320.2AA/7–2650
The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to Dr. Francis Wilcox, Chief of Staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
My Dear Dr. Wilcox: I should like to give you the following justification for restoration of the full amount of $27,450,000 authorized for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:
A recommendation from the Appropriations Committee to cut the above amount by 10 percent1 was not accompanied by any reasons for doing so.
In the Palestine Refugee Program, the Department presents to the Congress a definite program, carefully designed and documented, to do a particular job in a sensitive area, for a sum of money that is [Page 959] moderate when weighed against anticipated accomplishment. The budget of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine, Refugees of $54,900,000 was based on studies made by technicians, under the guidance of Mr. Gordon Clapp, Chairman of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East. This program received unanimous acceptance by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee reported unanimously when considering the authorizing legislation.
Authorizing legislation provides that the United States contribute half of this sum, or $27,450,000. Added to the contributions of other nations, who have begun to make gratifying responses to this need, the Agency will use a major part of this budget to help the Arab refugees to help themselves by putting them to work on public projects which the Clapp Mission recommended as beneficial to the economy of the nations surrounding Palestine. These states are poor, among the poorest in the world. They are not able to care for the refugees themselves. And so the refugees have stayed, for more than two years now, in camps and caves, or under temporary shelter, recipients of a dole of food and clothing from international sources, in idleness.
The problem is to bring direct relief to an end, and create opportunities for works projects that will help the economic development of countries bordering on Israel. If the works program does not succeed, the United Nations will be faced with a continuing problem of providing doles for relief to the refugee population, the principal casualties of the Israeli-Arab hostilities. If the full budget of the Agency is not met, it can safely be predicted that the cost of caring for this indigent refugee population will continue for a longer time than it otherwise would.
The longer these unfortunate people remain in indigence, the more they are prey to every kind of political subversion. The Department has become increasingly concerned in recent months at growing evidence of the activity of communist agitators among these people. Refugees who have lost homes, land and work are an easy mark for the blandishments of communism. At least, they reason, things could not be worse than they are. What we wish to do is, in cooperation with local governments, give them at least the opportunity to earn their living once again, by their own effort.
The Arab states where this effort is taking place lie in one of the most strategic areas of the world, as Admiral Sherman2 has testified before your Committee. For a comparatively small sum, we can add to the stability of the area, contiguous to Greece, Turkey and Iran. [Page 960] All of our help to these latter countries could be wasted if their southern flank is weakened by dissension and subversion.
Already the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East is a bright spot on the Near Eastern scene. Local governments are cooperating with the Agency, after an initial period of distrust. Refugees are requesting work. The Agency is directing this willing pool of manpower into a constructive effort.
Under these circumstances, a cut of 10 percent would have at least three unfortunate results. First, it will discourage other governments from contributing to the Agency; we have taken the leadership in encouraging such contributions. Second, the reduction of American and other contributions will fall entirely on the constructive phases of public works, many leading to settlement of refugees, the essence of the Clapp plan. Third, as there has already been delay in starting a works program, resulting in a heavier relief burden than originally contemplated, there is now more need than ever for the full amount of funds budgeted. It would indeed be unfortunate if a plan so well worked out were to suffer or fail for lack of a marginal difference of $2,750,000.3
Sincerely yours,
- The Department on July 10, had notified Ambassador Blandford concerning this development, pointing out that similar or deeper cuts had been made in all other foreign aid appropriations (telegram 17, identified also as Unrap 33, to Beirut, 320.2AA/7–1050).↩
- Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations.↩
- The Department, on August 1, informed Ambassador Blandford of the Senate action the day before to restore the full authorized appropriation of $27,450,000 (telegram 76, identified also as Unrap 42, to Beirut 320.2AA/8–150).↩