Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

357.AC/8–2150: Telegram

The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Jerusalem, August 21, 1950—4 p. m.

46. Palun 382. On August 17 PCC had meeting at Israeli FonOff Tel Aviv. I gave Israel FonMin résumé PCC position for peace negotiation between Arab states and Israel and stressed desirabilty favorable Israel attitude question of compensation. I also gave account of PCC activities Egypt and Jordan and read brief summary of views of Jordan PriMin (Palun 379¹) re negotiating peace settlement with Israel. FonMin replied by general restatement Israeli position and promised full written reply at later date. Both FonMin and Shiloah appeared very much interested in Jordan suggestion re the special committee, but both gave evidence of considerable scepticism as to actual intentions of Jordan Government this regard. PCC did not officially inform Israelis of suggested territorial concessions which Jordan had indicated would be necessary as indication of Israeli desire to work out territorial settlement, but both FonMin and Shiloah were clearly aware some specific proposal had been made.

Evening of August 18, I accompanied Shiloah to his house at his request. Shiloah analyzed at great length what we thought were motives behind apparent Jordan willingness re-establish special committee. He was very sceptical that Jordan Government had any serious intent reach actual settlement by this means. Shiloah said he had two excellent reasons confirming his convictions: (1) King had not communicated with him as had always been case in past when Jordan actually meant business; (2) announcement on Arab radio of appointment of Hamad Bey Farhan and Azmi Bey Nashashibi is clear indication that Jordan Government did not expect to accomplish anything through special committee. Shiloah said that he was himself prepared to sit on special committee and would expect Jordan to appoint someone with equal authority. Shiloah agreed with US Del that it was possible that after committee had been set up dels of both sides could be strengthened or replaced by high level officers. He did not think that this was likely however. Shiloah gave very artful reconstruction of what he felt had been background of situation in Jordan leading up to Jordanian proposal for reconstitution of special committee. His account indicated that he had excellent knowledge of King and of political situation in Jordan. Shiloah then continued that he did not think US or UK were in any great hurry for final peace settlement. In his opinion both countries were of opinion that tripartite declaration and armistice agreements were adequate guarantees of stability in NE and it was therefore unnecessary to urge parties to reach final settlement. British after permitting Jordan to annex Arab Palestine had been unwilling to do anything further which might upset AL applecart, and neither US nor UK had any intention of urging Jordan to take any attitude which might put that country at odds with AL. Shiloah said that there were certain circles in both Arab states and UK who advocated policy of keeping AL in existence. In this connection, he referred to conversation he had had with Doctor Cleland² when latter visited Tel Aviv a few months ago. Shiloah felt that it was definitely in interests of US and UK to urge above all Jordan to reach settlement with Israel. With regard to agenda of special committee, Shiloah said he had no objection to Jordan’s adding any question concerning territorial matters which latter might wish to include, but Israel could make no prior concessions as peace offering or conciliatory gesture before sitting down to discuss these matters in committee, and while he ardently hoped that committee might be able to serve useful purpose, he doubted, in light of composition of Jordan Del, it would be possible for special committee to accomplish anything at all.³

[Here follow remaining two paragraphs, dealing chiefly with various views of General Riley, particularly that if the Mount Scopus question were not resolved within the next few months, the Israelis might take military measures to occupy the area.]

[Palmer]

1. Identified also as telegram 40, August 17, from Jerusalem, p. 973.
2. William W. Cleland, Intelligence Adviser in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.
3. In a conversation with Mr. Shiloah on August 22, Chargé Ford learned of the latter’s pessimism regarding the efficacy of high level meetings of military rep represensatives of Israel and Jordan. The Chargé also noted Mr. Shiloah’s “vehemence” in his refusal to accept preconditions to peace talks with any Arab state. The Chargé concluded that the attitude of Mr. Shiloah indicated a “continuing and possibly hardening intransigence Israeli attitude vis-à-vis her neighbors.” (Telegram 106, August 23, from Tel Aviv, 684A.85/8–2350)