Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

396.1–LO/6–1750

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John R. Barrow of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs

confidential

[Washington,] June 17, 1950.

Subject: Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950.

Participants:	Dr. Chas. Malik—Minister of Lebanon
	Mr. Hare—NEA
	Mr. Rockwell—ANE
	Mr. Barrow—ANE

Problem: Dr. Malik sought clarification of certain aspects of the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950.

Action Required: None

Discussion:

Dr. Malik raised several questions about the May 25, 1950 Tripartite Declaration to which Mr. Hare responded. The points raised and the responses were as follows:

(1) Dr. Malik referred to the French approach to Lebanon for assurances of non-aggressive intent and stated he hoped this did not mean recognition of a “sphere of influence”. Mr. Hare said it was explained in paragraph 2 of the declaration that assurances had been sought by those countries who had already provided significant quantities of arms. Contrary to the impression that may have been gained, France had not been authorized to seek assurances on behalf of the US and UK; the latter countries would themselves seek assurances from those countries to which significant quantities of arms are provided in the future. There was, of course, no intent to recognize spheres of influence.

(2) Dr. Malik asked if the declaration was addressed to the question of prevention of aggression within the Near East or whether it also had reference to the larger question of aggression against Near Eastern countries by a non-Near Eastern power. Mr. Hare said the former interpretation was correct. Although paragraph 1 of the declaration recognized that the Arab States and Israel need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purpose of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole, the set of premises from which the declaration had been formulated were centered on the security problems within the Near East itself. The approach to the larger problem would obviously involve a different set of premises.

(3) Dr. Malik asked several questions about paragraph 3 of the declaration, viz:

(a) He was troubled by the fact that the declaration referred only to “preparation” to violate frontiers or armistice lines and not also to the “commission” of violations. If, as was conceivable, aggression occurred so suddenly that the “preparation” for it was not ascertainable, was it the intent of the declaration that the status quo ante be restored? Mr. Hare said it was the understanding and intent of the US, and he believed the understanding and intent of the UK and France as well, that if either preparation for or commission of aggression occurred, the three countries would take vigorous action to put matters right. It had not been believed necessary to refer to commission of aggressive acts since this seemed to follow naturally.

(b) Dr. Malik was also disturbed about the placing of the clause “consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations” immediately after the verb “would”. He believed that with this clause so placed, it could be interpreted to mean that if the Security Council failed to take action there would be no obligation on the three powers to act. Mr. Hare replied that there had been no intent in drafting the declaration to set out a formula by which action would be undertaken, and the wording of the declaration should not be given a legalistic interpretation. The purpose of the declaration had been to set forth as simply and clearly as possible the intentions of the three powers with regard to the security problems of the Near East and should be taken at its face value in the spirit in which it was issued.

(c) Dr. Malik asked if the erection of fortifications or the deployment of troops on maneuvers in frontier areas would come within the meaning of paragraph 3. Mr. Hare said that the question could not be answered hypothetically. It was, of course, entirely possible that the erection of fortifications or deployment of troops in a given area would be an entirely legitimate and peaceful maneuver and clearly not fall within the purview of paragraph 3. On the other hand, the erection of the same fortifications or deployment of the same number of troops in an atmosphere of hostility would present a different situation.

Dr. Malik said he was entirely satisfied with Mr. Hare’s clarificacations and that they had confirmed his own understanding. He said he had no information as to the nature of the reply to the declaration being prepared by the Arab League Political Committee. Speaking personally he thought the declaration would, in the long run, be the most important contribution to peace in the Near East made by the three powers—provided it were implemented with honest and sustained impartiality. He wanted, in his personal capacity, to congratulate the United States on it.