Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East,
South Asia, and Africa, Volume V
786A.5/4–1950
Excerpt of Report by the Chief of Staff of the
United States Army (Collins) to the Secretary of the Army
(Gray)1
top secret
[Washington,
April
1950.]
Saudi Arabia
-
a.
- Unfortunately my visit to Dhahran was so short that it was not
possible to make any detailed inspection of the Air Base which,
of course, is under Air Force control.
-
b.
- In my several conferences with Ibn Saud and his principal
advisors, which are detailed in appendices hereto, I was
impressed with the fact that at no time did any Arab raise the
question of the extension of our base rights at Dhahran. I do
not believe this was an oversight but rather, to me, indicated
that at least a subconscious acceptance of the fact that
American Base Rights at Dhahran would be continued.
-
c.
- The thought uppermost in the minds of Ibn Saud and his advisor
was the early implementation of the so-called O’Keefe report,
however modified it might be. I believe that I convinced them
that it would be far wiser to accept a more gradual and modest
modernization of their Armed Forces than that envisaged in the
O’Keefe report.
- (1)
- I am certain that the Arabian officials were shocked
at the cost of the proposed O’Keefe program. They
immediately proposed a monetary grant-in-aid to provide
sufficient funds for military equipment. I believe
Ambassador Childs and I convinced them that this would
not be possible.
- (2)
- At the specific request of the King and his principal
advisors and with the full assent of Ambassador Childs,
I have made a record of our discussions with reference
to the strength and organization of Arabian Forces. A
copy of this discussion is attached hereto as Annex 6. I
have agreed to furnish copies thereof to Ambassador
Childs for transmittal to Ibn Saud.
-
d.
- I am convinced that Ibn Saud is more concerned over possible
warfare resulting from some subsequent expansion of Israel than
he is over any threat from Russia. However, he and his advisors
are fully [Page 1159] cognizant
of how serious such a threat would be, not only to Saudi Arabia
but to the Moslem World. The Arabs would fight to the limit of
their ability if threatened by Russia.
-
e.
- With reference to a proposed token shipment of rifles to Saudi
Arabia (see CM–IN 16971, 4 April
19502), I believe that if Congress approves a
MDAP program for Saudi
Arabia clearance should be obtained from appropriate
Congressional leaders for a shipment of 5,000 rifles and an
appropriate amount of ammunition. Decision as to offering such a
token shipment should rest with Ambassador Childs, who assures
me that he will use the authority only if he finds it necessary
in order to obtain an extension of our base rights in
Dhahran.3
-
f.
- Action to be taken:
- (1)
-
G–3 take appropriate
steps to expedite action leading to the initiation of a
modest MDAP program, on
a reimbursable basis, for Saudi Arabia, including a
token shipment of arms, if such is deemed advisable by
Ambassador Childs.
Annex 6
Saudi Arabia
- 1.
- Shortly after arriving at Riyadh on 2 April 1950,
Ambassador Childs, General Collins, Colonels Johnson, Dodge
and Howze called upon the King, Ibn Saud. The King greeted
the party very graciously and extended a welcome to Saudi
Arabia. The King’s good humor was indicated by the fact that
he gave a detailed account of his capture of the Palace of
Riyadh fifty years ago with a party of only 40 men.
- 2.
- At four o’clock in the afternoon, following customary
procedure, the party paid its respects to the King.
- 3.
- Following this audience, the party then met with Crown
Prince Saud; Prince Mansur, Minister of Defense; Fuad Bey
Hamza, Minister of State and Counselor to the King.
- 4.
- At this conference General Collins outlined the current
status of the O’Keefe report and stated that an abbreviated
copy of this report had been forwarded by the JCS, without any final action
on their part, to the U.S. Secretary of Defense for
transmittal, through the Secretary of State, to Ibn
Saud.4
- 5.
- General Collins pointed out that the whole matter of
military aid to Saudi Arabia was still under study and
emphasized the fact [Page 1160] that no final action would be taken until
Congress authorized appropriations. He further pointed out
that if the usual MDAP
procedures were followed, it would be necessary to
consummate a bi-lateral treaty between the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia. He made clear that this treaty would not be a
military or political alliance but would simply stipulate
the extent of the program and the method of financing it.
The next step would be the completion of negotiations
between representatives of the Arabian government and U.S.
officials to determine the exact nature and extent of the
program.
- 6.
- General Collins then asked if the Crown Prince would care
to have General Collins’ personal observations as to the
type and organization of forces which he would recommend for
the Arabian Army. The Crown Prince and his associates
immediately expressed a desire to obtain General Collins’
views.
- 7.
- General Collins then told the party that he had read the
O’Keefe report. While it represented a very fine study, he
was convinced that the forces proposed would be much too
large and costly to be maintained by the Arabian Government.
He stated that the U.S. Army staff had made an analysis of
the costs involved in such a program and determined that the
cost would amount to at least 107 million dollars. This cost
would cover the provision of equipment, necessary
ammunition, packing, crating and transportation charges and
the establishment of necessary shelter for a U.S. military
mission which would be needed to train the Arabian Army.
Even if this cost were spread over a period of 5 years, the
annual cost would be approximately 22 million dollars. Since
it would not be possible to create and train newly equipped
forces immediately, it would be necessary for Saudi Arabia
to continue to maintain its present forces for some time.
The 22 million dollars for the new forces would be over and
above the annual cost of maintaining the residual current
forces.
- 8.
- When asked what the current military budget was, Fuad Bey
replied it was about 9 million dollars. However, he admitted
that this did not represent the entire military budget. It
was then pointed out that for at least the first 2 years the
annual cost would total at least 31 million dollars since
the bulk of the present forces would have to be maintained.
This would be nearly four times the present military budget.
General Collins stated that he doubted very much that the
country could afford to spend that much money on its armed
forces at this time.
- 9.
- Ambassador Childs pointed out that when the O’Keefe report
was drafted the financial situation of the government was
different from that now existing. In 1949 oil production was
rising with consequent increase in oil royalties; the
O’Keefe report was developed using [Page 1161] a Saudi income
approaching 100 million dollars annually. In the meanwhile
there has been a falling off in the demand for oil and a
cutback in oil production, with the result that in 1950
government revenues were likely to be substantially below
those of the high-water mark of 1949. The Ambassador added
that there was a serious question as to whether Saudi
economy could support the very heavy military charge.
- 10.
- Fuad Bey said the government was well aware of this
problem and that consideration was being given already to
the means of increasing oil royalties. (This short paragraph
should be omitted from the copy of the report forwarded to
the Arabian Government.)5
- 11.
- General Collins then suggested that rather than to embark
on such an ambitious program, it would be far wiser to
initiate a more feasible and modest one. He made the point
that it was not simply a question of money but also the
problem of the ability of the Arabians to absorb the new
techniques and to establish and to train the essential
non-commissioned officers and experts who would be required
to handle this equipment. He pointed out that it would take
some time to establish schools and to develop competent
instructors in the Arabian forces. If this were not done,
valuable equipment would stand idle and rapidly deteriorate.
Should such equipment be seen by visiting Congressmen from
America it would have a very bad effect. It might well
result in the curtailment of the program. General Collins,
therefore, suggested that it might be well to start with an
Army force of three infantry regimental combat teams and a
modified mechanized cavalry regiment.
- 12.
- General Collins outlined to the Arabians the American
triangular system of organization under which each unit
consists of three smaller homogeneous elements plus a fire
support unit. This type of organization is designed
primarily for an attack. For any attack there must be three
elements; first, the force which finds the enemy and holds
him in place. This is called the finding and fixing force.
Next, there must be a maneuvering unit which is employed to
outflank the enemy who has been fixed in position by the
holding force. Third, it is necessary to have a reserve in
order to carry home the attack and destroy the enemy. Each
of these homogeneous units requires the movement of men and
equipment over the ground. It is necessary for the commander
to have a fourth element by which, without the movement of
men or equipment, he can shift his supporting fires to
assist any part of the attack. This fourth element is called
the fire support unit.
- 13.
- All U.S. Army organizations are based on this theory of
attack. For example, a platoon consists of three rifle
squads and a fourth light [Page 1162] machine gun squad, the latter being the
fire support element. A company consists of three platoons
and a light mortar and machine gun platoon. A battalion
consists of three rifle companies and a heavy weapons
company. A regiment has three battalions and a heavy mortar
company and finally a division consists of three regiments
and an artillery group.
- 14.
- There are two great advantages of this type of
organization. First, young officers familiar with the method
of handling a platoon have no new principle to learn when
they become company commanders, a good company commander can
readily handle a battalion, and so on throughout an
officer’s career. The second great advantage and one which
would have special application to Saudi Arabia, is that, if
after the three regimental combat teams were well trained
and equipped and the government should decide then that it
could increase the size of its army, each of these
regimental combat teams could be expanded to become a
division. This could be done by adding men and material to
each company so as to convert it into a battalion. Each
battalion could be expanded into a regiment and then each
regiment could then become a division. Thus, under the
framework of the program suggested by General Collins, the
Saudi Arabians might ultimately develop three infantry
divisions and a light mechanized division, the latter being
created from the original mechanized regiment.
- 15.
- Fuad Bey then interrupted to say that while this was very
logical, the Arabs had felt that the forces recommended by
the O’Keefe report represented the minimum forces with which
Saudi Arabia could start. General Collins again pointed out
the great costs involved and the lack of wisdom in embarking
on such a large scale project until the proper groundwork
had been laid by training the necessary specialists in
schools.
- 16.
- Without divulging the contents of the O’Keefe report,
General Collins pointed out that he could not agree with
some of the units recommended in the report.6 For
example, the report provided for a parachute battalion or
its equivalent. General Collins told of his experience with
two airborne divisions in the Normandy campaign and pointed
out how complicated and difficult were airborne operations.
He stated that with the relative short distances in Saudi
Arabia it would be better to employ perhaps a mechanized
regiment to seize a given area and then to move troops by
air transport or overland by trucks rather than to parachute
them from the air.
- 17.
- In answer to a query, General Collins began to outline the
method now used of transferring equipment under the Mutual
Defense Assistance Program (MDAP). However, it was necessary to adjourn the
meeting in order that the Arabians might have time for their
evening prayers.
- 18.
- Following dinner, given by the King, the conference was
resumed. In addition to the Americans and Arabs present
during the afternoon discussions the King’s brother Abdula,
headed the Arabian group.
- 19.
- General Collins resumed his discussion of the pricing
methods employed under MDAP. He made clear that considerable equipment
being furnished countries of Western Europe, Greece, Turkey
and Iran was generally surplus to the maximum needs of the
US forces. This equipment was divided, for pricing purposes,
into three categories as follows:
-
a.
- The lowest category consists of such articles as
older types of armored vehicles, small bazookas, and
certain types of artillery of which the US Army has
some surplus above its maximum needs. In the
original program this equipment was priced at 10% of
its original cost plus the cost of rehabilitation,
handling, packing, crating and shipping. This system
was changed so as to eliminate the 10% charge;
however, the cost of rehabilitation and handling,
packing, crating, and shipping has usually amounted
to roughly 25% of the cost of new equipment.
-
b.
- The second category of equipment contains items
which the U.S. needs but are not required for the
minimum supply levels felt necessary for the U.S.
Army. Some examples of equipment in this category
are: certain radios, small arms and ammunition,
mortars, and 105 mm Howitzers. This equipment has
been furnished at its original acquisition cost
which is roughly the 1945 purchase price. These
costs represent approximately one-half of the
current 1950 new procurement costs for similar
items.
-
c.
- The last category of equipment contains those
items which are needed to meet the minimum supply
levels of the US Army. Examples of this category
are: engineer equipment, artillery ammunition,
almost all types of trucks, recoilless anti-tank
weapons. Such items may be furnished at the current
1950 procurement cost if the item can be procured by
the time the US Army needs it.
- 20.
- Abdula then remarked that the Arabian Army wished to have
only new equipment as it had had some bad experience
obtaining second hand equipment in the past. General Collins
pointed out that the equipment that might be furnished them
would be similar to that being used by the United States
itself and being furnished to the Armies of France and
Italy. He stated that it would be necessary to rehabilitate
some of this equipment but that it would be all in excellent
order. It would have a long life if properly
maintained.
- 21.
- Abdula then raised the question as to whether Saudi Arabia
could not be given this equipment as is being done for other
countries. He stated that Saudi Arabia was of great
strategic importance to the U.S. and that the oil from Saudi
Arabia was essential to the U.S. Navy; therefore, the U.S.
should be willing to furnish this equipment to Saudi Arabia
by means of a grant-in-aid. Prince Abdula also pointed out
that the O’Keefe report had been submitted some months ago
and that before that there had been discussions by His
Majesty Ibn Saud, concerning military aid for a period of 2
years and that nothing had come as yet from these
discussions. The inference left was that we did not seem to
be any nearer a meeting of minds than we had been before
these long drawn out discussions.
- 22.
- Ambassador Childs stated that he would assume the
responsibility for replying to certain of Prince Abdula’s
remarks as he was intimately acquainted with the background
of certain of the problems involved. The Ambassador stated
that, as he had so frequently remarked to His Majesty, the
United States Government was a very cumbersome machine. It
was unlike the Government of Saudi Arabia where decisions
could be implemented at the will of one man. Mr. Childs
stated that in his opinion the O’Keefe report was receiving
as prompt a consideration as was to be expected in light of
the many authorities in Washington who had to pass judgment
upon it and all the many other complicated problems with
which the American Government is faced in all sections of
the world. The O’Keefe report, after being studied by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, of which General Collins was a
member, would be referred to the Department of Defense and,
thereafter, to the State Department. When the decision had
been reached between these authorities and the President’s
approval had been obtained, it would still be necessary to
seek Congressional authorization for the implementation of
the report.
- 23.
- The Ambassador recalled Prince Abdula’s statement that the
Saudi Arabian Government considered the O’Keefe report
recommendations an absolute minimum. Prince Abdula had
stated the government desired even more than the O’Keefe
report had recommended. This attitude might be said to be
characteristic of all governments today in the world. In the
United States, as rich as it is, there is great controversy
of the amount of the military budget. No one was ever
satisfied regardless of what the military budget might be.
The great problem today is to fit the military budget to the
financial means available to the country. If an intolerable
burden were placed on a country’s economy it might be a
means of hastening the forces of disintegration and
preparing the way for Communism, against which all are
seeking to guard themselves.
- 24.
- Mr. Childs observed that when Mr. McGhee had visited
Riyadh, the week previous, he had taken great care to
explain that military [Page 1165] grants-in-aid could only be made by the
United States to those countries not financially able to
bear the cost of such aid. Saudi Arabia was financially
solvent and had no external debt. It would be impossible to
justify to Congress, under these circumstances, any request
that the United States should bear the burden of military
aid to Saudi Arabia. The United States was already faced
with a budgetary deficiency of 5 billion dollars and every
American was groaning under the burden of income taxes which
he was forced to pay, not only to support the American
military budget but for military aid to those countries not
in a position to pay for it. It would be out of the question
to expect the American taxpayer to assume the burden of
military aid for Saudi Arabia which was in a thoroughly
solvent financial position. The Ambassador stated he would
ask General Collins to undertake any additional replies to
Prince Abdula’s remarks.
- 25.
- General Collins stated that he fully supported the
position of the Ambassador. He pointed out that it would be
necessary in the United States to reduce the military budget
one billion dollars for the fiscal year 1951 under that
which was appropriated for fiscal year 1950 and that armies
everywhere had to reduce military expenditures in order to
prevent economic collapse.
- 26.
- General Collins then quickly reviewed the world strategic
position as might be estimated by the Soviets. He pointed
out that in the event of another major world war, the Soviet
major effort would most likely be launched against the
countries of Western Europe and England and that a
subsidiary attack would probably be made via Iran or Turkey
to seize the Cairo–Suez area. This latter attack might well
by-pass Saudi Arabia entirely; however, any attack on Cairo
would have to proceed through the Moslem countries, and if
successful, would be a blow to the Moslem world.
- 27.
- General Collins went on to say quite frankly that, in his
judgment neither the United States, nor its Navy, would be
dependent upon Arabian oil in the event of war. He pointed
out that it was likely that neither Russia nor the Western
Powers would be able to obtain oil in any quantity from the
Middle East. Russia would not be able to do so because of
the lack of transportation and both the Western Powers and
Russia would probably take steps to deny Middle East oil to
the other by destroying through bombardment all the great
refineries of the Middle East.
- 28.
- General Collins went on to say that, although the United
States did not regard Saudi Arabia as being in the “front
line”, nevertheless, its independence was of great concern
to the United States. The United States would, from a
strategic point of view, have to deliver its major military
aid under the MDAP programs
to the Western Powers and to the countries in the Middle
East which were in immediate [Page 1166] contact with Russia. He stated that, in
his judgment, based on experience with the appropriations
committees of the Congress, it would not be possible to
obtain a grant-in-aid to Saudi Arabia for military supplies
but that if Congress would approve a program it would be on
a reimbursable basis.
- 29.
- After some further discussion and at the request of the
Crown Prince, General Collins agreed to furnish a transcript
of the entire discussions, including an outline of his
proposals for consideration for the officials of the Saudi
Arabian Government. This transcript is intended to serve
this purpose.
- 30.
- It is particularly interesting to note that not once in
the discussions outlined above was the subject of the
renewal of the lease to Dhahran Air Base raised by any Saudi
Arabians. They gave the impression that they accepted as a
foregone conclusion the extension of U.S. base rights at
Dhahran. (This paragraph should be omitted from any copy of
the report forwarded to the Saudi Arabian Government.7)
