Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

780.5/4–1750

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins)¹

top secret

[Ankara,] March 26, 1950.

Subject: Turkish War Planning

Present:

Turks	Americans
President Ismet Inönü	General J. Lawton Collins
Minister of National Defense Shukru2	Ambassador Wadsworth
Chief of Staff, General Gurman3	Maj. Gen. Horace L. McBride
Deputy Chief of Staff, General Axelun4	Colonel Douglas V. Johnson

2 Interpreters

The President and General Collins exchanged greetings.

General Collins said he had been Deputy Chief of Staff when he had been here last⁵ but now that he was Chief of Staff he was even more interested than before in seeing what the American Aid Mission had accomplished.

The President replied that he had no doubt the General would be satisfied and asked where he had been in Western Europe, especially had he been to France.

General Collins said that he had been in Rome, Trieste and Athens.⁶

The President asked if they were working hard in Western Union–harder than in Turkey.

General Collins replied that he did not know—probably not!

The President asked how the problem of defense of Western Europe would be worked out.

General Collins replied that it was being most carefully studied under the Atlantic Pact.

The President said that he was hoping for the best in the future but that he had not yet had the assurance that there was determination in Western Europe to establish a front.

General Collins stated that he felt confident the North Atlantic Pact Organization would be able to organize and establish a front in Western Europe.

The President asked how long it would take.

General Collins said it would be three to four years before the western powers would be sufficiently strong.

The President asked why it should be so long since those were rich countries and the United States was doing its best to help. If they decided seriously today, it would not take long.

General Collins replied they could raise the men but they could not create the equipment overnight.

The President said the front could be established with insufficient equipment and deficiencies eliminated in time.

General Collins said Yes, but at least two or three years would be required in Western European countries, including Italy.

The President said first of all they must make up their minds.

General Collins said we thought they had made up their minds but that the equipment of modern armies cannot be constructed in a year or so.

The President said that he was glad that the General was optimistic about the completion of the organization in the West but that he was afraid that the progress was sluggish—if the slow progress continued the task would not be finished in time. Turkey is impatient because it is under the guns.

General Collins said that we were doing our best to help Turkey prepare its Army, Navy and Air Force for war.

The President said he was grateful for that and asked the Ambassador what good news he brought from the United States.

The Ambassador outlined the memorandum which he had brought from Mr. Acheson to the Turkish Foreign Minister,⁴ stressing that it had received careful consideration and approval at highest level; the territorial integrity and the national defense of Turkey was continuously in our minds; it was part of our overall thinking but not confined to thinking alone; that was what General Collins meant when he said we are “doing our best to help”. He could, too, add an important point made in Washington in support of General Collins’ argument that it must take a relatively long time to get Western Europe working together; the foreign ministers take little time to agree on policies, the ministers of national defense agree easily on desired contributions to the common defense, and the Chiefs of Staff are anxious to make it work; but current difficulty comes when the finance ministers oppose measures which will affect their countries internal economies. Mr. Acheson had told him he felt confident that substantial progress on this score would be achieved at the Atlantic Treaty foreign ministers’ meeting next month.⁵

The President observed that General Collins was very calm. He asked, “How long before the next war”.

General Collins replied that we do not think war is imminent.

The President asked, “Why not?”

General Collins replied that we think Russia has no stockpile of atomic bombs; that she has no navy and only now has begun the creation of a long range air force, and that since Russia is gaining a large number of her objectives without fighting, there is no reason for her to go to war now.

The President said that he had heard rumors that the Russians would take over Berlin in the near future.

General Collins said he believed the Russians would cause disturbances in late May, using boys organizations but he did not think they would seek to occupy Berlin.

The President said that occupation of Berlin would mean a collision.

General Collins replied, “We will remain in Berlin”.

The President said you have United States forces in Berlin. If the Russians want to occupy Berlin by force a collision will result.

General Collins said that we expected that German civilians would be used to cause the disturbances but that we did not believe that Russian troops would seek to enter the Western Sectors.

The President asked if we were going to raise an army of Germans.

General Collins replied, “There is no plan now to do so”.

The President asked if defense was possible without them.

General Collins replied in the affirmative.

The President asked if the Ambassador too would comment on this point.

The Ambassador said he had heard nothing to the contrary in Washington; specifically he had heard of no plans to arm or otherwise use Western Germany within the framework of the North Atlantic mutual defense program unless it be in the moral field.

The President told General Collins that he would find Turkey as strong as it had been on his (General Collins) last visit. Valuable economic and military aid, including the work of General McBride’s group, had been received from the United States and had been utilized to the maximum. The President of the United States had said that aid for Turkey would continue.⁶ That statement gave Turkey a pleasing and reassuring feeling. Turkey was working very hard to overcome its difficulties. The United States and Turkey are at the world’s geographic extremes, but their cooperation had been necessary and been carried out in a fine way; that working together should be established as our national policies. He asked if General Collins had any questions.

General Collins stated that he was happy to learn that General McBride’s group had been working with the Turkish General Staff on the Turkish War Plans and that he felt it very important that they continue to do so. We wished to continue to furnish military aid and equipment but it was necessary, in order to get Congress to appropriate the money, that Congress be assured of sound plans and that the equipment provided would be used in the implementation of such plans. He cited as an example the questions which he had been asked last week, when he and General Bradley⁷ appeared before a Committee of our Senate, by very influential senators of the opposition as to whether the plans for Western Europe were being soundly developed. He pointed out that he must answer similar questions when he appeared before the committee asking new appropriations for aid to Greece, Turkey and Iran. He stated that one of his reasons for visiting those countries was to assure the Committees of Congress that sound plans were being developed and that the costly equipment was being well used. He stated that the members of the JCS must know how much money to allot to the Turkish Army, Navy and Air Force respectively and that it was, therefore, necessary to know something of the Turkish plans.

The President asked if the Americans were not informed of the Turkish plans and stated that the Turks had been very open with the Americans.

General Collins said that we had no complaints but that until recently General McBride dealt in training matters rather than the matters concerning the location in which the forces would be employed. He pointed out that we were concerned that they had proper plans, not only for the stationing of their forces, but to provide for the complicated logistical requirements which must be thought out ahead of time. General Collins explained by an example which pointed out the vulnerable position of a large part of the petroleum storage in Turkey. Although he realized this storage was a commercial project which could not be removed to a safer place, he felt that an analysis should be made of the situation in order that any new military storage should be placed in some position, such as the vicinity of Iskenderun, where it would be relatively safe and could be re-supplied by sea.

The President stated that he saw no reason why the American and Turkish officers should not deal with such matters. General McBride had probably already told General Collins that he, The President, was very sensitive on the subject of storage for oil reserves which he felt would be a strategic problem of the utmost importance. He supposed that General McBride would give some advice on the subject in the near future.

General Collins stated that if the President wished we would be happy to reinforce our group that is working on the Turkish war plans.

The President said that he would be very grateful, and the Turkish Chief of Staff agreed.

General Collins said that he was aware that the Turks did not wish their war plans disclosed to anyone who did not have to have the information. He reassured the President that Turkish war plans would not be discussed with the American Congress but would be handled as they are in our own service, that is, they would be known only by people who needed to know them. The Congress needed only to be assured that good plans do exist.

The President said, “We are working with America and have nothing to conceal from you”. He said that the Turkish planning was progressing slowly but that it was being done with care and attention to detail. He said that discussion of military problems did not mean necessarily that agreements would be reached technically. Discussions would help both and as the work progressed the persons responsible for the defense of Turkey would make decisions in the light of the broad strategic concept adopted. Officers of both nations would explain their ideas and reach agreement. He had no doubt that General Collins would find proper plans would be established so that America could give more aid. He recognized that the current discussions were one-sided; full cooperation would come when both sides could discuss their plans.

General Collins stated that military men in the US could not discuss military plans without prior political agreements, but he could tell the President that if war started there would be a tremendous strategic air offensive launched against Russia which would be of immense help to Turkey as well as the countries of Western Europe.

The President said that was a very important point and he requested more detail, particularly as to whether the United States would bombard Russia if Russia attacked Turkey.

General Collins answered that, if Congress declared war, we would. The question of declaring war was one for Congress to decide but that it was his personal opinion, as an individual, that if Russia attacked Turkey, such an attack would be part of a world war in which Russia would attack on several fronts. He reminded the President that the President of the United States had said that the security of Turkey was vital to the security of the United States.⁸

The President asked if General Collins had said that if Russia attacked anywhere it would initiate a third world war and asked if General Collins was sure.

General Collins replied that it was the case, in his personal opinion—again stressing that this was his personal opinion.

The President stated that he accepted it as a personal opinion—that it was very important to him to hear General Collins, as Chief of Staff of the United States Army, give his views and that it was very refreshing to hear those views. He stated that when Turkey is engaged in war it will have to face attacks from land, sea and air—that if Russia would be subjected to long range bombardment the weight against the Turkish Armed Forces would be lessened.

General Collins assured the President that would be true if it came to a third world war.

The President commented that it was painful to think an attack on Turkey would start a third world war.

General Collins stated that, as an individual, he believed Russia would first attack to the West.

The President then recapitulated by saying: “Without any political commitment or agreement our two countries are working very closely together; Turkey has the very valuable statement of the President of the United States; and the personal opinions of American military and political leaders are that Turkey will not be left alone.” He asked if this was the case.

General Collins replied in the affirmative.

The President then stated that Turkey would await the future calmly and confidently.

General Collins stated that that was good but that General McBride told him there was much yet to be done in developing sound Turkish war plans. The Minister of Defense and the Turkish Chief of Staff must understand that, if they wished it, he, General Collins, would, be happy to discuss the matter in more detail.

The President replied that was very good—that the more advice General Collins gave the better he would be pleased.

General Collins commented that he wanted his point clearly understood. He, General Collins, was not suggesting this, and any further discussion he might have with the Turkish General Staff would have to be on their initiative and not on his.

The President stated that in his view there was no reason why such discussions should not be held; the Turks would be only too pleased! to know on which points they were deficient.

The Chief of Staff of the Turkish Army expressed his pleasure.

General Collins said to the Turkish Chief of Staff, “We will be happy to do this together”.⁹

The President closed this audience by saying, with obvious sincerity, “General, our discussion has been most useful”.

1. This memorandum was Appendix 1 to Annex 4 of a memorandum of April 10, not printed, by General Collins to the Secretary of the Army on the subject “Inspection by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, of the Middle East Covering the Period 20 March to 8 April 1950,” a copy of which was transmitted to Mr. McGhee on April 17. The present memorandum of March 26 was prepared by the General’s aide, Col. Douglas V. Johnson, in consultation with Ambassador Wadsworth, and was approved by General Collins.
2. Hüsnü Çakir.
3. Gen. Abdurrahman N. Gürman.
4. Gen. Izzet Aksalur.
5. See the editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vi, p. 1638.
6. See the memorandum of conversation, April 10, by David A. Robertson, Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, p. 362.
4. Enclosure 1 to Instruction No. 19, March 20, to Ambassador Wadsworth, p. 1239.
5. For documentation on the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at London, May 15–18, see vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
6. Possibly a reference to the President’s budget message to the Congress, January 9 (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 44).
7. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
8. Possibly a reference to President Truman’s address of March 12, 1947, before Congress, cited in footnote 5, p. 1239.

9. General Collins and heads of the American military mission in Turkey met in Ankara on March 27 with Minister of Defense Çakir, with General Gürman, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and with other Turkish officials; General Collins also met privately with Minister Çakir at the latter’s request.

   “Full details of these conferences were furnished to Ambassador Wadsworth who thoroughly approved the major points listed by General McBride and General Collins. Ambassador Wadsworth said that he would follow up with Minister Çakir on the problems involved in possible mining of the Straits.” (Record of conference, Appendix 2 to Annex 4 of the source text, 780.5/4–1750, not printed.)