Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

357.AC/2–2750

Mr. James W. Barco ¹ to the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bancroft)

personal and confidential

[Geneva,] 27 February 1950.

Dear Harding: I think that by now you must feel that some sort of personal report from Geneva is due. Until the present there has not been a sufficiently clear overall picture to encourage me to furnish you with my impressions. Meanwhile I have tried to keep the telegrams to a minimum and to report therein only such facts as had some significance. I remember quite well that we erred on the other side both in Indonesia and in Lausanne by reporting every small conversation and every event which a few days later had lost the significance they may have once had. On the whole I think that by our stripping the telegrams to their essentials you should have received a fairly accurate impression of the situation here.

USDel has in general followed carefully the outline of procedure contained in the memorandum which was prepared before we left Washington.² This has proved to be, I think, a very satisfactory guide. I discussed our views as soon as I arrived with Azcarate, the Turkish adviser and Boisanger and found that in general they appreciated this approach. Certainly in the case of Dr. Azcarate there has been very close understanding and cooperation. Boisanger has been somewhat more anxious to start off with definite proposals by the Commission to the parties, but with the passage of the last several weeks he has come more and more to view things as we do. Our position of course has been very satisfactory to the Israeli representatives, with whom so far we have been in quite close agreement and very cordial relations. Upon his arrival, Rafael, who showed a very reasonable and cooperative attitude within the limits of their policy with respect to the PCC, agreed with us that an indirect approach through the PCC to direct negotiations might prove most profitable in the end. This is the thing that we have been largely concentrating on in the last few weeks, but at the same time we have had frequent meetings with each of the representatives of the Arab States separately, both USDel and the Commission, and have kept our discussions largely on the question of direct negotiations. Discussion of this question has just about been exhausted, with no break in the Arab line. We took each one separately and avoided meetings with all the Arabs together in order in fact to increase the pressure slightly and to encourage frank discussion. Mr. Palmer was opposed to this procedure because he felt that the Arabs themselves did not like it and that they would hence feel less inclined to speak frankly. I felt on the other hand that the old approach of full Arab representation in all meetings had long since been proved barren of results and hence urged the separate meetings. The results did prove that this was in fact a desirable procedure and the resulting frank and fuller discussions I believe convinced Mr. Palmer.

At the same time these discussions were being held we have been studying the question of a so-called indirect approach to direct negotiations. The relative success of the Mixed Committee on Blocked Accounts encouraged us to think that the best approach might be through additional mixed committees. We began discussing the question with the representatives of both sides several weeks ago when we were thinking of setting up, after our return from Paris, a series of committees to consider all questions outstanding. This would have been quite satisfactory to the Israelis on the theory that the work of such a series of committees would lead to a general peace conference. They hoped that each committee might in time be regarded as a national committee, that is, a committee for considering questions between Egypt and Israel, Jordan and Israel, etc. The Arabs on the other hand shied away from this more ambitious project and in the last two weeks we have been concentrating on a joint committee of Israel and Egypt to consider proposals made by Egypt in New York last October. This has several advantages in that it would be highly desirable to start off with Egypt in the hope that a committee of this kind might encourage those Egyptians who are thinking of a full-scale conference with Israel, and it has seemed to us it would be very difficult for Egypt to refuse, inasmuch as the Committee’s terms of reference will be based on Egypt’s own proposals regarding refugees in the Gaza strip. I am enclosing a copy of the recommendations to the Commission by the General Committee, which has had this question under study. The Committee’s draft may prove to be the actual terms of reference adopted. At this moment Eban and Rafael object to setting up a committee whose work will be concerned primarily with the three Egyptian proposals without having a provision for consideration of all other questions outstanding between Israel and Egypt. We hope to persuade them that Paragraph 3(b) of the enclosed draft³ provides a proper device for enlarging the agenda of the committee, but that to begin with, in order to obtain Egyptian consent, the terms of reference will have to be at least this restricted. Unless we can set up this committee there seems little hope at the moment for setting up anything else. I rather think the Israeli position on all these questions fluctuates with the ups and downs of the negotiations with Jordan. When things do not appear to be going well in Shuneh, Israel is much more anxious for the Commission to find a device which might lead to direct negotiations; when it appears that an agreement with Jordan is more likely, they are not so interested in help from the Commission, on the theory, I suppose, that if an agreement can be announced between Israel and Jordan, that will be encouragement enough to the others to do likewise. However, from the beginning we have emphasized to the Israeli representatives that the Commission can really be of help in bringing about direct negotiations and that our efforts will be concentrated in this direction. Israel will not be able to say that we have not cooperated fully with them and on the whole I think that the Commission is in a very strong position with its proposal for a joint committee on the Gaza question. If it is refused by the Israelis, they will refuse something that they have in effect asked us to do and which has been worked out in accordance with their own desires. If on the other hand the Egyptians refuse, it will not look well for them, since they will be refusing to cooperate in the Commission’s effort to give effect to their own proposals. I rather think that about the time you have this letter we will be able to report that the committee is to be set up. Some of this perhaps could have been put in telegrams, but again I felt that it would be better to report accomplishments or failures, as the case may be, rather than hypothetical situations.

The question of compensation has been more or less in abeyance while we have concentrated on the joint committee on Gaza. If and when we are able to set up the Gaza committee, we will then give more attention to a similar procedure on compensation. Boisanger, as you know from the telegrams, was at the beginning anxious for the Commission to make an immediate proposal to both sides for the setting up of a fund for compensation, and to announce at the outset that the Commission regards the question of compensation as separate from reparations or the peace settlement. We discouraged this procedure and persuaded him to leave the question open for the time being. He is, however, anxious to return to the question and the French Foreign Office is definitely behind him in this respect. He has given us a memorandum from Parodi⁴ which I will translate and enclose. You will notice that the Foreign Office agrees with Boisanger that the Commission should begin by taking up the question of separation of compensation from reparations and the peace settlement. This would, in my opinion, lead to a fruitless wrangle with Israel which would successfully prevent any more useful work being done on the question of compensation. On the other hand the Foreign Office agrees with us apparently that a committee to appraise the value of lost property and to study methods of payment would be useful.

There are a good many more things I could tell you, but I really prefer to wait until we can talk together. The Commission’s work up to now has been, I think, entirely satisfactory, given the circumstances of so wide a gap between Israeli and Arab viewpoints. If and when the parties permit a more active role by the Commission, I may have a different opinion, but so far it has been largely a question of using tact, restraint and judgment. These are things which perhaps are easier to achieve in a situation like the present one than in the give and take of full-scale negotiations. We shall see if there will be a chance to display such sterling qualities in the latter situation.

I am always anxious to have your views.

Best Always,

Jim

1. Attached to the U.S. Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission.
2. Presumably the Halderman-Barco memorandum of January 3, p. 661.
3. Entitled “Report to the Conciliation Commission on the question of the establishment of a Joint Committee on the Egyptian proposals concerning the Gaza refugees and on other related questions”. This report, not printed, was prepared by the General Committee of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and is identified as Com Gen./14. Paragraph 3(b) reads as follows: “Either the Chairman or any member of the Joint Committee will be entitled to request that any related question whose examination, in his opinion, becomes necessary in the course of the work be placed on the agenda of the Joint Committee.”
4. Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The copy of the French memorandum was attached to the source text and bore no date; it is not printed.