357.AC/11–1550
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward P. Maffitt, Adviser to the United States Delegation at the United Nations
Subject: Palestine
| Participants: | Dr. Ralph Bunche—Director, Division of Trusteeship, UN |
| General William Riley—Chief of Staff, Palestine Truce Supervision Organization | |
| Ambassador Gross,1 Mr. Ross, Mr. Ludlow,2 Mr. Rockwell, Mr. Maffitt |
The above met in Dr. Bunche’s office late Saturday afternoon, the 4th, to discuss Palestine developments. Dr. Bunche reported that Dr. Farid Zeineddine (Syria) had approached him on October 27 indicating a conciliatory attitude toward the Palestine issue. He said he had come to the conclusion that the present would be a propitious time to wind up the Palestine question and he wondered whether Dr. Bunche would arrange for a talk to be held between the Egyptian Foreign [Page 1044] Minister, Ambassador Gross, Dr. Bunche and himself. Some skepticism regarding the depth of the Arabs’ conciliatory feeling was voiced, but it was felt that Zeineddine’s idea should be followed up. Ambassador Gross was disposed to attend the proposed meeting and Bunche said he would so inform Zeineddine.
Although it was clear that the meeting proposed by Zeineddine had nothing to do with present Palestine matters before the Security Council, it was agreed that developments in the Council, such as the submission of a resolution, might complicate or obstruct the conversation suggested by Zeineddine. In that connection Gross reported that Tsiang (China) had told him that morning that he thought Fawzi (Egypt) had suggested he present a resolution calling on the Israelis to evacuate Bir Qattar and take back the expelled Bedouins. Tsiang was not very clear about just what Fawzi had suggested he do, because of Fawzi’s “Dance of the Seven Veils” technique, but gathered that the Egyptian wanted him to check around among the Members and ascertain their reaction to such a draft resolution.
Ross said he thought the Israelis had authorization to depart somewhat from their rigid line. Bunche said that if the Arabs, or any of them, really wanted settlement, something might be done. Riley added that Fawzi had told him that if Bir Qattar and the Bedouin matter were cleared up satisfactorily to Egypt, he might be able to proceed toward a non-aggression pact with Israel in association with other Arab States. This would be more a psychological than a practical matter since the Armistice Agreements already contain adequate undertaking against aggression.
It was felt among the group that an effort should be made to have the Security Council meeting scheduled for the following Monday put off, and Bunche and Riley undertook to talk to Shiloah (Israel) and try to persuade him to commit the Israelis to get out of Bir Qattar by Monday. If successful they would inform Gross who would call Tsiang and explore the possibility of the latter’s suggesting to Fawzi that the Egyptian seek postponement of the meeting.
Clarifying the Yarmuk situation somewhat, Riley said that while technically, in accordance with the maps, Israel had a right to be in the enclave, equitably it did not since the land was undeniably Jordan territory. The Jordanian, el Jundi, who had signed the map had apparently been nodding. He did not think that Israel would leave the territory until the issue went through the Mixed Armistice Commission.