690D.91/4–850: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
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486. 1. I have just returned from conversation with Bajpai who appeared exhausted and quite ill. (Embtel 484, repeated Karachi 48 of April 8.)1 He said last few days represented great strain in his life. It seemed almost a miracle agreement has been reached and he gave much credit to Nehru for courage and perseverence pointing out that Nehru’s greatest difficulties were not in working out agreement with Liaquat but in maintaining unity in his own Cabinet. He maintained that although there were at times divergencies on various points between Nehru and Patel, Patel on whole loyally supported Nehru during various crises. Without Patel’s support result would have been negative.
2. Bajpai permitted me read text of agreement. It is lengthy and contains: detailed provisions covering treatment to be accorded to migrating refugees and to refugees returning to their homes, it calls for compensation for property losses for minorities from or in East Bengal, West Bengal, Tripura and Assam; it provides for the setting up of committees of inquiry and of minority commissions in these provinces, for suppression of news and propaganda of a nature calculated to arouse communal hatred or hostility between Pakistan and India, for appointment of a minister from each of central governments to handle minority problems, etc. Since under its terms agreement will be presented publicly to Parliaments both countries on April 10, I shall not endeavor describe it now in detail. Full text will be available early next week. My general impression of agreement however was that so far as provinces covered were concerned it was document which with reasonable amount of goodwill and with loyal implementation could be basis for gradual elimination of minority problems.
3. Bajpai said his deepest concern now was ability leaders GOI to prevent sabotage these arrangements by Hindu fanatics, extremists, and political opportunists. There can be no doubt that many Indians who desired war with Pakistan would be disappointed at success of conversations. On other hand he was convinced result of conversations would improve atmosphere both in India and Pakistan and would strengthen hands of those who really desire friendly cooperation.
4. Bajpai made additional comments and observations which may be of interest: [Page 1407]
- (a)
- At Mohammed Ali’s suggestions, conversations have been taking place re trade relations and basis has been laid for formal conference on subject during latter part this month.
- (b)
- Mohammed Ali suggested that it would be helpful if Pakistan and India could come understanding re Kashmir before arrival mediator. Bajpai agreed and outlined various methods for settlement of dispute including his own favorite method which he described to Ali as “Lippmann’s2 suggestions” i.e. partition plus plebiscite in Vale of Kashmir. Ali said Pakistan was so deeply committed to “over-all plebiscite” he did not see how any other method could be approved at this time. Bajpai replied that perhaps it would be preferable not attempt do too much during this first conference—perhaps mediator would be helpful in solution this particular problem.
5. In reply to my inquiry Bajpai said at opening conversations Liaquat had referred to Indian troop concentrations Ambala. Nehru emphasized shifting of troops was not planned by aggressive intentions and suggested discussion this problem be postponed until after agreement had been made re minorities. Today just before his departure Liaquat again raised this question. Nehru told him impossible make any changes in troop disposition just now but he was confident that if agreement resulted in improved atmosphere and in curtailment of migration of minorities he would be in position later to take measures which should relieve Pakistan anxieties in this respect. Nehru did indicate however that it might be possible to suspend further movements necessary to complete planned composition of mobile corps at Ambala. I told Bajpai I had asked this question because of my government’s deep interest in this matter. Unless Pakistan’s suspicions aroused by these movements could be removed much benefit derived from minorities agreement might be offset.
6. Bajpai said that Liaquat invited Nehru pay return visit Karachi discuss other outstanding problems before his departure US and Nehru tentatively agreed. Visit will probably be about April 27.
7. In conclusion Bajpai said that in his opinion greatest single advantage derived from conversation was that Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan had become acquainted and each had learned to have respect for and trust in other.
8. I told Bajpai my government had been awaiting with anxiety outcome of conference since it realized importance of success to stability and even peace of South Asia. I knew I was speaking on behalf my government when I asked him to convey to Prime Minister hearty congratulations. We understood perhaps better than Prime Minister realized strain under which he had been working and admired [Page 1408] courage and restraint with which he had succeeded in face of such tremendous obstacles. It seemed that Liaquat had also shown outstanding statesmanship and all hopes must now be placed on ability two governments implement agreement and prepare way for elimination other differences. Bajpai promised convey this message to Nehru.
Sent Department 486, repeated Karachi 50.