474.418/3–1050
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State1
Subject: Near Eastern Armaments Situation
| Participants: | S—The Secretary |
| Senator Herbert Lehman of New York | |
| Mr. Edelstine, Legislative Assistant to Senator Lehman | |
| ANE—Mr. Rockwell |
I received the Senator and Mr. Edelstine at the Senator’s request. We discussed the question of the British shipment of arms to the Arab states, and particularly to Egypt, for approximately one-half hour.
The Senator opened the conversation by stating that Great Britain was now shipping heavy military equipment to Egypt and the other Arab states. He said that the military balance in the Near East had thereby been disturbed, and that Israel for its own security was now forced to spend precious dollars to acquire arms to defend itself. The Senator added that he was sincerely alarmed by the situation, not only because Israel was being forced to spend for military equipment money which could much better be used within Israel, but because the security of Israel was so seriously threatened.
I said that this situation was a matter of deep and continuing concern to the Department, and that we were maintaining a very close watch on developments. It was essential, we thought, that peace and stability be established and maintained in the Near East. There were, of course, two elements involved in the situation. One was the relationship between Israel and the Arab states, and the other was the Soviet threat to the Near East and the oil fields there and the desirability that the states in the area be generally strengthened in order to be able to contribute as much as possible to the defense of the region. We felt that the overall situation could not be considered without giving full weight to both of these factors.
With regard to the first factor, I said that we were encouraged by continuing developments to believe that the trend in the Near East was away from war toward peace. I mentioned the talks now going on between Israel and Jordan, and the Israeli-Egyptian agreement concerning the disposition of certain “no man’s land” areas near Gaza. If an Israeli-Jordan five-year nonaggression pact should be signed, as it was entirely possible that it might be, there would be no reason to believe that similar or related agreements might not be reached between Israel and the other Arab states. I said that we sincerely did [Page 800] not believe that Egypt was planning to attack Israel. If we received any signs that Egypt was making serious preparations to do so, we most certainly would get together with the British and take strong steps to prevent this.
With regard to the second factor, I said that the Senator would appreciate that the Near East was an extremely vital strategic area from our point of view. The military situation of the Western powers vis-à-vis the Soviet Union made it desirable for us to rely as much as possible and wherever possible upon the military strength of friendly nations, such as this strength was. This did not mean that we thought that Egypt could stave off a Soviet attack. However, we did think that Egypt could be helpful in defending the Suez Canal and the Near Eastern oil fields. The Senator was of course aware of the strategic importance in the Near East in British military planning in the two past wars. We knew that the British had assigned the highest priority, militarily speaking, to this region. I had discussed this question often with Mr. Bevin, and had not failed to point out to him the danger of re-igniting the Palestine conflict. I would see Mr. Bevin again in a month or so and would discuss the matter with him anew. I did not wish to minimize the danger latent in the Near Eastern armaments situation. I wished to assure the Senator, however, that we did not believe that the present situation was leading to a renewal of the conflict between Israel and the Arab states.
I then asked Mr. Rockwell if he had any additional comments to make. Mr. Rockwell emphasized the reports which we had been receiving and which led to the conclusion that the trend in the Near East was towards peace rather than towards war. He mentioned the capable body of United Nations military observers who, in fulfillment of their responsibilities to the Security Council, were on the spot in Palestine closely observing developments and travelling about between the various countries. They had reported the area to be relatively calm and in fact the chief observer, an able American Marine [Corps] general, was of the opinion that not only was neither side making serious preparations to renew the conflict, but neither side was actually in a position to do so. Mr. Rockwell also emphasized that the relations between the Arab states were governed by internationally-recognized armistice agreements in which the parties committed themselves not to resort to hostilities.
Senator Lehman felt that the Arab states had proven themselves to be unreliable partners in past military adventures on the side of the Western powers. He felt that the Department was placing too much emphasis on Arab military potential, and was tending to overlook what he considered to be the real purpose for which the Arabs were acquiring the arms—to renew the attack on Israel. It was imperative [Page 801] that the defense needs of Israel therefore be met. The Senator then Inquired what I thought of his suggestion that the United States request a Security Council investigation of the Near Eastern armaments situation.
I said frankly that I did not think that such action was merited by the facts or that it would be helpful. I foresaw that the Soviet Union would use this for its own purposes and that the water would become very muddy indeed.
Mr. Rockwell then said that the Department recognized the necessity that the states in the Near East be able to provide for their own legitimate defense needs and that we had established this necessity as one of the basic principles underlying our Near Eastern arms export policy. As a matter of fact, within the framework of this policy we were even now considering an Israeli request for assistance in obtaining defensive military material in this country.
Mr. Edelstine repeated that the Egyptians had proved themselves to be thoroughly unreliable during the last war. Accordingly, perhaps it would diminish the security of the Near East from the Western point of view if the British continued arming such undependable people.
I said that I thought that the Egyptians were indeed not thoroughly reliable. It was essential, however, that the British stay in the Canal area as long as possible, and perhaps if the Egyptians felt that they had more military responsibility in a partnership with the British for the defense of the Canal, they could be counted upon to be more effective in the military sense. Mr. Rockwell commented that although certain Egyptians had not proven themselves to be very reliable during the last war, the fact was that it would have been very easy for the Egyptians to sabotage British communications and other war preparations involving Egypt, and that the British had had very little trouble in this regard. He thought that if the Egyptians had determined to be effectively disloyal, they could have done great damage to the British war effort in the Mediterranean area.
Senator Lehman then said that the future of Israel would be dark indeed if Israel were forced to arm itself to the point where it was militarily equal to the strength of all its Arab neighbors. I said that I thought that if there was any danger at all, it would not come from Lebanon, Iraq, Syria or Jordan. Egypt was the center of any possible trouble. Mr. Rockwell stated that the Israeli Ambassador had that morning informed the Department that Israel realized that it could not arm itself to the point of being militarily equal to all its neighbors. The Israelis relied upon their superior technical ability and manpower, plus defensive arms which they hoped to obtain, to enable them to withstand an Arab attack.
[Page 802]The Senator then said that he thought that public opinion would not stand for Great Britain’s furnishing to the Arab states arms given to England by the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact. I assured the Senator that the British were not sending to the Arab states any arms which we were sending to England, or any arms for which we were furnishing England replacements.2
The Senator added that none the less he thought there were a number of people in Congress who would oppose a Governmental program of sending arms to any nation which was arming the Arabs at the expense of Israel. I said that I had a feeling this might be so. Mr. Rockwell added that we thought that the strengthening of the Arab states should not be considered as being at the expense of Israel. The strengthening was being done for an entirely unrelated purpose, and the two elements should be kept separate.
The Senator concluded the discussion by expressing the hope that the Department’s analysis of the situation was the correct one, and by requesting that we keep in constant touch with the British on this matter and influence them to stop sending heavy military equipment to the Arabs.
- Drafted by Mr. Rockwell.↩
- At one point in a memorandum of March 8 to Secretary Acheson briefing him on his appointment with Senator Lehman, Mr. Hare stated: “You will recall that the National Military Establishment has, on an informal and top secret basis, informed us that it is fully advised of the amount of arms the British plan to ship to the Near East in connection with their plans for the mutual defense of the area, and that this amount is not excessive for the purpose envisaged. The NME has, accordingly, expressed the hope that the Department will interpose no objection to these shipments.” (474.418/3–850)↩