Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

684A.85/6–250: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

secret

London, June 2, 1950—8 p. m.

3043. a. Furlonge today gave us following information:

1. Re Arab League action on Jordan’s annexation of Arab Palestine, 2 new suggestions have been put forward which Furlonge thinks generally reflect desire find formula for getting both Arab League and Jordan off hook. First is suggestion by Tawfiq Suweidi to postpone Arab League meeting on question until October. Second is suggestion of Saleh Jabr and Biadh Solh¹ referred Amman’s 117 May 29.²

2. Furlonge referred to report that Israel has offered make concessions to Jordan in Jenin triangle in return renunciation claims by Jordan to Negev. (Amman’s 116 to Department.³) Furlonge says Foreign Office feels it necessary to be realistic about Negev, which Israelis going to retain in any event. Nevertheless, he thought Jordan should proceed carefully on question of settlement with Israel at this time, since this, on top of Jordan’s defiance of Arab League on question of Arab Palestine might have very serious repercussions, including likelihood of other Arab states imposing economic sanctions on Jordan. For this reason he felt Jordan should recognize potential seriousness of such situation and, if it decided resume negotiations, take measures to insure its economy would be protected by insisting on free zone at Haifa.

b. In separate conversation with Sheringham we asked him what Foreign Office thought of numerous recent press reports re armistice violations on Jordan-Israeli borders.

Sheringham said Foreign Office has had no direct reports from its missions re these incidents but that in view persistent press reports, Foreign Office took occasion a few days ago informally to express concern to Israeli chargé here.

Sheringham added Foreign Office feels Israelis may deliberately be provoking these incidents to test efficacy of application Anglo-Jordan treaty to Arab Palestine, although British Minister Tel Aviv discounts this possibility. Sheringham also speculated that reported Israeli interference with Arab harvesters may be calculated endeavor to force Jordan to agree to peace settlement which would be guarantee against such interference.⁴

Department pass Amman; sent Department 3043, repeated info Tel Aviv 41, Amman 17.

Douglas

1. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Lebanese Prime Minister, respectively.
2. Not printed; their suggestion was to “recognize unification of both banks until the liberation of all Palestine; in other words, until the disappearance of Israel” (786.00/5–2950). The message also indicated that “King Abdullah, while finding the formula silly, is prepared to accept it.”
3. Dated May 29, not printed; it reported that King Abdullah had informed Minister Kirkbride of a “message from Israel” to this effect (786.00/5–2950).
4. Embassy London advised, on June 6, that Mr. Furlonge took a less serious view of the reported Israeli-Jordanian armistice violations than did Mr. Sheringham. The Foreign Office official indicated that there had been suggestions that the incidents were part of a calculated campaign by Israel but there was no evidence to prove this point (telegram 3169, 684A.85/6–650).