The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State
173. First basic premise Deptel 95, August 151 is that doubts of Asian Governments of fundamental US foreign policy objectives contribute to their reluctance to take clear stand against danger of Soviet imperialism. This generalization is not applicable to GOP whose willingness to lend military support to UN in Korea is blocked by Kashmir negotiations which have had unfortunate byproduct of strengthening innate Pakistan suspicion of Indian motives.
Assuming, however, that premise is otherwise applicable in free Asia, Department’s second premise is that some of those doubts of Asian governments may be removed by closer consultation of non-Asian problems and encouragement to assume greater responsibility therefor. Embassy is not satisfied that free Asian countries, most of whom currently engrossed in vitally pressing domestic problems, can be induced to seriously consult or to assume responsibility for non-Asian problems to such extent as to reorient them in foreseeable future to an appreciation our basic objectives and motives. Such a program is both sound and desirable in terms of the long run but we question seriously whether, given accelerated Commie expansion, pursuance of our immediate objectives should rely on that essentially educational approach to combat an urgent problem.
On the other hand should the US approach Nehru and Liaquat and other free Asian leaders on basis establishing consultative machinery predominantly for important Asian problems, Embassy has two observations.
- US Government must realize that in pursuance such program it stands to become more intimately associated than ever before with most controversial individual country issues (for example colonialism in Indochina). This association may not only unnecessarily spotlight differences in viewpoint between US and Asian countries which will be food for Commies, but it also has potential of introducing stresses and strains in our relations with interested European powers, i.e., UK, France and Netherlands. In this connection Department has not indicated in its telegram under reference what will be the status of the aforementioned powers in the concept of consultative machinery. The Embassy presumes that if such advances were made to Asian leaders by US they would be done so with knowledge and agreement in principle of interested European governments.
- In Embassy opinion Baguio conference revealed that time is not yet for meaningful Pan Asiatic consideration of either Asian or non-Asian problems by Asian countries, with exception inoffensive [Page 1502](to west or east) economic and commercial development projects. However this exception in itself is sufficiently important for US to develop a consultative program through existing channels of Point Four, ECA and so forth.
In reality a program of the kind envisaged by telegram under reference would automatically begin and normally center around Indian sub-continent. Unfortunate fact is, however, that Pakistan and India are certainly not now disposed to enter into a consultative pattern on Asian or non-Asian problems so long as they are unable to solve their own problems. Putting first things first Embassy firmly believes that US should concentrate its immediate energies and attention and full weight prestige to disposition Kashmir issue whose protracted deadlock would form substantial block to US aims in South Asia as a whole.
It is significant as Department pointed out in telegram under reference that the several Asian governments seem increasingly aware of threat to them and their countries individually but not collectively. This is certainly true of Pakistan and is due partly to self explanatory activities of local Commies as well as USSR government and in part to combined effect western countries propaganda efforts. This increasing awareness is a phenomenon which we should exploit to the fullest. Commies will do their part in our behalf if we follow up with intelligently integrated and expanded USIS activities.
In final analysis US Government’s problem in South Asia is a selling job and for reasons indicated in paragraphs above the relentless publicizing of our side of story and exposure of Soviet imperialism seems to be major and most effective implement at our immediate disposal.