795.00/10–1250
Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency
C. Threat of Chinese Communist Invasion of Formosa1
i. statement of the problem
1. To estimate the threat of Chinese Communist invasion of Formosa during 1950.
ii. capabilities
2. Despite certain definite Chinese Communist deficiencies in naval and air forces and probably in amphibious training and doctrine, the Communists are now capable of launching an invasion against Formosa with about 200,000 troops and moderate air cover. The USSR could at a minimum furnish tactical advice and technical and logistic support.
3. Although Chinese Nationalist forces are sufficient in number and matériel to defend Formosa, lack of staying power, poor command [Page 530] structure, lack of inter-service coordination, questionable morale and shortages of some types of ammunition make their defense capabilities questionable.
4. Without direct Soviet participation and given strong naval and air assistance by the US armed forces, the Chinese Nationalist defense forces are capable of holding Formosa against a determined Chinese Communist invasion.
iii. factors bearing on intent
5. Indications of Intentions. Frequent official statements of the Chinese Communists have clearly indicated their intention to seize control of Formosa. However, available intelligence does not indicate their intention to do so in the immediate future. An unknown factor bearing upon the intent to invade is the degree of control the USSR is capable of exercising over the Chinese Communists, and the Soviet intent with respect to Formosa.
6. Factors Favoring Invasion of Formosa.
a. The occupation of Formosa would remove the symbol of Nationalist resistance; eliminate a potential source of coordinated opposition to the Chinese Communist regime; and would seriously diminish continued anti-Communist resistance in China and throughout Southeast Asia.
b. Abandonment or continued postponement of an attack on Formosa would result in a loss of “face” to the Chinese Communists.
c. Formosa would provide the Chinese Communists with a small but significant source of foreign exchange, and a potential source of rice, thereby contributing somewhat to Chinese Communist capabilities for economic reconstruction.
7. Factors Opposing an Invasion of Formosa.
a. Success would be improbable.
b. An attack involves the risk of war with the US as long as US forces are interposed between Formosa and the mainland. The Chinese Communist leadership would be reluctant to jeopardize its popular support, domestic achievements, and internal porgram by an attack on Formosa that could lead to retaliatory air attacks on Chinese cities, to a strict blockade of the Chinese coast, to strong economic sanctions, and to protracted warfare that could sap Chinese economic strength.
c. The Chinese Communists face serious domestic problems, including banditry, widespread unrest, guerrilla opposition, economic stagnation, agrarian maladjustments, and the problems involved in consolidating the Communist Party’s political control. For these reasons the danger exists that, if attacks should fail or prove unduly costly, the present apparent solidarity of the Communist regime would be subjected to a severe strain.
[Page 531]d. In view of current UN interest in Formosa, the Chinese Communists have some reason to hope for a favorable political solution.
iv. probability of chinese communist invasion
8. It is believed that barring a Soviet decision to precipitate global war, an invasion of Formosa by the Chinese Communists will not be attempted during the remainder of 1950.
- This paper was one of a series prepared for background rise in connection with the conference at Wake Island on October 15 between President Truman and General MacArthur, for documentation on which see vol. vii, pp. 731 ff.↩