357.AC/2–850
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)1
Subject: United States Role in a Palestine Settlement; US Attitude Toward the Proposed Arab League Collective Security Pact and Lebanese Independence and Territorial Integrity.
| Participants: | Dr. Charles Malik, Minister of Lebanon |
| Mr. George C. McGhee—NEA | |
| Mr. Burton Y. Berry—ANE | |
| Mr. J. R. Barrow—ANE |
Problem: To clarify the United States role in the Palestine settlement, including the Jerusalem question, and matters related to Lebanon’s security, independence, and territorial integrity.
Action Required: 1. To send Dr. Malik a note regarding the United States position on Jerusalem.
2. To formulate the Department’s position regarding Dr. Malik’s request for a public declaration of support for Lebanese independence and territorial integrity.
3. To re-formulate the Department’s views on the proposed Arab League Collective Security Pact in the light of recent developments.
Action Assigned to: ANE
[Page 731]Discussion:
Dr. Malik referred to the Department’s note of December 13, 1949 in response to a joint note submitted by the Arab diplomatic representatives dated November 14, 19492 (copies attached) on the subject of the Palestine settlement and the US role in advancing a settlement. Dr. Malik stated that the Arab governments were disturbed at the tone of the note, which seemed to indicate that the US Government was disassociating itself from the problem in favor of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. Moreover, the United States seemed to be departing from its affirmations in support of the General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947, from the Jessup statement at the third session of the General Assembly in Paris, from Mr. Ethridge’s repeated statements at Lausanne, and from the May 12, 1949 protocol drawn up under the auspices of the PCC. Dr. Malik referred to the fact that the Arab states felt the May 12 protocol had constituted an agreement to open negotiations for a Palestine settlement on the basis of the boundaries delineated on the map attached to the protocol. He said that the agreement had not been observed.
I replied that although it was true, as Dr. Malik said, that the US had supported the November 29 resolution and as a Member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission had approved the May 12 protocol, it had never followed a policy, or stated an intention to follow a policy, of entering unilaterally into Palestine negotiations or discussions. The US had always participated through the UN and its agency, the PCC. The May 12 protocol was not an agreement providing reciprocal obligations for a settlement, but only a proposal by the PCC that the working document (map) attached to the protocol be used as a basis for discussion, which proposal had been accepted by the Arab representatives and those of Israel. Israel had subsequently indicated that it desired to retain the territory it held, and the Arab states had asked for certain extensive territorial compensations for the Palestine refugees. Each side had found the other’s position unacceptable and the PCC had been forced to report that prospects for a settlement at the time were poor. I said I therefore could not see that any agreement had been violated.
Dr. Malik demurred to the extent of remarking that “When one agrees to use a certain map with various colors representing rights to certain territories as a basis for discussion, one does not completely erase the colors from mind; one makes modifications and adjustments but preserves the essential pattern.”
Dr. Malik agreed that the PCC was the proper channel for the US Government’s participation in the Palestine settlement. He stated his [Page 732] Government was concerned, however, about the repeated “concessions” of the United States Government to Israeli demands. He cited as an example the fact that the Israelis were always seeking direct negotiations with the Arab states, and that now the US Government was sponsoring direct negotiations. He said his Government would not agree to direct negotiations because (a) it did not trust the Jews; and (b) direct negotiations would constitute recognition of Israel. His Government, therefore, would only agree to negotiate collectively with the other Arab states.
I said that the US Government’s favoring direct negotiations was not a concession to the Israeli viewpoint. We had always been in favor—and had made it clear that we favored—direct negotiations, collective negotiations through the PCC, or any type of negotiations which would be effective in reaching a settlement. Moreover, although not an expert in international law, I did not believe that direct negotiations would prejudice the Lebanese Government’s position on (de jure) recognition of the Israeli Government. I said, however, that if the Arab states insist on approaching the Palestine problem from the standpoint that Israel does not exist, they were not being very realistic.
Dr. Malik said that governments often took unrealistic positions for a time, and wondered whether the US was not doing the same in withholding recognition from communist China.
I said that this was not the case; we recognized the existence of China as a state, but were not recognizing the communist régime since we felt that it had not complied with certain requirements essential to recognition. I believed the Arab states could well recognize the existence of the State of Israel as a fact and negotiate a Palestine settlement on that basis without prejudicing their position on (de jure) recognition of the Israeli Government.
Dr. Malik did not press the point but said the Arabs had made many concessions in the Palestine controversy; they had come a long way from their original position of refusing to accept any Jewish political authority in Palestine whatsoever to the acceptance of the solution proposed in the General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947. The Jews, on the other hand, had made no concessions at all, and the US Government kept shifting its position toward the Jews.
I stated that the United States Government, it was true, had taken positions with respect to solutions to the Palestine question but had never indicated that it would apply sanctions to enforce its viewpoint if the positions taken were unacceptable to the peoples and governments concerned. I knew of no means by which we could impose a solution on the Israeli Government any more than we could impose it on the Arab governments. I cited, as one obvious example that we were not controlling Israel, the fact that the Israeli Government was [Page 733] not voting with this Government on many important UN issues. If we were exercising control of Israel this would not be the case.
Dr. Malik said that the Arab peoples found it difficult to believe that the US would let an entity it had taken such a decisive part in creating escape from its influence. If indeed we did not exercise such influence, the US Government should take steps to disabuse the Arab peoples of the illusion, for the Arab psychology on this point was a very serious matter for US interests in the Near East.
Dr. Malik said that in line with his foregoing remarks, the Arab peoples felt that if the US was unwilling even to prevent the invasion of UN territory in Jerusalem by the Israelis, the Arabs could not be sure where we would make the Israelis stop. The Arabs wanted to know when we were going to say, “So far, and no farther.”
I replied that, as Dr. Malik knew, we had originally supported the plan for Jerusalem proposed by the Palestine Conciliation Commission which, however, the General Assembly had voted to reject in favor of the Australian proposal. We had doubted the workability of the latter plan, and voted against it, but we abided by the General Assembly Resolution and were cooperating faithfully with the current efforts of the Trusteeship Council in Geneva to implement it. I agreed to send him a note affirming that fact.3
I stated further that although, as I had mentioned previously, we had no intention of imposing a solution to the Palestine problem, we would react most sharply to any aggression, and, as Dr. Malik knew, we had made this unmistakably clear to all parties to the Palestine conflict, including the Israelis.
Dr. Malik, turning to a new but related subject, said that at some future time he would like to speak to me about the US attitude toward the proposed Arab League Collective Security Pact. He also hoped to discuss a request for a demonstration of US support for the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon. In the latter connection, he had in mind the possibility that whenever a suitable opportunity arose, the US would make a public declaration of its support for Lebanon’s territorial integrity and independence. Such a suitable occasion, he thought, might be a definitive event in the Near East such as a final territorial settlement in Palestine, or, as an outside possibility, a unification of Iraq or Jordan and Syria.
I thanked Dr. Malik for advising us in advance so that we could clarify our views on these matters. I fully realized that Lebanon would feel its position strengthened if we made a declaration of the type [Page 734] Dr. Malik had mentioned, and we would be glad to give the matter some thought.
I also took up with Dr. Malik the question of Lebanese restrictions on shipping between Lebanon and Israel and movements of passengers, which will be made the subject of a separate memorandum.4
- Drafted by John R. Barrow of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs.↩
- The exchange of notes is printed in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vi, pp. 1488 and 1535.↩
- Assistant Secretary McGhee sent an appropriate note to Minister Malik on February 15 and included the text of the statement on Jerusalem made by Mr. McDermott on January 16 (357.AC/2–550); for the latter, see telegram 75, January 14, to Geneva, p. 690.↩
- Mr. McGhee’s second memorandum of conversation of February 8 is not printed; it noted the Lebanese Minister’s request for a note giving pertinent details (983A.531/2–850). For the note sent to him on February 17, see p. 746.↩