357.AB/1–2750: Telegram
The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations ( Gross ) to the Secretary of State
priority
88. Gross and Ross1 met with McNaughton and Cadogan this afternoon for further discussion of Kashmir case. McNaughton, quoting from telegrams he had received from Ottawa, indicated that Pearson would not be in favor of McNaughton continuing his efforts unless [Page 1377] three conditions always laid down by Canadians are met. Pearson hopes that proposal for McNaughton to continue would not be put forward in any other circumstances. Pearson shares general view India not willing to agree continuance McNaughton’s efforts and Pearson feels very remote promise useful solution in present situation would result from such continuance.
According to Pearson’s reports through Canadian High Commissioner New Delhi2 all his interviews both Karachi and New Delhi reveal tragic nature present situation. Pearson found at New Delhi, contrary impression Noel-Baker,3 Patel was more extreme than Nehru. Other ministers had very negative view. Bajpai reflected no further hope UN contribution in present situation and talked about mediation on fresh basis to bring parties together. Fresh basis would be three-man group, each of parties designating one and these two selecting third. Bajpai reflected view over-all plebiscite no solution. Pearson convinced if someone else does not propose procedure along Bajpai line India will itself. Chipman was informing Henderson fully.
Gross emphasized immediate question was to determine what we do in next few days. Suggested possibility McNaughton continuing in his personal capacity. McNaughton said firmly, and it was generally agreed, his instructions preclude this possibility. Gross also suggested possibility McNaughton telescoping procedure by adding to his factual report analysis of issues and suggestions for further SC procedure, but later withdrew this suggestion. McNaughton wondered whether best course would not be to have SC instruct new president to continue where McNaughton left off. Neither we nor British thought much of this idea.
Gross emphasized that position our secretary had taken in message to Bajpai was not reconcilable with new developments. Pearson quite unwittingly, and with best intentions had put Acheson in anomalous position from which we felt obligation to extricate him. This seems to require discussion Cabinet level between Acheson and Pearson who was due home in Ottawa February 8. Gross added he did not see how it was possible for us to make any statement in SC until we all knew precisely where we are going.
It was agreed that best course in all circumstances would be to proceed with SC meeting Thursday, February 2, as contemplated, to hear factual report by McNaughton. We would then contemplate McNaughton’s report would be followed by statements by parties and [Page 1378] by members of Council, but that meetings after Thursday would be spelled out to provide opportunity for meeting Secretary and Pearson.
McNaughton seemed depressed, but in mood to carry out orders loyally. He commented, for example, that Pearson’s report “sweeps everything that has been done out of the road.”
USUN’s comments to follow Monday.
- John C. Ross, Deputy U.S. Representative to the U.N. Security Council.↩
- Warwick F. Chipman, Canadian High Commissioner to India.↩
- The Rt. Hon. Philip J. Noel-Baker, British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, had been conversing in recent days with government officials in Karachi and New Delhi. His visit roughly coincided in time with that of Lester Pearson.↩