484A.118/2–650
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs
Subject: Arms Shipments to Arabs and Israeli Defense Needs.
| Participants: | The Honorable Eliahu Elath, Ambassador of Israel |
| Dr. Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel | |
| ANE—Mr. Berry | |
| Mr. Rockwell |
Problem: Israeli Ambassador will submit evidence that Arabs are preparing for second round and also list of defensive military equipment needed by Israel.
Action Required: To give appropriate consideration to this information when received.
Action Assigned to: ANE and MD
Discussion:
Mr. Berry received Messrs. Elath and Keren at their request. The following are the important points covered in the friendly and frank discussion, which lasted for an hour.
1. Evidence that Arabs are preparing for second round.
Ambassador Elath said that in accordance with the promise he had made to the Secretary on January 31,1 he would soon submit to the Department a list of the evidence which had led the Israeli Embassy [Page 724] to believe that the Arab states were preparing for a second round.2 This evidence, said the Ambassador, was based largely upon official statements by important Arab personalities and broadcasts and newspaper comment from the Arab countries. It did not necessarily mean that the Arabs would attack tomorrow; but it did mean that they were planning at some time to renew hostilities. The Ambassador emphasized that no statements of similar nature had been made by responsible officials of the Israeli Government.
Mr. Berry said that we would be interested to receive this information, since we believed, on the basis of reports and information available to us, that Israel had no reasonable cause for alarm in the matter of the arms being furnished the Arab states.
The Ambassador said that he hoped this was so and that he was grateful for the United States’ offer to use its influence if there were convincing evidence that serious preparations were being made by the Arabs to resume the war. However, Israel needed defensive military material in order to be able to defend itself during the time elapsing between any Arab attack and the moment when the international community would be able to intervene. The Ambassador emphasized that there was no other motive in the Israeli request for arms, and that the Israeli Government did not wish to spend money for armaments or to brutalize the Israeli youth by overemphasis on militarism. The Israeli Government did not wish to see Israel turned into an armed camp, but the Government had to be able to convince the people that it was taking reasonable measures to provide for their security.
2. Israeli request for military equipment.
The Ambassador said that the Embassy would soon submit a list of defensive military equipment needed by Israel. He hoped that the Department would be able to give favorable consideration to the granting of export licenses for this equipment. The Ambassador added that Israel did not seek to match every piece of military equipment acquired by the Arab states, but just to acquire enough to provide reasonable [Page 725] means of security. He stated that Israel was now weaker than the Arab states.
Mr. Berry said that the list mentioned by the Ambassador would be given sympathetic consideration.
Mr. Rockwell mentioned that ANE had received a report that the Israeli Government had requested military assistance under the MAP. The Ambassador and Dr. Keren said that they knew of no such request.
3. Iraq-Syria Union.
The Ambassador mentioned the UP press report that the Department had warned Israel not to intervene in Syria and that this had been done because Ambassador Elath had stated in the Department that uncontrollable Israeli extremists would urge Israeli military action in Syria if the Syrian-Iraqi union took place. The Ambassador wished to give express assurances that the Israel Government had absolutely no intention of intervening in Syria and no aggressive designs whatsoever. He had not wished to give the impression that the Israeli Government could not control the extremists.
4. Arab reaction to acquisition of arms by Israel and continued Jewish immigration.
Mr. Berry asked the Ambassador, as a person who had long studied the Arabs and knew them well, what the reaction of the Arabs would be should they see more arms going into Israel and at the same time a constant stream of Jewish immigrants entering this small and overcrowded country. The Ambassador replied that he perfectly well understood the Arab conviction that these factors could only mean that one day Israel would need more territory and would embark upon aggression against its neighbors. It was the job of Israeli Government officials, a job he was constantly attempting to carry out, to convince the Arabs and all other observers that aggression would be the ruination of Israel. What Israel needed was not more deserts but time and money to develop the territory now under Israeli control. Israel planned to develop an industrial society, not an agricultural one. The Arabs must learn that Israel is here to stay, and that Israel has no intention whatsoever of committing aggression against them. The Ambassador admitted that it was difficult to make effective use of this logic when there was so much suspicion on both sides.
5. Czech Arms for Israel.
Mr. Rockwell noted that the Ambassador had on several occasions stated that the United States was the only source of arms open to Israel. He wondered why Czechoslovakia was not closed as a source. The Ambassador said that he was glad that this frank question was asked, and that the answer was that Israel did not wish to become too deeply entangled with the Czechs. Israel had in the past acquired [Page 726] arms in Czechoslovakia only as a last ditch measure in a time of desperate emergency. However, Israel knew that its future lay with the United States. It desired to pattern its army after the American army and to replace the arms acquired in Czechoslovakia by American arms. If further arms were acquired now in Czechoslovakia, it would mean continuing Israeli dependence on the Czechs for ammunition and replacements.
6. Possibilities of Peace Settlements.
The Ambassador again mentioned the real desire of Israel for peace. He said encouraging progress was being made in the talks with Jordan and that there was some possibility of talks with Egypt. Mr. Rockwell asked whether there was any thought in Tel Aviv that Israel, in order to reach peace settlements with the Arabs, might be able to make any substantial territorial concessions. The Ambassador said that the Israeli offer of a corridor to the sea for Jordan, if accepted by Jordan, could cause a greater domestic political crisis for the Israeli Government than the Altalena incident.3 The corridor offer was a very great concession and real proof of the desire for peace with Jordan. There was no possibility of territorial concessions to Syria and Lebanon. The states with which it was most important to make peace were Jordan and Egypt, and there was a possibility of territorial “adjustments” along the Egyptian frontier, but no question of giving away any sizeable pieces of the Negev. Israel found Abdullah reasonable and quite understood his desire and necessity to gain some territory in order to justify to the Arab world a settlement with Israel.
- For Secretary Acheson’s memorandum of this conversation, see p. 712.↩
- The Israeli Foreign Office presented to Ambassador McDonald on February 9 an eight-page aide-mémoire of the same date, entitled “Arab Threats of a Second Round”. The aide-mémoire cited authoritative statements by prominent Egyptian, Iraqi, and Syrian leaders, which were said to throw an ominous light on preparations for war during the past year by the Arab countries, especially Egypt. It cited the steep rise of the Egyptian military budget under a three-year rearmament program, Egyptian purchases from Great Britain and other European sources of tanks, military aircraft and naval vessels, and the building up by Egypt of a domestic arms industry. The aide-mémoire concluded that the comprehensive rearmament activities of Egypt as well as those of Syria and Jordan were not to be explained by considerations of internal security and defense. Embassy Tel Aviv transmitted a copy of the aide-mémoire to the Department of State in despatch 89, February 14, neither printed (748.00/2–1450).↩
- This incident, on June 22, 1948, involved the firing by Israeli Government armed forces on the Altalena, a vessel controlled by the Irgun Zvai Leumi. The IZL was attempting to disembark, near Tel Aviv, armed men and possibly arms and munitions. For additional information on this incident, see footnote 1, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1142.↩