782.5/7–3150: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

44. 1. At their requests I called on Foreign Minister July 29 and on Prime Minister July 30. Both conversations surveyed major objectives Turk-US collaboration in military, economic and political fields. On both occasions I was guided by and stressed position given me in Department’s most helpful telegram 41, July 26. On latter occasion I was able emphasize to Prime Minister supplementary instruction given me in Deptel 47, July 281 received morning July 30.

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2. In re subject latter instruction (i.e. Department’s concern lest Senator Cain’s statements lead Turkish Government believe its offer assist in Korea might result in Turkey’s inclusion Atlantic Pact and increased economic aid), I can assure Department these statements played no part in formulation Turkish policy which had already before his arrival been well thought out by Foreign Minister in consultation with President and Prime Minister. Cain press conference, held at request official Turkish press bureau just prior to his leaving Ankara,2 was unfortunate in that it suggested such conclusions to certain editors. In all prior conversations with Turkish officials Cain had been discreet, emphasizing that while he could report major reactions American public he spoke as an individual, as a Senator who represented minority view even in his own party and in no wise as spokesman official US Government policy.

3. Foreign Minister, after repeating earlier assurances government’s intention implement McBride recommendations for immediate strengthening Turkish defense forces, informed me he proposed stress again in conversation with Schuman3 in Paris and with Bevin4 at Strasburg Turkish view that critical world situation impelled reconsideration Turkey’s place in over-all western mutual defense. Basic foreign and security policy considerations, he said, had long pointed to desirability Turkey joining Atlantic Pact, “a view shared alike by former and present Turkish governments.” He hoped this “vital matter” could be considered by American, British and French Foreign Ministers at their September meeting.5 He himself hoped to head Turk delegation to GAUNT and at time convenient to Mr. Acheson be afforded opportunity elaborate Turkish government views.6 He said he would leave Ankara that evening, would make similar communication to British and French Ambassadors in Istanbul and fly Paris next day. Prime Minister would give me aide-mémoire confirming [Page 1287] that position he had outlined was official position Turkish Government.

4. Foreign Minister then said fuller Turk-US collaboration in military and economic fields might in present emergency situation require additional US aid to attain objectives to be mutually determined. Generals McBride and Yamut would make recommendations re military. On economic side he handed me aide-mémoire7 and asked that I study it carefully with Dorr and inform Prime Minister our views. Dorr and I believe position presented in this aide-mémoire is substantially same as that given Department by Turkish Chargé July 21.8 We will comment further after my visit Ankara August 3 with Admiral Ballentine.9

5. Prime Minister began by referring to Yalova conference (see Embtel 51, July 22). His communiqué had stated that “new measures for re-organization of armed forces had been examined.” Now, he could tell me, orders to implement them immediately had been issued and provision made for closest working relationship between Generals McBride and Yamut. He referred in detail and without notes to McBride’s June 30 recommendations;10 then stressed urgency completion military airfields project. They, he said “constitute basic link for close collaboration with American forces.”

6. Prime Minister continued, “I have given particular instructions that defense planning by our staff and your officers be given top priority; but planning does not depend on one party alone. We naturally want to know what you are planning and are prepared to do in, and for joint defense of, Turkey in event of war.” In reply I reiterated Department’s answer to Turkish request for joint staff talks as given Turkish Government in writing on my return from Washington last March.11 Its essence was that such talks could not precede political commitment. He promised read answer and memo of ensuing conversation between President Inonu and General Collins;12 then said, “this brings us naturally to need for coordination our political views and first and foremost to Turkey’s vital interest in joining Atlantic Pact. Our collaboration should be as close in political as in military and economic fields.”

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7. Prime Minister then handed me aide-mémoire13 promised by Foreign Minister. It recapitulates major points outlined above; urges that military and economic aid “respond to exigencies of the present hour”; and stresses common interest in “moral reinforcement” of Turkish public opinion as defense against “harmful propaganda” by “bringing to contractual stage” present close, friendly collaboration and “thereby adding a link to the system for the safeguarding of general peace and security.” It concludes with urgent plea that “moment is propitious for admission of Turkey as member of system of defense and security instituted by the Atlantic Pact” and requests that “US Government kindly see to it that the necessary measures be taken to the end, that this question be examined and resolved with the shortest possible delay.”

8. In reply, after carefully laying before Prime Minister all major points made in Deptel 41, July 26, I promised wire Department detailed report my conversations with him and Foreign Minister.

9. Our conversation then turned to military and economic aid programs. Turkey would not, he said, reduce its defense budget but he could not see how it could be increased. In particular, if some 20 million Turkish liras were to be needed to augment NCO and technician corps, where could he find them; he would cut economic investment program wherever possible and would not undertake new projects (e.g. Sariyir hydroelectric dam project)14 unless contributing immediately to over-all defense. Could I see, he asked, possibility that US Government might help if supplied with careful analysis of needs? Generals McBride and Yamut were to prepare such an analysis on military side; he was himself giving close study to economic.

10. In reply I made following suggestion: In same way that our two generals were elaborating military recommendations for submission to us at end first week in August, so it would seem highly desirable that Dorr and new Turkish Minister of State submit to us at same time economic recommendations including major elements ECA and Turkish Government investment programs for current FY. He concurred and set August 8 as date with me, two generals, Dorr and Minister of State.15

11. Before ending conversation Prime Minister referred to official reports made him by Provincial Governors that Turkish decision to send troops to Korea had met with wide enthusiastic support, and [Page 1289] he belittled any lasting effect of Opposition Party’s criticism “because it was so patently prompted by considerations of domestic policies”. He concluded: “Korean war has opened new era, one in which we must strive harder and work faster towards common objectives. We will not be Utopians but apply ourselves to practical realities.”

Wadsworth
  1. Not printed; it suggested that Ambassador George Wadsworth caution Turkish officials against drawing the conclusion that the Turkish offer to assist in Korea might result in Turkey’s inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and have a bearing on the extent of U.S. economic aid to Turkey (795.00/7–2550).
  2. In reply to a question asked at a news conference in Ankara on July 25, Senator Cain said “I can say we are going to be much more sympathetic in helping those who helped most in Korea, we want all of our friends tied together as free nations militarily, economically and politically” (telegram 57, July 25, from Ankara, 795.00/7–2550).
  3. Robert Schuman, French Minister of Foreign Affairs; see telegram 124, August 22, from Ankara, p. 1296.
  4. Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, met with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuat Köprülü at the offices of the British Delegation to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on August 5 (the London Times, August 7).
  5. For documentation on the Tripartite Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom, and the United States, New York, September 1950, see vol. iii, pp. 1108 ff.
  6. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Köprülü did not serve as Chairman of the Delegation of Turkey to the Fifth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly. No record of a conversation between him and Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson has been found in Department of State files for 1950.
  7. Aide-memoire, July 29, from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (enclosure 1 to despatch 62, August 5, from Ankara, 882.10/8–550, not printed).
  8. See memorandum of conversation, July 21, by Mr. McGhee, p. 1278.
  9. Vice Adm. John J. Ballentine, Commander, Sixth Task Fleet, visited Ankara, August 3–4.
  10. Recommendations in a letter, June 30, from Maj. Gen. Horace L. McBride, Chief of the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, to Gen. Nuri Yamut, Chief of Staff, Turkish General Staff (Ankara Embassy files, lot 58F33, box 3299, 400 MDAP January-June 1950, not printed).
  11. See Enclosure 1 to Instruction No. 19, March 20, p. 1239.
  12. See memorandum of conversation, March 26, p. 1241.
  13. Aide-memoire, July 30, from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (enclosure 2 to despatch 62, August 5, from Ankara, 882.10/8–550, not printed).
  14. The Chief of the ECA Mission to Turkey, Russell H. Dorr, and the Turkish Minister of State, Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoglue, signed the Sariyar hydroelectric power agreement on September 22, 1950 (despatch 307, December 5, from Ankara, 882.2614/12–550, not printed).
  15. The meeting set for August 8 was held on August 19.