785.022/4–2450
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs
Subject: Union of Arab Palestine and Jordan and Extension of Anglo-Jordan Treaty to New Territory.
| Participants: | Mr. Burrows, British Embassy |
| Mr. Greenhill, British Embassy | |
| NEA—Mr. Hare | |
| ANE—Mr. Rockwell |
Problem: The British Foreign Office planned to issue a declaration recognizing the union of Arab Palestine and Transjordan and stating the view that the Anglo-Jordan Treaty applied to the new territory. The Foreign Office hoped the US would be able to issue a declaration of approval of the Union.
Action Required: To consider what action should be taken by the US on the occasion of the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan, and the US reaction to the British démarche.
Action Assigned to: ANE, NEA.
Discussion: Mr. Burrows and Mr. Greenhill called under instructions to leave copies of two telegrams from the Foreign Office.
The first telegram said that, on the assumption that the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan would shortly be proclaimed, it was the intention of the Foreign Office, soon after the proclamation, to announce recognition of the union and to state the view that the Anglo-Jordan Treaty applied to Arab Palestine. At the same time the Foreign Office would announce de jure recognition of Israel. Either at the same time or later, the Foreign Office intended to issue a further statement declaring UK opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any Near Eastern states, and the UK intention of using its influence to prevent any such development.
The second telegram contained the text of the statement which the Foreign Office was considering issuing on the occasion of the proclamation of the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan. In addition to recognition of the union and the extension of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty, the statement declared that in view of the fact that the frontiers between Arab Palestine and Israel had not yet been defined, the UK regarded the territory of Jordan to which the Anglo-Jordan Treaty was applicable as being that bounded by the armistice lines, until such time as definite frontiers were established by final settlement. The statement also declared that the UK did not recognize Jordan sovereignty over Arab Jerusalem, but that, in view of the fact that Jordan exercised de facto authority in the Old City, the UK considered that the Anglo-Jordan Treaty applied to the Old City unless or until the United Nations should have established effective authority there. In conclusion, the statement said that the UK had no intention of establishing military bases in peacetime in Arab Palestine.
Mr. Burrows said that the Foreign Office had given full consideration to the points made by Departmental representatives in the last meeting on this general subject but still hoped the US would be able to make a declaration approving the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan. The Foreign Office believed that such a declaration would be helpful in promoting the Israeli-Jordanian negotiations.
[Page 870]Mr. Hare inquired as to the timing of the proposed UK declaration. Mr. Burrows did not know exactly what the timing was, but thought the Foreign Office would wish to take action shortly after announcement of action by Jordan.
Mr. Hare said that the Department had thought of discussing this subject further during the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. The Department’s policy was not fully developed but, frankly, the Department was still worried by the same points which had been taken up in the last meeting, such as Jerusalem and the position of the PCC. We had been thinking that the ideal situation would be for the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan to take place in the context of a final peace settlement, but we had an open mind as regards other occasions. Unilateral action was not the best method but, if that course were adopted, we had hoped that it would be possible for the union to take place quietly, as a sort of prolongation of a de facto situation. Mr. Hare added that we had also been considering the possibility of US–UK declarations concerning general security in the Near East and of possibly tying them in with the Near Eastern arms situation. We still did not feel that the Jordan union afforded an appropriate peg on which to hang such declarations. We were specifically thinking of the apprehensions of Israel and Egypt, with the idea of seeing if there wasn’t something general which could be applied to the situation. We were planning to put forward certain considerations in London during the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.
Mr. Hare then inquired of Mr. Burrows what the UK thought the reaction of Israel and the Arab states to the declaration would be. Mr. Burrows thought that Israel would protest unilateral action but would not feel too deeply about it. As regards the Arabs, they all would make vocal protests but none would take serious action except possibly Syria, which might close its frontier with Jordan. The UK was prepared to disregard all this. Mr. Hare asked what would be accomplished by a public announcement concerning something which could quietly be accomplished de facto.
Mr. Burrows said that it was essential for the UK to let the Near Easterly states know exactly where it stood concerning Arab Palestine.1 In response to a further question from Mr. Hare, Mr. Burrows said he did not believe that the extension of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty would add a new element to the Israel-Jordan armistice agreement.
[Page 871]Mr. Burrows commented that he thought it was essential for the US and UK to make declarations on the union before the USSR had an opportunity to say something which might create a disturbing influence.
Mr. Hare said frankly that the Department’s position was pretty much the same as it had been when this matter was last discussed. He saw no reason to change our basic attitude.
Mr. Burrows then remarked that if the US was not able to go along with the UK on a declaration on the union, perhaps it could make a general statement about security in the Near East at the same time. Mr. Hare stated that, if the US was not able to go along with the UK on the union statement, the Department might suggest withholding the general statement until we could find a satisfactory common basis for this statement, possibly in connection with the armament situation. We had developed some ideas on this on the working level which were now awaiting top level clearance. If such clearance were obtained, we hoped to bring the matter up in London at the Foreign Ministers’ conference.
Mr. Burrows inquired what the Department would say when the press asked for comments on the union. Mr. Hare replied that the Department might say that the union was a de facto situation which did not require formal recognition. As regards the Treaty, this was a matter for interpretation by the two parties. Mr. Burrows commented that, frankly, London would be “horrified” if the US were to indicate that it disapproved of the Jordan Parliament’s action in proclaiming a union.
Mr. Hare said that this whole thing was a matter which would have to be very carefully thought out as far as the US position was concerned. The situation in the Near East was rather tense at the present time. Two of our Legations had been bombed,2 presumably because of our efforts to accelerate peace between Jordan and Israel. A US declaration of approval of the Union of Arab Palestine and Jordan might be taken as another step in the same direction. It was necessary to let an explosive situation quiet down. The US and the UK were basically after the same thing in this matter, and it was purely a question of tactics. Mr. Hare reiterated that he saw no reason for the Department to change its position as regards a US declaration on the union question or the use of this occasion for a general security statement.
- In a parallel discussion between Embassy officers and the British Foreign Office on April 24, the latter gave its views that the “time had come back Abdullah against Arab League” and that “extension [of] treaty to Israel border should be best assurance to Arabs against possibility Israeli expansion.” (Telegram 2236, April 25, from London, 784.02/4–2550)↩
- The U.S. Legations at Damascus and Beirut were bombed during the evening of April 18. For documentation on the bombing of the Legation at Damascus, see pp. 1201 ff.↩