886A.2553/11–2050: Telegram
The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Hare ) to the Secretary of State
priority
318. Returned from Riyadh yesterday. Reason for summons was desire King discuss recent developments Persian Gulf boundary dispute, particularly situation resulting from British note of November 11 (summary being telegraphed separately)1 and reestablishment of petroleum development oil camp in Abu Dhabi area claimed by SAG.
British note found objectionable by Saudis because: (1) It regarded as indicating further procrastination in setting up fact-finding commission on grounds of need for further detailed study; (2) it placed on SAG the responsibility for establishing claim to territory which King regarded as his beyond dispute; (3) it expressed unwillingness [Page 115] to subscribe to general policy of mutual restraint, and (4) it specifically refused to restrain activity of oil companies in area in question.
In discussion with King and Yusuf Yassin many old members were raked over but nothing new of factual nature brought out unless reestablishment of oil camps regarded. What was evident was that King [quite?] steamed upon subject (with YY,2 I feel sure, making certain that fuel was not lacking) and central theme of discussion was that British were imposing will by force and guilty of “active aggression.” What should SA do to meet this violation of its sovereignty? What was its friend the US going to do? Were our pledges of support only applicable when unfriendly states were involved or would we also intervene when friends guilty of wrongdoing? Should SA meet force with force? Should it refer case to Security Council?
I reiterated our position as being not that of party to dispute but as a friend concerned in satisfactory solution by agreement between SAG on one hand and British and Shaikhs on other. We had accordingly not undertaken to pass on substance of matter both as confined our efforts to suggesting procedures conducive to agreement. What did SAG see as constructive steps to resolve difficulty? YY said and King agreed two steps necessary: (1) to activate fact-finding commission immediately and get to work; (2) to exercise mutual restraint in meantime on all aspects of problem (presumably this stipulation would involve insistence on withdrawal of British oil camp but this not specifically stated).
I asked if SAG had said as much to British. King said no reply made to November 11 note since had thought best consult us first. I expressed opinion SAG should carry on directly with British. We could then, as we had done in past, see if we could do anything as friend of both parties to facilitate negotiations. King agreed this best procedure and that reply to British would be undertaken without delay.
Following this discussion YY dictated outline salient points in Saudi position which being telegraphed separately. Text of British note of November 11 and supplemental details being airmailed.
Saw British Ambassador last night and outlined foregoing to him. He said he had not played much of role in matter but had acted largely as “Post Office box” for transmission of messages, for drafting of which legal experts of Foreign Office largely responsible. I suggested desirability his taking more active interest and made two specific suggestions: (1) that he recommend to London activating fact-finding commission as soon as possible since impasse in that regard was having frustrating effect; (2) that an effort be made to talk over matter [Page 116] frankly with Saudis with view to removing misunderstanding re basic attitudes. Continued exchange of formal notes could hardly be expected to effect this much needed clearing of air.
Trott expressed appreciation for information given, said he thought we had taken correct attitude in obviously difficult situation and expressed intention give our recommendations serious consideration.
Foregoing of course does not face up to government fundamental aspect of problem, i.e., oil. It was clear from discussion with both King and Trott that, although both British and Saudis feel prestige at stake, each feels oil basic motivation of other. In circumstances, negotiation which excludes this factor must necessarily be limited in scope but promises be more productive than continued exchange of recriminatory notes.
Sent priority Department 318; repeated info London 20.
- Telegram 320 from Jidda, November 20, not printed, listed the main points of the British letter. The British letter said a detailed reply to the Saudi Arabian memorandum of September 22 on frontiers was under preparation, but expressed regret that Saudi Arabia had not produced any evidence in support of its boundary claims and stated until that was done the United Kingdom would continue to exercise its rights in the area. (786A.022/11–2050)↩
- Yusef Yassin.↩