The matters which I have brought to your attention cover so wide and
detailed a range, that I have thought it convenient to summarise
them in the enclosed memorandum.2 The first part deals with Israel’s supply position
and the need for stockpiling in advance of a possible emergency. The
second part relates to Israel’s immediate military needs which I
have described to you during two of our conversations. I should be
grateful if opportunity could be afforded for Ambassador Eban and
Colonel Herzog to discuss these matters further in the United States
Department of Defence.
In this connection I cannot refrain from expressing one general
reflection. The uncertainty affecting the question of the defence of
our region weighs very heavily upon us and disturbs us deeply.
In conclusion, may I send to you my most cordial greetings on the
festive season and my best wishes for your continued health and for
success in your labours on which so much depends for the peace and
freedom of the world.
[Enclosure]
confidential
Memorandum
i
The present world tension has caused the Government of Israel to
examine its position in the event of any further aggravation
which might affect the Near East.
2. Israel’s population is increasing at a rate unprecedented in
the development of any country. The Jewish population of
Palestine in 1948 was 650,000; Israel’s population today is over
1,300,000. Immigration is continuing at the rate of 200,000 a
year; the possibility of war is an additional incentive for Jews
to expedite their departure from certain countries of Europe and
from the Arab world, while the opportunity still exists.
Although Israel already has many notable achievements to its
credit in the increase of its productivity, it is obvious that
such increase cannot yet keep pace with this rapid expansion of
population. Israel has plans whereby it hopes within three or
four years to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency and a
considerably higher degree of industrial production. When that
stage is reached Israel will be less dependent on imports for
the provision of
[Page 1079]
its
most essential supplies in food and other consumer goods. In the
meantime that dependence is very marked indeed. Israel’s
imports, paid for in foreign currency, total about $200,000,000
annually.
3. The high degree of Israel’s dependence upon its sources of
supply abroad, especially in the United States, is further
enhanced by the situation now prevailing in the Near East.
Israel has no contacts of trade or communications with any of
its immediate neighbours. Its single life-line for all essential
supplies reaches out across the Mediterranean Sea towards the
Western world.
4. Thus, even in the event of a temporary interruption of
maritime communications in the East Mediterranean, Israel would
be in danger of losing its current supplies of food and of raw
materials. Its population would be threatened with famine and
its industries with paralysis. Owing to its rapid increase of
population, Israel is even now barely able to cope with its
current needs and has obviously been in no position to build up
reserves or stock-piles in any essential commodity.
5. It is therefore imperative for Israel, as a matter of
elementary precaution, to take immediate steps to build up
reserves of essential commodities, especially grain, preserved
foods, oil seeds, feeding stuffs, petroleum products and basic
raw materials for its industries.
6. While the existence of such stock-piles is a vital necessity
for the State of Israel, it could also be an important asset for
the United States in its capacity as a world power with an
interest in the defence of the Near East. Any power with
possible military commitments in this area would be gravely
handicapped by the absence of supplies with the resultant
necessity to build up reserves in conditions of actual
emergency, perhaps even under fire. The prompt transportation of
such reserves to Israel in advance of such an emergency would
thus solve an important defence problem. It is realized that
this problem may well exist in relation to other strategically
situated areas; it certainly does not apply in the same degree
to the Arab countries, none of which is experiencing a similar
growth of population, and most of which have a surplus of food
available for export and for the stock-piling of their own
reserves.
7. Israel’s supply position is directly related to its defensive
capacity. Israel has declared its determination to fight, if
necessary, in the defence of its democracy. The importance of
this pledge is reinforced by the fact that Israel has a manpower
potential for combat duty in the neighborhood of 200,000, which
figure is constantly growing as the population increases by
immigration. Moreover, Israel’s factories, whether devoted at
this time to the manufacture of war material or to the
production of civilian consumer goods, could, as they stand, and
even more so after suitable improvements or conversions, furnish
important sources of supply such as food stuffs,
[Page 1080]
clothing, equipment, etc. for
any forces operating in this area. Even during World War II,
despite adverse political circumstances and without the powers
and potentialities of statehood, the Jews of Palestine made a
disproportionately significant contribution towards the Allied
war effort, including maintenance and replenishment of Allied
supplies. Today that potentiality is greatly increased. Yet
Israel’s ability to defend itself effectively and to render
assistance to any larger effort of defence now depends on an
effective interim solution of its own supply problem, pending
the attainment of a stable balance of production and trade. If
its supplies of food and raw materials are consolidated by the
timely building up of reserves, Israel can be a unique and
powerful asset to any cause which it helps to defend in the Near
East.
8. For these reasons, the establishment of these stock-piles in
advance of an emergency would both serve the interest of
Israel’s security and powerfully increase the defensive
resources of democracy in the Near East. This dual objective
might well be attained by a project along the following lines:
- (a)
- The United States would establish in Israel territory
stockpiles of essential materials, especially grain,
preserved foods, oil seeds, petroleum and the basic raw
materials for industry. These commodities would remain
the possession of the United States Government and, if
necessary, be kept under its direct supervision.
- (b)
- These stock-piles would be greater in quantity than
Israel’s annual needs. Israel would withdraw from them
according to its current requirements and the United
States would replenish the stockpiles in order to
maintain them at a fixed quantity. Israel would pay for
the materials that it withdrew at any given time.
- (c)
- Arrangements for transportation, storage and payment
would be made by agreement between the United States and
Israel, after negotiation between Israel representatives
and the appropriate departments of the United States
Government.
ii
9. In the military sphere, on the understanding that the Middle
East is a vital area for the democracies to defend, Israel is
anxious to be in a position to contribute as effectively as
possible to the security of the region. The military achievement
of the Jewish population of Palestine in World War II and the
record of the Army of Israel in defending the newly born State
against the combined Arab forces in 1948 are a good augury of
the service Israel could render, if its military potential were
developed and organised in good time. In that spirit it is
respectfully requested that urgent consideration be granted to
the following matters, all of which have been discussed in
conversations between the United States Secretary of Defence and
the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs.
[Page 1081]
(a) Arms
No official reply has yet been received to the request for most
of the categories of armaments mentioned in the note of the
Ambassador of Israel to the Secretary of State on 13 February,
1950. Nor has Israel’s deficiency in these armaments been made
good from any other source in the meantime.
(b) Standardisation of
Equipment
The Israel Government is anxious to bring the rifle strength of
its army up to the mark. Moreover, it would like to replace all
its rifles, which are of varying origin, by American rifles.
This would involve the supply of 150,000 rifles and a
corresponding proportion of machine guns to the Israel Army. The
Israel Government would like to discuss possibilities of paying
for these weapons and for the arms released under (a), above, through short-term credits
(four or five years), if it is not found possible to provide
them without payment as part of projects for the consolidation
of the defence of democracy in the world.
(c) Israel’s Arms
Factories
These, if fully utilised, are capable of producing more of
certain types of medium and light weapons than is necessary for
national purposes alone. It is suggested that the United States
utilise this facility which is without any parallel in the Near
East. Assistance by way of expert advice, provision of adequate
raw materials, and the despatch of machine parts and tools could
increase both the quantity and quality of Israel’s arms
production.
(d) Improvements in
Israel’s Port Facilities (e.g. Haifa and Elath)
Such improvements would enhance Israel’s value as an asset in the
defence of the Near East against aggression.
(e) Expert Survey
A discreet expert survey, undertaken without undue delay under
United States auspices, of Israel’s military and industrial
potential as well as of its installations and communications,
would be an invaluable and prudent prelude to any plan for the
defence of the area.
(f) Vacancies Allotted
to Israel Students
The recent limited increase of the vacancies allotted to Israel
students at United States Military Schools is appreciated. It is
hoped that favourable consideration will be given to
applications submitted for entry to the State [Staff]3 College
at Fort Leavenworth, where it is understood, students from 22
countries outside the United States are receiving
instruction.
(g) Israel’s Security
Grading
It would similarly be appreciated if Israel’s security grading
were adjusted so as to enable Israel attaches to receive
“restricted” material which would be of great use for training
purposes.
(h) Defence Orders
It is submitted that in considering the issuance of Defence
Orders authorising the export from the United States of raw
materials, essential supplies and capital goods consigned to
Israel, the Department of Defence should fully bear in mind both
Israel’s special problems and its potential value, as set forth
in this memorandum.
[Page 1082]
10. It is hoped that an opportunity will be granted for the
Ambassador and the Military, Naval and Air Attaché to discuss
these proposals in detail with the competent officials of the
United States Department of Defence.
New York,
December
23, 1950.
