661.93/2–1150: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

top secret   priority

584. Eyes only Amb Bruce. In numbered paras below is follow-up info on Sino-Sov negots which, if you are confident security can be maintained, may be provided same outlet as before.1 In this instance [Page 309] reports and rumors which we have recd and possible lines of speculation are presented separately. Ur contact may use material as he sees fit. This approach is designed to develop relationship toward more normal forms of background fill-in in which correspondent is left free to make his own analysis. Protection of real source however still of utmost importance.

1.
Reports: Moscow negots have been dragging due largely Chi resistance. Mao said to have been highly dissatisfied with attempted exactions on China and to have been pressing hard for return Dairen, Port Arthur. Even rumored that Chou told Sov delegation he would resign rather than accede to their demands as presented. Sov demands reported earlier for control five Chi ports additional to Port Arthur, Dairen were reportedly scaled down to take effect only in event war. Mao rumored to have received msg from Chu Teh supporting Mao position that agreement must be acceptable to Chi people who are becoming agitated over sovereignty issue.
2.
Speculation: In this oriental bazaar bargaining Kremlin is probably discovering Chi Delegation least submissive it has had to deal with in all its experience with “peoples democracies”. It wld not be surprising if Stalin is finding it necessary to retreat from his original asking prices involving demands openly infringing China’s sovereignty. Kremlin may well have reconciled itself to more modest, slower-moving and disguised forms of aggression.
3.
Reports: Rumors suggest Soviet Delegation has more recently been concentrating on three types of demands: (a) introduction of Sov advisers into China (b) insistence upon so-called minority rights in Manchuria, Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet, and (c) sending large numbers Chi laborers to USSR.
4.
Speculation: Negots having descended from asking prices to hard bargaining, these three sets of demands are probably being traded against Chi demands for extensive econ assistance, milit matériel, technical milit aid and release from obligations to send grain to USSR at time China facing catastrophic famine.
5.
Reports: Sov “advisers” have already been extensively introduced into China, particularly in field of communications. Sov advisers have technically done an excellent job toward rehabilitating railroads. In addition to communications, Kremlin is most vigorously seeking to press advisers into fol categories: secret police, party and milit.
6.
Speculation: Kremlin’s interest in advisers is not purely technical. This technique, reminiscent one of principal features Japan’s 21 demands on China, is directed at bringing Chi party and Govt apparatus completely under Stalinist control. Soviet interest wld seem to be much less in giving technical advice than in obtaining listening posts and points of influence and, eventually, control. How far penetration has gone in secret police is not known. In party, it is unlikely penetration has gone into rank and file; rather it has concentrated on propaganda arm to affect younger elements of party. Commie armies are, of course, major target. Penetration there is presumably by NKVD and polit commissars in guise training officers. However, Russians [Page 310] have probably met most political resistance in army which of peasant origin and feels it won civil war by strength its own arms and cost its own blood.
7.
Reports: Last spring and summer when Chi Natl Govt in full retreat south of Yangtze, Sov Govt energetically pushed negots with Nats Sinkiang for commercial and trade agreements giving Sovs extensive concessions and exclusive privileges.2 When Sinkiang turned over to Peking, Ili group Sov controlled and holdout from Nationalist provincial regime was incorporated into Commie provincial admin. Seifutdin, Sov trained Hi leader now deputy governor Sinkiang, with Sinkiang delegation, called to Moscow to participate in negots. Peng Teh-huai, Commie northwest milit commander not fully trusted by USSR; accordingly Kremlin has through Liu Shao-chi Stalinist elements in Peking leadership arranged to have Peng surrounded by Chi whose first loyalty is to USSR not China. Burhan, present governor Sinkiang declared at about time of Seifutdin’s departure for Moscow that Sinkiang is everlastingly and indivisibly a territory of the People’s Republic of China and that the races and people of Sinkiang will like steel steadfastly unite with their brothers of the nation. Ill troops holding back on incorporation in Chi Commie armies despite Peking’s announcement of their assimilation.
8.
Speculation: Sov negots with Chi Nats at time when it evident Chi Commie control of Sinkiang imminent and inevitable suggests Kremlin unwilling depend entirely its domination Peking insure free hand Sinkiang. This view supported by reported Sov displeasure at incorporation Hi group, which Kremlin doubtless was grooming to take over province, in Commie provincial admin.
Sinkiang is mosaic racial groups and conflicting interests. Principal protagonists have been still are Russians, Chi and Turki racial group with latter basically hostile to first two. Russian policy under Czars and Sov alike, as relative strength Chi and Turki-Moslem groups fluctuated has been to support weaker faction thereby redressing balance and exacting as price its support concessions favoring expanding Sov penetration and control. In present situation with ambitious Commie Govt at Peking seeking restore Chi control over Sinkiang, Sovs appear be fol familiar pattern by supporting Turki autonomy.
Question control Turki and other racial groups in Sinkiang thus becomes major problem Moscow negots. In view his background, Seifutdin probably called Moscow by Kremlin support its demands on Chi for concessions to Turki group, probably including introduction Tashkent-trained personnel into civil govt and continuance autonomous Turki milit formations. Burhan declaration coming as it did at time Seifutdin mission likely inspired by pro-China elements CCP to strengthen hands Chi negotiators resisting this demand and counter effect Seifutdin mission. While argument rages in Moscow, implementation of measures incorporating Ili milit units in Commie forces stalled.
9.
Reports: Sovs reportedly pressing for up to 1,000,000 Chi [Page 311] laborers to work in USSR. Rumors that 300,000 such laborers already sent arrived in Siberia from Manchuria.
10.
Speculation: Undoubtedly USSR wants large numbers manual laborers and sees in China potential source to replace slave labor formerly supplied by German and Japanese war prisoners now becoming depleted by repatriation and attrition. On this score Kremlin undoubtedly encountering vigorous Chi resistance presumably for domestic Chinese political reasons.
11.
General Comment: It is emphasized that treaty if and when announced will probably breathe friendship and cooperation with unpalatable Chi concessions well hidden in secret protocols and agreements.

Pls impress desirability that these reports be credited to some non–U.S. source, preferably Eastern Europe. In case last story, suggestions of East European sources appeared so late in article that it frequently omitted in summaries and rewrites.

Acheson
  1. Mr. Sulzberger stated that the contents of this telegram were shown to him by Ambassador Bruce on February 15; see Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles, p. 495.
  2. For related documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. ix, pp. 1037 ff.