784A.00/3–950: Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

secret

170. Shiloah at his suggestion at residence March 9 reported substantially:

Short Israel-Jordan meeting March 7 which agreed to “adjourn” but “not break off” negotiations. Present for Jordan, Mulki, the King, and Said el-Mufti; for Israel Shiloah and Dayan.

[Page 797]

Mulki read text “note verbale” which was copied textually by Israelis. This stated substantially: Jordan Government accepts King’s plan as basis for settlement. Owing to rumors and lies circulating in Jordan it is decided not to press negotiations but to ask for adjournment. Hope expressed that at earliest possible moment these will be resumed “animated by same spirit and objectives as in conferences to date.” End text.

King explained that he preferred to go ahead but since his government accepted his plan he agreed delay.

Shiloah attributes King’s willingness to delay to pressure from outside Jordan from Syria, Iraq and Lebanon and from internal intrigue. Shiloah “hopes resume conferences after April election.” Meanwhile, he hopes there will be American and British “more encouragement” for King’s position, “perhaps during Drew’s and Kirkbride’s planned holidays as King’s guests.”

New subject: Answering my question suggested by General Riley’s conference at residence earlier March 9 “would Israel do better to concentrate on negotiations with Egypt?”, Shiloah replied: Israel recognizes that peace with Egypt “would end danger of second round” and that Egypt’s lead would be followed probably by negotiations with other Arab states. Difficulty is that Israel not in least convinced Egypt now ready for negotiations. On contrary, recent information suggests that King and Foreign Minister favor “second round” or at least preparations for it. Letter received from Eban re his recent talk with Muniem was “not encouraging.”

Re Riley’s complaint that Israel misses opportunity conciliate Egypt by refusing withdraw from disputed Ras En Naq, Shiloah argued with such withdrawal would strengthen extremists in Egypt and “put back peace negotiations six months.”

Comment: I have no judgment as between the opinions of Riley and Shiloah. I am certain only that each man is wholly convinced that his interpretation is correct. End comment.1

Sent Department 170, repeated Beirut 11, Baghdad 11, Damascus 11, Jidda 11. Department pass Cairo 48, London 39, Paris 28, Moscow 9, Geneva 9.

McDonald
  1. Ambassador McDonald, on March 20, reported to the Department of State on his talk with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion the day before, in which the latter indicated his belief that King Farouk does not now desire peace, although he had the power to make peace, and that Israeli concessions in negotiations would only whet the King’s appetite and his desire for a second round (telegram 195 from Tel Aviv, 784A.00/3–2050), Embassy London advised, on March 9, of information from the Foreign Office that “reports from British Embassy Cairo [indicate] apparent unlikelihood present Egyptian Government agreeing negotiate with Israel.” (Telegram 1342, 674.84A/3–950)