674.84A/5–650
Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in Egypt (Ireland)1
Col. Ismail Shirine,2 brother-in-law of King Farouk and principal Egyptian officer on the Egyptian Armistice Commission, invited me to call on him at Princess Fawzia’s house yesterday afternoon in response to my remark, on the occasion of his return from Europe, that it had been a long time since we had seen each other and talked.
Col. Shirine has the reputation of being on excellent personal terms with the King and enjoying his confidence. His marriage with the King’s favorite sister, H. I. H. Princess Fawzia was with the approval of the King. Col. Shirine was, during the premiership of Nokrashi Pasha, chief of the latter’s political cabinet. He also enjoys a general favorable reputation as a bright young man with a reputation for practical thinking. We were together three months in 1945 at San Francisco and we have been on friendly terms since that time. Several conversations with him at the General Assembly meetings in Paris in November, 1948, indicated that he was probably the most realistic of all the Egyptian delegation. I have found him frank almost to the point of indiscreetness, as well as genuinely interested in the future of this country on a realistic and practical basis. My part in the present conversation was to keep him talking. His English is perfect and he makes frequent use of American idioms.
[Page 884]Col. Shirine opened the conversation by saying that he was “wild” with the way he found things concerning Israel had been handled by the present government during his two months trip to Europe. He had even considered resigning from the Armistice Commission. He feared that he had greatly offended Salaheddin Bey by his frank speech.
He had agreed with Salaheddin Bey, however, that the public sentiment in Egypt was still anti-Israel and that any government in Egypt which proposed peace would be in a delicate position. He believed something positive could be done if it were carefully handled with regard to the psychology of the people. He further believed that an Egyptian-Israeli peace would be followed almost immediately or simultaneously by negotiation of peace with Israel by other Arab countries.
Three courses, he said, were now open to Egypt:
I. War. This, he reminded me, was manifestly impossible. Even if Egypt wished to renew hostilities it could not possibly do so for eight to ten years. Egypt had no equipment, no ammunition, and no transport. Every Military Attaché and observer in Egypt knew this. It was, in fact, apparent to everyone.
Notwithstanding the Israeli declarations to the contrary, practically no arms promised under contract with the British had been delivered. Two or three planes had been delivered here and there but the bulk of the material had not been supplied. He was critical of Britain’s and America’s attitude on the subject of Egypt’s request for arms. He characterized the situation as one in which both countries passed the buck to each other, possibly under pressure from the Israelis. In any case, Egypt was getting nothing.
He labelled the idea of an arms race in the Near East being initiated by Egypt or the Arab States as fantastic. Egypt and the Arab States would start from scratch while the Israelis could rely on their imports from Czechoslovakia and other points. Israel’s military potential, in fact, was already immeasurably greater than that of all the Arab States put together. An arms race was, therefore, impossible. It was thus a fact that Israel, notwithstanding its propaganda, was in no danger from an attack from Egypt or any of the Arab powers. Egypt, however, should have arms in the interest of the common defensive position.
He said this lack of military power was a bitter pill to swallow but the Arab loss of the war in Palestine and the current lack of military potential, which could not be remedied for years to come, definitely limited Arab ability to negotiate with Israel.
[Page 885]II. The second alternative was to continue the present situation. This was possible but he held it to be potentially dangerous and therefore unwise.
- (a)
- Israel during the first three weeks of the armistice had started nibbling away at Egyptian territory contrary to the terms of the armistice. It made advances here, and took a point there. This may have been a calculated campaign or it may have been due to natural enthusiasm of the army and its officers. But, in any case, the position had changed greatly to the disadvantage of Egypt in the area between Egypt and Israel and he was afraid it would continue and get worse.
- (b)
- Israel was engaging in a campaign of faits accomplis. The Arabs feared that this campaign would be continued, if not with the tacit consent of the Great Powers, at least without opposition by the Great Powers.
- The Arabs, moreover, could expect no help from the United Nations. The Israelis had disregarded instructions and declarations by the United Nations. General Riley himself was a fine man and, Shirine said, their personal relations were of the best. Riley, however, either acted on instructions from his superiors or from the knowledge that he, fundamentally, was powerless if he found for the Egyptians. He had always urged Egypt “for the sake of peace” to accept violations by the Israelis at the same time he indulged in ineffective remonstrances with Israel. Riley also took certain points of view because he was imbued with the desire to be a great “mediator”. The rest of the Military Commission, Frenchmen for the most part, Shirine described as time-servers, completely ineffectual, and perhaps even venal.
- (c)
- Gaza represented a certain amount of danger to Egypt. Egypt had withdrawn practically the whole of its troops but it was still in occupation. Should Israel occupy Gaza, it would set back the cause of eventual peace. There was a general feeling, moreover, that if the Israelis did move into Gaza, it would be done with tacit approval of Great Britain or the United States. In any case they do no more than look on ineffectively.
- (d)
- Sooner or later, he said, the Arabs expected there would be pressure from the United States and Great Britain, arising out of their impatience with the Arabs, stimulated by Israeli complaints that the Arabs were stubborn and uncooperative.
- (e)
- There might also be pressure from the United Nations through cutting off United Nations funds for refugees.
III. There remained, he said, the establishment of peace. “Let’s not ‘kid’ ourselves”, he said. “Peace means recognition of Israel by Egypt and the other Arab countries. It means going back on our announced and sincerely meant principles but Egypt and the Near East must have peace.”
In discussing the obstacles in the way of peace, he listed the following:
(1) No basis for negotiations had ever been set up by the Israelis.
[Page 886]One hears, he said, that Israel wants peace and that she is ready to negotiate. When one asks the Israelis, however, what they have to propose as a basis for negotiation they merely say, “Start negotiations with us and then you will see how benevolent we can be.”
Egypt could not negotiate on this basis, he said. Once negotiations were started they had to go on to completion. They could not be broken off because the Great Powers would bring enormous pressure, once they are started, to carry through to an end. Moreover, if Egypt starts negotiations it will be the signal for all the other Arab states to negotiate and Egypt might be faced with the prospect of Lebanon, Jordan, and even Syria signing a peace with Israel, leaving Egypt high and dry as the only Arab state which has not signed peace with Israel. Therefore, the items of negotiation must be agreed upon prior to their initiation.
He said, in this connection, that a principal objection by Egypt to separate negotiations by Jordan or any other Arab state was that if Israel once made concessions to Jordan and then afterwards were called upon to make concessions to Egypt, such immense political difficulties would be raised for the Israeli government that the chances of the essential concessions to Egypt would be diminished. It was, therefore, necessary to think in broad terms of peace for all.
(2) No Egyptian Government or head of state can announce peace and recognition at the same time. This job has to be done in two stages:
- (a)
- Delimitation of frontiers with the announcement that Egypt had reached satisfactory arrangements with Israel, with specific achievements. Without such a declaration including the announcement of definite achievement, no Egyptian Government could even approach the second stage, that of recognition.
- In further discussion of what he held to be Egypt’s basic
requirements he emphasized again that the first essential
was delimitation of frontiers. This meant:
- 1.
- Restoration of the situation at Akaba as it was on the day the Israeli-Egyptian armistice was signed.
- He described in some detail the process by which he claimed that Israel had occupied the area in and around Akaba in direct violation of 1) cease-fire arrangements with Jordan, and 2) of the Armistice Agreement with Israel. In addition the area around the head of the Gulf of Akaba represents a defensive necessity for Egypt. Its possession by Israel meant that the whole coast of Sinai and of the Red Sea would require the establishment of defenses by Egypt. Egypt, therefore, was unable to accept the proposal of dividing the area as put forward by the French officer who was in charge of negotiating between Israel and Egypt on this matter. The settlement of this point in Egypt’s favor was essential. He said that Egypt had threatened to take the issue to the United Nations but it did not want to do so since the whole [Page 887] Israeli-Arab question would then be raised with public recriminations on both sides.
- 2.
- Rectification of frontiers, including the points occupied by Israel in violation of the Armistice Agreement.
- 3.
- Gaza. He said Egypt set no great store by Gaza but there was the question of the refugees. Egypt realized that any proposal that Israel would take over Gaza in exchange for assuming responsibility for the refugees was based on false premises. The refugees, either because of actual Israeli treatment or fear of such treatment, would leave the area. The desert southward would not support anyone. He, therefore, suggested that an outlet for the refugees now at Gaza should be made by allotting territory between the coast and the north of the desert, say toward Beersheba, where these refugees might earn a living, precarious as it might be.
- As for the refugee question in general, he criticized the Arab states for adopting an unrealistic attitude. Whether or not the refugees wished to go back or whether Israel itself would be willing to take them back or not made no real difference. The fact was that there was no room for the refugees to return to in Israel. The more quickly the Arab states recognized this point, he said, the quicker better relations would be established with Israel.
- (b)
- The second essential was restoration of confidence in Israel’s pledged word. He said he had talked at great length on this subject with Elias Sassoon, the Israeli negotiator at Rhodes, when the armistice was signed. He had implored Sassoon to see that (1) the armistice terms were kept, and that (2) the question of further talks leading toward peace should not be raised for at least six months. His first request was made on the basis that if the armistice terms were not kept by Israel no Arab could be convinced that a peace settlement would be observed by Israel. Sassoon had emphatically declared that the armistice would be kept. Nevertheless, in three weeks infringements had begun and they had continued. Now every time the question of peace with Israel came up responsible Egyptians shook their heads and referred to the failure of Israel to keep its word.
On the matter of raising peace talks immediately after the armistice, Sassoon had also said that he was in agreement. Shirine pointed out that his request had been based on the necessity for Egyptians to get familiar with working relations with the Israelis on military points. It would then be possible to pass on to the political subjects. Not only had the Israelis demonstrated that no working relations could be established between themselves and the Egyptians but they had also raised too soon the question of peace negotiations.
Shrine then reiterated that even if the delimitation of frontiers were established, some time would then have to elapse before commercial and diplomatic recognition of Israel. To think otherwise, as apparently did the Israelis, was to fail to understand the psychology of the Egyptians and Arabs. It simply could not be done.
[Page 888]He went on to say, in connection with restoration of Arab confidence in the future, that if some guarantee could be given by the United States or by the United States and Britain along the lines of the guarantee such as Britain had extended to the territory absorbed by Jordan (which he approved as the only practical thing to do), he believed much good would be done. He then remarked that whatever genuine fear might exist in Israel concerning the Arabs, the fear of Israel by the Arabs was ten times greater.
Col. Shirine gave the impression that he is tremendously interested in peace with Israel as a practical necessity and his analysis of the obstacles was directed toward the objective of revealing what he deems are Egypt’s basic views concerning peace and not merely toward laying the groundwork for the territorial aggrandizement of Egypt.