Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

357.AC/3–3150: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Barco) to the Secretary of State

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Geneva, March 31, 1950—9 p. m.

468. Palun 342. Shortly before Palmer’s and my scheduled departure for Bern at 11 a. m. today to attend luncheon meeting with Egyptian Minister and member Egyptian royal family, Rafael telephoned to say Israel delegation would submit note to PCC today and issue four page summary as press release. He was sending USDel copy of note. It was decided therefore I should remain Geneva to receive note which arrived few minutes after departure Palmer’s train. Israel note is fourteen pages of severe attack on Arab attitude towards direct negotiations and rearming of Arab countries. I feel its importance warrants forwarding it as following telegram (Palun 343¹) for Department’s immediate consideration. Asserting that no negotiations for final settlement have been undertaken and “none are in prospect” Israeli delegation states “Arab states which launched savage war for destruction Israel now refuse negotiate with Israel for settlement problems created by their war.” Israeli note further states “refugee question only exists as result war launched by Arab states.” Asserting that Arab states “actually laid claim to entire territory Israel with exception small strip in coastal plain and Valley of Jezreal,” Israel note says “Arab refusal negotiate became more sinister than ever in light these avaricious demands.” Arab territorial proposals “frankly and wildly expansionist” and “Arab states explicitly covet greater part Israel.” Note states further that “these general considerations assume particular urgency in light current policies Arab governments; these policies consist of program of active rearmament—and campaign of inflammatory utterances whereby public opinion in Arab countries conditioned for renewal of war. Israel Government has authentic information to effect war of revenge against Israel is plan which exercises certain minds at very summit of political power in Arab world. Representatives of US and UK gave assurances Arab states would only receive such arms as essential for internal security and most essential defense. These assurances have been swept completely aside. Governments which have taken up arms against their neighbors and have created only threat to peace yet determined under Chapter VII of Charter are in no moral condition to affect air of injured grievance or dictate settlement to a state which successfully resisted their onslaughts Israel asks nothing of any of these states. But Israel owes them nothing and has done them no injury which merits the ‘compensation’ which they inexplicably demand.” Israel note ends with request to PCC “to convey to each Arab state its readiness to begin negotiations at once by any effective procedure which may be devised, with view to settlement all outstanding questions and attainment permanent peace.”

General tenor of note is all-out attack on Arab position. At same time it can readily be inferred from note that Israelis not prepared make any concessions to Arab countries. In my opinion, if such statement is made public at this time it will create immediate reaction in Arab countries which will make almost certain a rejection by Arab states of PCC proposal contained in memorandum of March 29. I therefore telephoned Rafael immediately after reading Israel note and requested him and Eban to meet me in Azcarate’s office at close of morning’s session TC. I explained to them when we met that I believed publication of summary their note would be most detrimental to prospects of acceptance by Arab states of PCC proposal. While I did not deny that presentation Israel’s case was plausible and probably justifiable, I felt it would have exactly opposite effect to that which I believed Israel and the Commission wished. Coming at this time it would not give PCC proposal a fair chance nor did I feel that it was fair to Palmer and Boisanger for a statement to be made public which they had not had an opportunity to see. I therefore urged Eban to hold up release at least until Commission had met on Monday and had had opportunity to consult with him.

Eban said Israel Government had been giving long consideration to its statement and could not forego an appeal to world opinion when forces leading to war were gaining ground. Rafael asserted I was assuming tremendous responsibility in asking Israel to remain inactive in face of growing threats to its security and that I was committing US Government to proving that their fears were wrong. I said I felt it was unfair to say that I was assuming responsibility or committing anyone but on contrary responsibility was entirely with them for taking a step which might well prevent the peace talks which they apparently desired. It seemed to me that the important question was whether peace talks could be achieved and if my judgment was correct release of their note would be against Israel’s interests. Eban then revealed in reply to my questioning that Israel delegation had received no instructions from Tel Aviv since transmitting PCC memorandum but that arrangements were already made for release their note simultaneously today in Geneva, Tel Aviv and New York which indicates plan for release was known to Rafael when he reiterated immediately after meeting March 29 his desire to coordinate with me any publicity by Israel delegation or PCC. Nor am I convinced that delivery of Israel note to USDel at 11:40 today was not timed to occur after our departure for Bern, since I had told Rafael on March 29 of our plans to leave at 11 a. m. 31st.

After further discussion all of which was on friendliest basis Eban said that he could not take responsibility for advising Israel Government not to release note but would cancel press release and telephone New York and Tel Aviv to do likewise. He would at same time make known my views to government and be prepared to meet with Commission Monday morning. He and Rafael felt, however, that Israel could not hold up statement indefinitely and again said Commission should first release its memorandum of 29 March.

I believe that Israel should be dissuaded from releasing statement, but if this is not possible, PCC memorandum should be released first to avoid some of damaging effect of Israel statement. Prior release of Israel note, which curiously enough is dated 29 March, date of PCC memorandum, might create impression that PCC action in submitting memorandum was solely at insistence of Israel, which would have damaging effect on PCC relations with Arabs. Meanwhile, Paris edition Herald Tribune March 30 carries story that PCC placed new secret proposals before Israel and Arab states involving direct contact in peace negotiations based on suggestions by PCC. Fisher reports from Jerusalem 30 March that similar stories front-paged all Israel and Arab press. Since PCC announced to Arab delegations situation might arise when release of PCC memorandum would be necessary and the PCC would in such case notify Arab Governments, I believe situation generally requires such action.²

[Barco]

1. Identified also as telegram 469, March 31, not printed; it gave the text of the note to be submitted to the Palestine Conciliation Commission. Its 36 numbered paragraphs dealt with “The Present Situation”, the history of efforts at conciliation, and the “Implications of the Arab attitude”.
2. The Department of State, in reply on April 1, gave its view that “decision rests with PCC and in view developments agrees action along lines last paragraph Palun 342 (telegram 419, identified also as Unpal 249, to Geneva, 357.AC/4–150).