684A.85/3–2850
The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Department of State
No. 171
Subject: Syria’s Attitude Toward Jordan–Israel Peace Move
Prime and Foreign Minister Khalid Bey al-Azm, who leaves early tomorrow morning as head of the Syrian Delegation to the Arab League meeting at Cairo, received me at nine o’clock this evening [Page 823] and for the better part of an hour explained, among other things, his attitude toward Jordan’s peace move with Israel in response to my expression of the Department’s concern in the sense of Deptel 95, March 17. I had previously asked to see him, but he had been too occupied with urgent matters to be disposed of before his departure for Cairo to see me earlier. My call, ostensibly to bid him Godspeed on his journey, offered an opportunity to bring up the subject of his alleged threat (Renter’s report Tel Aviv Embtel 164 March 7 to Department) to retaliate if Jordan signed a peace accord with Israel.
Khalid Bey emphasized that his statement to which I referred had been conditional upon future circumstances that might make it necessary to take steps to protect Syria’s economy. He denied that to declare that Syria would have to consider the possibility of closing its frontier with Jordan if the latter signed an accord with Israel that would have the effect of flooding Syria with Israeli goods, or other competitive products, constituted intervention in Jordan’s or Israel’s affairs. It was merely a declaration of assurance to the Syrians that their economic interests would be protected no matter what Jordan and Israel might do. He pointed out that recently to protect Syria’s economy, the Syrian Government had closed its frontier with Lebanon, a sister state with which it is on cordial terms. Surely this could not be construed as interference in Lebanese affairs. Lebanon did not so consider it, for only today he had been to Beirut and had conferred and amicably agreed with the Lebanese Government on a common front in the forthcoming Arab League meeting. If Syria was free, as no one would seriously dispute, unilaterally to regulate its commerce with a friendly sister Arab state such as Lebanon, how much more so was it free to regulate its commerce with Jordan if the latter endangered Syrian economy by an agreement with Israel whose militant aggressive expansionism was well known. If that could be construed as intervention, how was my communication any less so? Was it permissible for a big state to tell a little state how it should protect its own interests but not within the little state’s right to decide for itself how its own interests could best be protected?
I replied that one seemed to me to be in the nature of a threat against another state (Jordan) if it did what it evidently considered to be in its own interest, whereas my démarche was in the nature of friendly persuasion to endeavor to make him see how his statement, evidently designed for home consumption, had had a disquieting effect abroad which might tend to impede what seemed like a healthy trend toward the resumption of more normal relations in the area as a whole. He said that he did not question my own friendly motives, but the United States, while pretending to be a friend of the Arabs, seemed always to favor Israel. We had intervened, he said, to help Israel establish [Page 824] itself against the will of the indigenous population; we had intervened to prevent the Arabs from defending themselves against Zionist aggression; and now we were intervening to try to persuade those who are merely trying to protect their own interests that they should not do so. I replied that in our view it was in the interest of all states in the area to restore normal relations. He countered that that was for each state to decide for itself; if Syria should come to believe that its interests so dictated it would act accordingly. He was not convinced that a so-called peace agreement between Jordan and Israel would serve the cause of peace in the Near East. As he now saw it, the U.S. appeared not only content with Israel’s territorial conquests but wants as well to see Israel expand its economic position to encompass all the Arab lands. The agreement which we favor with Jordan was in that direction; instead of a “Greater Syria,” we would see a “Greater Israel.” I said “Why not a “Greater Jordan?” He shook his head and said: “Abdullah represents only himself, and they (the Israeli) are too much for Him!”
With respect to our vaunted desire for peace, said Khalid Bey, one might ask why we do not make peace (end the cold war) with Soviet Russia, which like Israel says it seeks peace. As far as Syria is concerned the situation is similar with Israel; there is an armistice which Syria has no intention of violating; Syria will not attack Israel, but will defend itself if attacked. If Israel respects the Armistice, the existing “peace” will continue. I might assure my government, he said, that Syria will take unilaterally from time to time for the protection of its own economy such action as it considers necessary whether with respect to Israel, Jordan or any other state, just as it has done recently in its relations with its friendly neighbor Lebanon. As for political measures, they would be taken in consultation with other Arab states.
In conclusion, Khalid Bey said sadly that he couldn’t understand why the United States persists in rebuffing and alienating Arab friendship and in burdening its back with Arab ill will by continuing to favor Israel against the Arabs. Other countries, he said, seemed to be able to be friends impartially with both the Arabs and the Israeli, but while we profess equality of friendship we prove by our action, such as my intervention, that we still play Israel’s game. Without admitting that in this instance our action was evidently inspired by Shiloah of the Israeli Foreign Office (Tel Aviv Embtel 164, March 7), I assured him that our policy is one of strict impartiality and that my Government’s démarche in this instance was in its considered opinion as much in Syria’s interests as in any other’s. He reiterated, and gave details to support, his previous statement that it would not serve Syria’s economy to permit trade to flow freely into Syria from Jordan in the circumstances envisaged, although he admitted [Page 825] that Syria might continue to admit such few products as now come from Jordan: some wheat and some sheep. He pointed out that Israeli goods are already prohibited entry into Syria and that his statement to which I had referred was intended only to reassure his compatriots that there would be no breach in the embargo which had been imposed solely for Syria’s own protection.
I felt it unwise to labor the point, for, as he had himself pointed out, his original statement was conditioned on future developments that might or might not come to pass and which if they come to pass might have a different issue than that now envisaged.