784.13/7–3150: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 1
52. Embtel 61, July 31. Dept has read with interest your acct PriMin’s views re Israel’s support for West, particularly his remarks concerning attitude Israeli people re Commie collaboration in event world conflict. Israeli official statements with respect UN action re Korea are gratifying example this attitude.
Dept’s policy re NE is based on desire for stability and peace that area as whole. Our participation in and support of such activities as PRA and Point IV are intended help achieve this end. Such statements as tripartite declaration are indicative our endeavors restore confidence and foster security in area. These policies and activities have merit of helping NE states to help themselves and of assisting them more effectively to play their individual and regional roles in world affairs.
Three-year immigration program providing for movement approx one million people and direct mil assist by USG for greatly augmented Israeli Army are concepts whose implementation wld be contrary to present programs and policies and wld thereby jeopardize current progress toward area stability and peace.
Furthermore, US requirements in light of internatl situation and US commitments around the world, particularly in Europe and Far East, wld make such concepts as those of PriMin impossible to implement.
Dept considers it advisable that prior to ur departure you seek opportunity to convey Dept’s views to PriMin along foregoing lines.2
- This telegram was drafted by Messrs. Wilkins and Day on August 4. Acting Secretary Webb took the message on August 7 to President Truman, who read it and “generally agreed that this was the right line to take.” (Memorandum of conversation by Mr. Webb, Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444) Before being transmitted to Tel Aviv, the message was cleared by officers of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program in the Office of the Secretary of State and of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, and by the Department of Defense.↩
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Ambassador McDonald, on August 17, informally conveyed the substance of telegram 52 to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. The latter “was obviously disappointed but made no comment.” (Telegram 99, August 18, from Tel Aviv, 784A.13/8–1850) The same message advised the Department of State that a visit by the Prime Minister to the United States had not been decided on but that he would not make the visit unless the Department had no objection and that he would be able to see President Truman.
Chargé Ford advised, on August 20, that “government leaders at last realize Ben-Gurion’s explanation of plan to Ambassador McDonald was premature and consider Ben-Gurion’s action as blunder”. He indicated also that Mr. Kollek’s hasty departure to the United States on August 19 was ‘indicative state nervous agitation government circles result final recognition Ben-Gurion’s blunder. Ultimate manifestation nervousness was when Ben-Gurion went so far as to tell Ambassador McDonald during their final conference August 17 he had no intention Ambassador’s reporting his plan Washington, that he was merely ‘talking personally’ to Ambassador.” (Telegram 101 from Tel Aviv, 884A.10/8–2050)
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