might be the right solution for Formosa. So far as he knew, there was no firm United States policy. He thought the United States would go into this commission with an open mind as regards the final result, but having in mind various factors which it would take into account. In addition to those he had already mentioned, the age-old association of Formosa with China had to be taken into account. He admitted, however, that it was difficult to see how all these factors could be woven together. He would be surprised if the commission could come to any decision by the time of the next General Assembly. He referred parenthetically to the fact that the Italian colonies, which were a far less complicated problem, had taken a great deal more time, considering not only the period during which their fate was under consideration in the Council of Foreign Ministers, but also the time—over two years—consumed in the United Nations.⁵

Senator Lodge inquired whether the United Kingdom, India and Pakistan had expressed their views on Formosa. Mr. Dulles said that India believed that Formosa should be promptly returned to the Communist regime. The United Kingdom said the same thing, but he believed it had its tongue in its cheek. The British appeared to feel that their position in Hong Kong was immune so long as they could persuade the Chinese Communists that they were trying to get Formosa back for them. That was his own interpretation of their position. He did not know Pakistan’s position. Senator Lodge observed that the Indian and British views ran directly counter to those of the United States.

In response to a query, Ambassador Jessup⁶ said he had nothing particular to add, noting that he had just been away on a two-week vacation. He understood our position to be what Mr. Dulles had described. He believed that it was not a proper procedure, in putting a subject into the United Nations, to say that there was only one solution which we would accept. We had to go to the United Nations with an open mind. We certainly could not start out by saying we would not agree except to a certain solution. There were several possible solutions, as he saw it. All of them might take considerable time to work out. He asked Mr. Dulles whether his speech would make clear that the proposed commission could visit Formosa. Mr. Dulles said that, before the resolution came to a vote, he expected to submit an express provision to that effect or to clarify this point in the debate.

Senator Sparkman⁷ recalled that several times in the course of the discussion, reference had been made to changing conditions in the Far East. It seemed to him that once that fact was recognized, it was necessary to inquire as to the urgency of a study of the Formosan problem at this time and why it should not be postponed until conditions were more settled.

Mr. Dulles thought the reason for dealing with Formosa now was to get a certain amount of international sanction for the present United States unilateral action in assigning the Seventh Fleet to defend, or rather to preserve the neutrality of Formosa. This had been criticized in United Nations circles. Just because the situation might be prolonged for a considerable period, it seemed wise to get a United Nations decision to the effect that Formosa was a matter of international concern and that it was to be kept out of involvement in the present Far Eastern crisis by maintenance of its present status. There was a certain amount of subtlety in the resolution to make it acceptable to our Commonwealth friends, but this was the intention, and it did sanction the maintenance of the status quo. Mr. Dulles referred to the statement made by the President at his press conference to a question on the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet to which the President had responded that it was there to protect our Korean flank.⁸ If we maintained our fleet there, particularly if the Korean situation should improve, we would require some international sanction, or otherwise our policy would arouse serious suspicions in Asia. The present situation was in suspense because of weather conditions and the ensuing monsoon season. After February there was another period when an invasion might be possible. It would then become important to have Formosa’s neutralization sanctioned internationally.

Senator Cooper⁹ referred to the provision in the resolution regarding the interests of the Formosan people. He did not believe that the second paragraph set forth clearly enough their interests. He would have thought that this item could be better covered in a separate provision. Mr. Dulles did not think this would be possible if we submitted a resolution jointly with the British. That was the reason for the present obscure language. The; British simply were not willing to accept explicit language on these points. We had in mind some reference to Chapter XI of the Charter in this regard, but the British did not want such an explicit reference on the ground that it tended to prejudge the validity of the Cairo Declaration. If we wrote our own: resolution, Mr. Dulles would prefer to spell out more clearly the interests of the Formosan people, but we simply could not do this and get the British to go along. They would not cosponsor a resolution which appeared to suggest that the independence of the people of Formosa should take priority over the Cairo Declaration.

Senator Lodge observed that from the standpoint of American public opinion, the draft resolution was not a very appealing document. Without direct reference to the eight million inhabitants, it looked like the old power politics type of proposal.

It was agreed that the discussion should be continued at the next Delegation meeting.

1. US/A/C.12266 contained the text of the United States draft resolution on Formosa; the text was the same as that in the enclosure to Mr. Acheson’s letter to Secretary Marshall, November 11, supra.
2. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, was a United States Representative to the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
3. Senator Henry Gabot Lodge, Jr., of Massachusetts, was a United States Representative to the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
4. Reference is to Mr. Dulles’ forthcoming speech before the First Committee on November 15.
5. Related documentation is scheduled for publication in volume iii.
6. Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup.
7. Senator John J. Sparkman of Alabama, was a United States Representative to the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
8. See the editorial note under date of August 31, p. 476.
9. John Sherman Cooper, Consultant to the Secretary of State and former Senator from Kentucky, was an Alternate United States Representative to the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.