986A.524/9–1950

Memorandum by Mr. Robert Thayer of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs to the Ambassador-Designate to Saudi Arabia ( Hare )

secret

Dhahran Airbase is for the most part a civil airport. As you know, it is used extensively by civil aircraft in transit on routes between the Near East and South Asia. The field is located on the normal great circle route between points in the Near East such as Cairo and points in Pakistan and India.

It has never been clear to me whether the desire of the USAF to retain control over the operation of the field is necessitated by the fact that the Saudis are technically and financially incapable of operating it themselves or whether USAF operational control is made necessary by virtue of the possibility of having to mount combat air operations from the base. If the latter, I would expect that in the event of an emergency, civil aircraft would be excluded from the field. If, on the other hand, inability of SAG to operate the base is the reason for USAF retention of control, it seems to me that we should approach the problem of a long term agreement on a somewhat different basis than has been the case in the past.

In that event, I believe that we would wish to recognize the fact that 90% of the operations at Dhahran are civil operations, and that the problem before us can be stated as follows:

“How should the U.S. assist the SAG to operate the civil airfield of Dhahran and how can we best retain the right to conduct necessary military air operations at the field?”

The SAG holds title to Dhahran and it follows that the SAG is within its sovereign rights in retaining operational and administrative control over the entire base if it so chooses. The SAG appears unwilling to enter into a formal agreement which gives up this right even though they are prepared to relinquish it in fact through the device of a jointly appointed administrator in the person of General O’Keefe. The problem is not one of attempting to define the area of responsibility and authority of the SAG as against the USAF. The existing agreement attempts to do this although it is an accepted fact that an airport cannot be safely and efficiently administered and operated under dual authority.

I suggest, therefore, that providing the Air Force concurs, we call a spade a spade and formally acknowledge the full sovereignty of the SAG over Dhahran with all that it implies. We should then insist, that in view of the inability of SAG to operate the field that the two [Page 1190] governments enter into partnership by jointly appointing a mutually acceptable Administrator of the field. During the period of existing military requirements this individual would, of course, be the Commanding Officer at Dhahran. At some future date he might well be a civilian, perhaps a firm such as the private company which ran Kimpo Airfield in Korea under contract with the ECA and CAA, or an individual who might be employed by the SAG. I strongly recommend that we try to provide for the future through such an arrangement. It is always possible that at some future date Dhahran might not be of sufficint military importance as to justify the large expenditures from the military budget which are required to maintain and operate this essentially civilian airport.