Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

711.56386A/4–1850

Report of the Joint United States Survey Group to Saudi Arabia ²

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

JUSSGSA Field Report With Final Recommendations for the Saudi Arabian Army, Navy and Air Force

general

1. Introduction

a. The Joint United States Survey Group to Saudi Arabia visited Riyadh for the purpose of discussing with His Majesty the mission of the survey group. It was decided that the first objective would be an on-the-site study of Saudi Arabian defense requirements, and would be conducted with Saudi Arabian Army members. American members of the survey group would also determine United States requirements at Dhahran for future consideration in connection with long-term agreement negotiations.

b. To accomplish the mission of the survey group, a number of distinguished military experts representing the three Armed Forces of the United States were chosen by the Department of Defense. These military experts are currently occupying positions of great responsibility in their respective services in Washington. All of these officers achieved records of outstanding distinction in the past war. The United States Government was very careful to select qualified officers who had the theoretical knowledge of military affairs and also required these officers to have a background of extensive military experience under actual battle conditions. His Majesty assigned five Saudi Arabian Army Officers to the survey group to represent the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in accomplishing the assigned mission.

c. His Majesty was informed that the group would establish headquarters at Dhahran Airfield and would cover the Arabian Peninsula by vehicle and aircraft to accomplish the on-the-site study of the Saudi Arabian Government’s internal security. Headquarters, United States Air Force, in Washington, directed that Dhahran Airfield would logistically support the survey group mission. Since the Arabian American Oil Company had extensive experience in Saudi Arabia, and facilities throughout the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula, the oil company was asked to assist the survey group in its mission. Mr. Floyd Ohliger, Mr. George Johnson, and Mr. Richard Kerr were the principal Aramco officials who contributed much of their time and effort to the successful completion of the survey group’s studies. Mr. Kerr acted as Liaison Officer between the survey group and Aramco, and accompanied the survey group on all of the ground vehicle survey trips in the capacity of Field Manager. It is pertinent to state at this time that the on-the-site study would have been impossible without the full cooperation of the Arabian American Oil Company. Both the Saudi Arabian Government and the United States should be grateful to Aramco for their unselfish efforts in accomplishing the survey group’s mission.

2. Travel

a. The survey group made four separate vehicle trips. The routes covered were, generally, throughout the Hasa Province, the southern Nejd east of the Tuwaiq Mountains, the northern territories in the vicinity of the Tapline, and the central Nejd in the Hailburaida district. Total vehicle travel in the above areas was 3,825 statute miles. Survey groups objectives in vehicular travel were:

(1) Terrain study.

(2) Climate.

(3) Local tribes.

(4) Saudi Arabian Army garrisons and outposts.

(5) Equipment, arms and training of Saudi Arabian troops.

It was felt that more extensive vehicle travel in the Arabian Peninsula was desirable; however, in the interest of expediting the mission, vehicular travel was kept at a minimum.

b. Vehicular observations were supplemented by air trips throughout the Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea area, and the Gulf of Aden. The entire Arabian Peninsula was covered by air with the exception of the Trucial Oman, Muscat, Hadhramaut, and the extreme eastern Rub ’Al Khali. Aerial surveys were made by the survey group in thirteen separate air trips which traversed air routes of 10,988 statute miles. The aerial survey objectives were:

(1) Road observations.

(2) Topography.

(3) Invasion routes.

(4) Defensive areas.

(5) Coastlines.

(6) Large centers of population.

(7) Large areas of cultivation.

(8) Natural terrain barriers.

(9) Airfields and airstrips.

(10) Ports.

The distances travelled, as enumerated above, included only route miles. In addition to the route miles traversed, the Air Rescue Service unit of Dhahran Airfield supported the survey group in the field by forty-eight support missions which traversed 27,310 statute miles.

The Air Rescue Service unit also performed six photographic missions covering 6,315 statute miles. To summarize, the Joint United States Survey Group’s studies required a total of 44,613 statute miles of travel by vehicle and aircraft.

3. Economic

a. The survey group followed the American concept of military requirements; namely, (1) simplicity, (2) economy, and (3) mobility, in recommendations for the Saudi Arabian Army, Navy and Air Force. This concept resulted in the determination that all vehicles for the Armed Forces should be commercial vehicles suitable for the needs of Saudi Arabian defense and, at the same time, capable of use by the Saudi Arabian Government in support of normal government operations. The type of vehicles should be, in general, such, as those now being successfully used by the Arabian American Oil Company in Arabian desert operations. In addition, the Air Force Troop Carrier aircraft should be suitable not only as troop carrier aircraft, but also for commercial airline operation of the government-owned Saudi Arabian Airlines. Communications, airfields, maintenance shops, etc., should have the dual use of supporting the Arabian Government operations and being readily available if required for the defense of the Kingdom.

b. The American members of the survey group have followed the instructions of His Majesty in making the on-the-site survey of Saudi Arabian defense needs by placing themselves in the position of the Saudis and assuming that it was their mission to defend Saudi Arabia from its enemies. In following these instructions, the survey group has arrived at conclusions which must be carefully analyzed by the Saudi Arabian Government with regard to the ability of the government and its financial structure to support the military organization recommended.

c. National Defense budget data obtained from eighteen major and minor nations may be used by the Saudi Arabian Government in arriving at some conclusion as to its ability to support the recommended Saudi Arabian Army, Navy and Air Force. In terms of the national income, these eighteen nations obligated to the defense establishment, an average of 6 per cent of the total national income. Also these eighteen nations averaged, for defense needs, 19 per cent of the total government expenditures. During the survey group’s visit at Riyadh with His Majesty, Shaikh Yussef Yassin³ and Bey Hamze⁴ were asked to keep these figures in mind as a wise guide for the type of military equipment and the extent of the military establishment which would be desirable for Saudi Arabia. In view of the lack of official figures relative to the Saudi Arabian Government’s national income and budget for the coming year, with a five year forecast, the survey group roughly estimated that the total national revenue for 1949 would be approximately eighty-five to one hundred million dollars.

d. The recommended defense organization for Saudi Arabia is considered by the survey group to be a desirable organization rather than an essential one. The organization can be reduced in strength and cost as determined by the Saudi Arabian Government, keeping in mind that the existing defense organization is in such condition that it requires complete reconstruction, reorganization, re-equipping and training; therefore, the initial cost of the recommended defense organization might appear to be beyond the ability of the Saudi Arabian Government to support it.

e. The recommended defense organization is planned on a five-year program for reconstruction, re-equipping and training. This five-year program is based upon a smooth coordinated effort by both the Saudi Arabian Government and the United States Government. There will be unforeseen delays which might easily extend the recommended five-year program. It is suggested that the Saudi Arabian Government arrange for distribution of initial defense costs over a period of years which would be commensurate with its national income. It is not considered infeasible that the Saudi Arabian Government could budget twenty million dollars each year to its Department of Defense.

f. In obligating Saudi Arabian defense funds to support the recommended defense organization, the Saudi Arabian Government should consider that these costs accomplish a great deal in addition to providing a strong defensive force. Implementation of the defense organization will not only provide a strong internal security for the Kingdom, but will contribute to the progress of the people and the government in improved communications, improved airfields, construction of many types of facilities such as roads, maintenance shops, etc., and above all else, will institute a technical and educational program which will be available to a large bulk of the Arabian population.

g. The American training required for implementation of the recommended defense organization will be made extremely difficult by the scarcity and, in some cases, the total absence of an adequate elementary and scientific educational program for children and young men of the Kingdom. It is strongly recommended that the Saudi Arabian Government take the necessary steps to establish an adequate educational program with recognized standards which will prepare the youth of Saudi Arabia for future service in the defense organization. Basic knowledge acquired by youth during at least eight years of elementary school and possibly four years of high school are very necessary in preparing them to absorb the knowledge required of a modern soldier using modern weapons.

h. If the recommended defense organization is to serve its purpose, it must have full support of its government, financial and otherwise. The defense organization and its General Staff must be organized in such a manner that it will only be under the authority of the Minister of Defense and not be subject to the will or the desires of local Amirs. To accomplish this, the defense organization must be entirely independent of local Amirs in garrisons, billeting, messing and all supporting facilities. In other words it must be an instrument of His Majesty and Minister of Defense and no one else.

summary of requirements

4. Army

a. The survey group recommends that the Saudi Arabian Army consist of approximately 2,700 officers and 39,700 enlisted men organized into:

(1) A GHQ.

(2) Reserves for GHQ.

(3) Two infantry divisions.

(4) Reserves for two divisions.

(5) Parachute Infantry Combat Team.

(6) TD Battalion.

(7) Miscellaneous service support units such as medical, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, engineer, motor pools, and reserves.

b. The recommended Saudi Arabian Army will be trained and advised by a United States Army cadre consisting of about 150 American Army Officers and 240 Enlisted Men.

c. The armament would be modern and that which is normal in the American Army for the recommended units. Ammunition required for a five-year training period will also be necessary.

d. The initial cost for equipping the Army and construction of the necessary facilities is calculated at approximately $80,000,000. This figure is broken down into $46,000,000 for combat units (including trucks, communications, uniforms, and individual equipment); $20,000,000 for service units; and $14,000,000 for construction of items such as barracks, training buildings, instructor (U.S.) quarters, signal repair shops and field hospitals. In addition, in order to provide for the initial Army training at Dhahran Airfield, it will be necessary that additional Army construction be provided at a cost of about $1,700,000.

e. All costs are roughly estimated and are subject to major changes. It is contemplated that exact costs will be discussed in detail during final negotiations. Costs listed do not include Saudi Army pay, subsistence, billeting, nor maintenance cost of the Saudi Arabian Army during its training or active service periods. The costs enumerated above simply include the cost to Saudi Arabia of military equipment which must be provided by the United States to include some facilities necessary to the Saudi Arabian Army and the American Army training program.

5. Navy

a. The survey group recommends that the Saudi Arabian Navy consist of approximately 50 Officers and 215 Enlisted Men organized into:

(1) A Naval Headquarters.

(2) Two Naval Bases.

(3) Persian Gulf Fleet of:

• 2 PGM (Motor Gun Boats)
• 2 PT (Motor Torpedo Boats)
• 2 LCS (S) (Landing Craft Support Small)
• 3 ML (20 to 26 ft.) (Motor Launches)

(4) Red Sea Fleet of:

• 2 PT
• 2LCS(S)
• 3 ML

b. The recommended Saudi Arabian Navy will be trained and advised by a United States Navy cadre consisting of three American Naval Officers and eight Enlisted Men.

c. The armament would be modern and that which is normal in the American Navy for the recommended units. A complete set of spare parts will be provided for all engines and for radio and ordnance equipment. Necessary training ammunition will also be necessary.

d. The initial cost for equipping the Navy and construction of the necessary facilities is approximately $7,800,000. This figure is broken down into $6,500,000 for vessels; $1,200,000 for bases (construction of training buildings, storage, quarters, headquarters, kitchen, etc.); and $100,000 for a five-year ammunition training allowance. All costs, as in the case of the Army, are roughly estimated, subject to change, and do not include Saudi Navy pay, subsistence, or maintenance cost of the Saudi Arabian Navy during its training or active service periods. The costs enumerated above simply include the cost to Saudi Arabia of Naval equipment which must be provided by the U.S. and, in addition, the cost of Naval base facilities which must be constructed by the Saudi Arabian Government, to include training facilities.

6. Air Force

a. The survey group recommends that the Saudi Arabian Air Force consist of approximately 107 Officers and 755 Airmen.

b. The recommended Saudi Arabian Air Force will be trained and advised by a United States Air Force cadre consisting of 26 American Air Force Officers and 38 Airmen.

c. The major items of equipment and facilities for the Saudi Arabian Air Force are:

(1) 28 Super C–47 twin-engine Transports.

(2) 5 C–54 four-engine Transports.

(3) 2 Major Air Bases.

(4) 2 Major Airfields.

(5) 8 Minor Operational Airfields.

(6) 12 Weather Stations (all airfields).

(7) 4 Major Airways Communication Centers.

Necessary training ammunition will be necessary.

d. The initial cost for equipping the Air Force and construction of the necessary facilities is approximately $19,700,000. This figure is broken down into $10,300,000 for tactical and service units (including 33 transports); $3,500,000 for construction (housing, airfields, storage, runways, etc.); and $5,900,000 for spare parts, packing, shipping and maintenance. In addition, in order to provide for Air Force training at Dhahran Airfield, it will be necessary that additional Air Force construction be provided at a cost of about $26,200,000.

e. All costs are very roughly estimated and are subject to major changes. It is contemplated that exact costs will be discussed in detail during final negotiations. All costs recommended do not include Saudi Arabian Air Force pay, subsistence, nor maintenance costs for the Saudi Arabian Air Force during its training or active service periods. The costs enumerated above simply include the cost to Saudi Arabia of military equipment which must be provided by the United States to include airfield facilities throughout the Kingdom very necessary to the Saudi Arabian Air Force.

f. Attention is invited to construction required at Dhahran Airfield for Saudi Arabian Army and Air Force training. It will be noted that in the event the U.S. undertakes training for the Saudi Arabian defense organization, it will be necessary to expand the present facilities of Dhahran Airfield at a cost of about $27,900,000 (Army and Air Force combined). The expansion of Dhahran Airfield would then provide for housing and maintaining some 500 American military personnel, and, in addition, provide family quarters for an additional 53 American military families. The expanded facilities will also provide for 500 civilian personnel which would be necessary for the administration and maintenance of the expanded airfield. Additional housing, messing, and training facilities are provided in the program to process 70 Arabian Army and Air Force students undergoing training at Dhahran. The expanded airfield and its facilities would provide for an Army training program with an Arabian Army student body of 117 Officers and 117 Noncommissioned Officers at one time. The Air Force training program would provide for a Saudi Arabian student body of 100 Officers and 200 Airmen. Saudi Arabian Navy training will be conducted at one of the selected naval bases with a student body of 150 personnel and a 9 month course duration. Three such courses will be conducted consecutively by U.S. Navy instructors.

7. Training

a. In addition to the Saudi Arabian Army, Navy and Air Force student training noted in paragraph 6f above, it is contemplated that selected students would receive training at appropriate U.S. Service schools in the United States in accordance with the following table:

Army:

(1) During first three years: Two separate groups of 59 Officers and 58 Enlisted Men each.

(2) During last two years: Two separate groups of 69 Officers and 58 Enlisted Men each.

Navy:

(1) During first two years: One group of 15 Officers and 52 Enlisted Men.

Air Force:

(1) During last four years: Four separate groups of 30 Officers and 50 Airmen each.

2. This report was better known as the O’Keefe Report. It was named after Brig. Gen. Richard J. O’Keefe, U.S.A.F., Commander of Dhahran Airfield, who was the chief of the survey group. The survey team had spent the period from September 1 to October 22, 1949, in Saudi Arabia studying that country’s security requirements and ways in which United States requirements at Dhahran Airfield could be correlated with Saudi Arabian military needs. The group’s mission was outlined by Ambassador J. Rives Childs to King Ibn Saud in an aide-mémoire of May 30, 1949, printed, along with other documents relating to the survey group, in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vi, pp. 1573 ff. The group’s report was completed and submitted on January 3, 1950, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Air Force, for review. He in turn submitted it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 19, 1950, for study as a matter of priority.

   The source text was enclosed in a letter from Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson to the Secretary of State on April 18, 1950; not printed. In his letter, the Secretary of Defense said the enclosure was a condensation of an abridged report. He recommended that the Department of State transmit a copy to King Ibn Saud together with a statement telling him that a great mass of detail had been omitted, but “the detailed report would be available for the detailed working out of arrangements between his Government and the United States Mission to Saudi Arabia.” He further requested the King be informed that: “No action has been taken on the report and no inference should be drawn that it has been approved by the United States Government, particularly as to the size and composition of forces recommended. However, the report is under study.” (711.56386A/4–1850)

   A memorandum dated June 26, attached to a file copy of the letter, stated that the Department of State had decided in April not to transmit a copy of the O’Keefe Report to the King. An undated memorandum, also attached, said: “The consensus is that this report be placed in our file and not be sent to Jidda. It would only give us headaches we need not have.”

   A complete copy of the O’Keefe Report is in the Department of Defense files.

3. Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia.
4. Fuad Bey Hamza, Adviser to the King.