611.87/11–950
Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State 1
Iraq
a. objectives
Iraq is important to the United States and the western democracies because of its strategic location, its vast petroleum reserves, its control of the potentially fertile Tigris-Euphrates valley, and its control of Basra, the largest seaport on the Persian Gulf. The United States also has an important, if indirect, interest in the special treaty position and the strategic military facilities which the UK currently maintains in Iraq.
Our objectives are to bolster Iraq against Soviet penetration from within or without, to assist Iraq in economic and social development generally, to encourage progressive government, to protect western petroleum and other commercial interests in the area and to give effective support to the legitimate desires of the Iraqi people for national expression and development without prejudice to Iraqi defense or the British strategic position.
A further important objective is to encourage harmonious relations, and cooperation in economic and social development among Iraq and other countries of the Near East.
b. policies
The worsening international situation and oil-rich Iraq’s proximity to the Soviet Union and to Iran, have greatly increased Iraqi apprehensions of a Soviet thrust in one form or another. Among the conceivable contingencies are: (1) a direct military onslaught by the Soviet Union through northern Iran; (2) subversion of Iraq by the Communist Party; or (3) a Soviet subterfuge by which irregulars in the guise of Kurdish, Assyrian or Armenian exiles would attempt to “liberate” their dissident kinsmen in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and possibly Turkey and form a Kurdish national state.
Unless the Soviet Union is prepared now to risk a major war, contingency (1) seems for the present unlikely, though plans should be [Page 652] made now to meet such a contingency should it arise. Contingency (2) is also remote despite discontent with the semi-feudalistic social system prevalent among peasants and low-income groups in Iraq. If, however, the Soviets wish to start a Near Eastern conflagration of serious proportions without assuming direct responsibility themselves, contingency (3) would be a natural choice. The Kurdish tribes of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey are not well organized and local security forces could probably cope with any uprising of purely internal origin and direction. The situation would be changed completely, however, if merely a small well-equipped force of Soviet “Kurds” infiltrated across the inadequately guarded frontiers into Iran, Iraq and Syria as the nucleus and striking force of a general Kurdish uprising. To meet such a contingency Iraq would definitely need better armament and some military technical assistance and would possibly require support from outside military forces.
Since the UK enjoys special strategic facilities in Iraq, we are discussing the foregoing problems on a continuing basis with the UK, emphasizing that we would expect the UK to assume the primary role in providing Iraq with such military assistance as it required. If we should become convinced the Iraqi security situation was sufficiently serious and that the UK alone could not provide all the support necessary, we should consider extension of limited timely assistance to Iraq, in whatever manner might there be feasible.
Both the UK and US should also assist Iraq in minimizing the causes of disaffection in the Kurdish areas by encouraging better provincial administration and by providing technical assistance to help solve economic and social problems in the Kurdish areas.
A further urgent need is better UK and US political and military intelligence coverage of sensitive areas, and a greater exchange of information between the UK and US. We should open a small consulate in Northern Iraq to serve primarily as a political listening post. The US and UK should also coordinate their propaganda services in the area, and information activities—especially Kurdish language broadcasts—should be increased.
Although solution of Iraq’s military problems is an urgent, immediate aim we should emphasize to the Iraqis that the long-range battle against Communism depends upon enlightened economic and social development and progressive government. The trend toward more progressive government was advanced in Iraq, albeit on a very small scale, when the Government began tribal settlement projects, such as at Dujaila and Hawijah, on state lands, and enacted a law to encourage cooperatives. Progress in economic development has also been made in the past year. A $12.8 million IBRD loan for the Wadi Tharthar flood control project was granted and the IBRD is sending a mission [Page 653] in October to consider further projects; a 50% increase in Iraq’s oil royalties was granted by the Iraq Petroleum Company; the Iraqi Government enacted a law providing for the creation of an autonomous central development board and assigning oil royalties in totality for development purposes.
We have also succeeded in bringing a number of Iraqi leader-specialists to this country under the Smith-Mundt Act. We have notified Iraq that we are ready to implement the Point Four program and that the Iraqi Government has already submitted a considerable number of requests for various technical experts including a request for an American engineer to serve as a full member of the Iraqi Central Development Board which we have accepted in principle. Substantial progress is being made in negotiating a Fulbright Agreement providing for exchange of persons between Iraq and the US.
If these successful beginnings can be expanded, Iraq’s future looks bright. Of particular importance, however, is to increase the number of progressive leaders in the Iraqi Government and gradually to eliminate reactionary elements. The western democracies should avail themselves of every opportunity discreetly to encourage the development of more liberal government and improvements in the social system such as progressive taxation and better land distribution. The feudal land tenure system constitutes one of the greatest single obstacles to economic progress in Iraq.
We should encourage the activities of American cultural institutions in Iraq such as Baghdad College and give encouragement and cooperation to the several progressive American-trained leaders serving in technical and administrative positions in Iraqi Government.
We should urge Iraq to expand its world trade on a non-discriminating multilateral basis by adherence to GATT and by improving its tariff, exchange and trade practices consistently with the principles set forth in the ITO Charter. We should especially encourage Iraq to conclude a modern Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the US to replace the outmoded 1938 Treaty.
The US Government should avoid the appearance of being an instrumentality of the oil companies. However, in view of the world significance of oil and the role it plays internally in Iraq, the US discreetly should continue to encourage increased development of Iraq oil resources from each of the three concessions at Kirkuk, Mosul and Basra or the relinquishment of territories the companies do not intend to develop; should continue to encourage the Iraq Petroleum Company to improve its public relations and labor practices and conditions; should increasingly identify the development of Iraq oil resources with the people of the country by encouraging the training, education and employment in company positions at all levels of the [Page 654] maximum number of Iraqis; should encourage the US partners in the Iraq Petroleum Company to place Americans in other than technical positions; and should maximize oil intelligence in the area by maintaining closest liaison with company and government oil officials and with other Iraqis involved in oil operations. It is also an important objective to restore normal operation of the Haifa pipeline which has been shut off as part of the Arab economic boycott of Israel. However, it is unlikely that representations on the Haifa question would be successful until a more favorable political atmosphere develops.
We should take an early opportunity to resume negotiations for an air transport agreement with Iraq based on the standard Bermuda pattern with full fifth freedom rights. We should be sympathetic, however, to the problems of Iraqi Airways in connection with competition along the routes it serves.
c. relations with other states
We support the British treaty position in Iraq and believe the British should have primary responsibility in working out with Iraqi authorities arrangements for that country’s defense. At the same time we are aware of Iraqi resentment of vestiges of British imperialism in their country, and we should encourage the UK to continue to seek a suitable means to place its relations with Iraq more nearly on a basis of cooperation between equal partners, continue its policy of interpreting liberally the provisions of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty regarding technical assistance and, whenever practicable, to modify its treaty position in the direction of the unratified Portsmouth Treaty.
We should also counsel the Iraqis to be moderate in their attitude toward the UK and emphasize the importance to Iraq’s security of maintaining effective working arrangements with the UK in matters of defense.
We recognize a strong desire among the Arab peoples for greater unity and we believe that this aspiration should be encouraged so long as it does not develop chauvinistic or aggressive characteristics. For the present, however, a political approach to Arab unity, such as the Syro-Iraqi Union plan which Iraq has espoused, appears to have little chance of success in view of the widely divergent attitudes toward and interests in this subject prevailing among current Arab leaders and political groups. On the other hand, we see fruitful possibilities in an economic, social and cultural approach to Arab unity which would leave the political aspects to develop by evolution. We should, wherever practicable, point out the advantages of the economic and social approach to the Iraqis. We should not, however, give the impression that we would oppose peaceful political unions which might emerge from the spontaneous will of the Arab peoples.
[Page 655]If necessary, we should recall in this connection the attitude of the US, UK and France set forth in the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950: “The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.” This policy applies as well to Iraq’s relations with Israel.
While Iraqi attitudes have an influence among Arab League members, Iraq’s involvement in the Palestine dispute is for the most part only indirect. Iraq does, however, maintain an interest in two of the three important aspects of the Palestine problem: the refugee question and Jerusalem. Iraq, like the other Arab States, maintains an economic boycott of Israel which has a special application in the problem of the Haifa pipeline and refinery. Having no boundary contiguous to Israel, Iraq is not involved in territorial questions.
With respect to refugees, Iraq holds the position that the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948, should be carried out. This Resolution provided that refugees who wish to return to Israel should be permitted to do so and that those not returning should be compensated for their property. Iraq has not thus far agreed to resettle refugees in Iraq, pointing out that Iraq has a sizeable number of its own tribes to settle and that Palestinians have a difficult time adjusting themselves to the Iraqi climate, terrain and means of livelihood. It thus seems improbable that Iraq can be counted upon at present to assist greatly in the current problems of the refugees. However, in view of the fact that Iraq has a basic population shortage, the time may well come when Iraq will welcome additional manpower, especially if given assistance such as contemplated in the UN Relief and Works Administration report in assimilating it. We should lose no opportunity to give all possible encouragement to such a trend.
With regard to the status of Jerusalem, Iraq, a member of the Trusteeship Council, has taken the lead in pressing for the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution of December 9, 1949, providing for full internationalization of the city. This has been opposed by Israel and by Iraq’s sister Hashemite state, Jordan, who jointly occupy the city. We should continue to make clear to the Iraqis that although we originally opposed the General Assembly Resolution of December 9, 1949, on the basis that it was unworkable, we have loyally cooperated with the Trusteeship Council in trying [Page 656] to implement the resolution and in drawing up a satisfactory statute for Jerusalem. We believe, however, that any plan to be successfully implemented must have the substantial support of Jordan and Israel and at the same time the support of a necessary majority of the international community and in the present General Assembly we will support any proposal for this resolution of the Jerusalem problem which satisfies these criteria.
We deplore Iraq’s economic boycott of Israel and its recalcitrant attitude on the Haifa question, but any representations we might make would probably meet a negative response and undermine Iraqi good will toward the United States. Accordingly, action on this question should await greater likelihood of a more favorable response.
It is of utmost importance to our relations with Iraq that we maintain a policy of strict impartiality between the Arab States and Israel and that our public officials refrain from giving the impression that United States policy favors either party.
So long as Iraq’s present leadership remains in power and provided the western democracies retain the initiative in helping Iraq solve its security and economic problems, there is little chance of the Soviet Union’s attaining major diplomatic successes. The western democracies, therefore, should concentrate on assisting Iraqi leadership to solve its internal problems and to combat Soviet subversive activities among dissident groups.
d. policy evaluation
The Arab grievances against the US because of its Palestine policy, which has overshadowed all other aspects of our relations with Iraq for the past several years, fortunately appear to be sinking into the background, though they are by no means forgotten. This improvement in our relations can in large part be attributed to the progress made in the past year in the field of economic and social development, and to the fact that the Iraqis have been won over to the logic of concentrating on their own internal problems rather than dissipating their resources and energy in futile altercations over Palestine.
However, it is imperative that we recognize that a larger and far graver issue is developing, which may determine the success or failure of our policy in Iraq. Iraq will expect as a quid pro quo for aligning itself and cooperating with the western democracies concrete evidence that the western democracies will effectively assure its security in the present international crisis. So far Iraq has not been given such evidence and although understanding the reasons why the major effort of the western democracies has been directed to improving security in Europe and latterly in the Far East, it is naturally most apprehensive over the inadequacy of the defenses of the Near East.
[Page 657]Whatever our ultimate security needs in the area, the western democracies will at all stages need Iraqi good will. The latter will be difficult to retain if the western democracies allow themselves to appear unmindful of Iraqi security problems now.
Despite the undoubted strain on our resources and the undesirability of spreading ourselves too thin, the UK primarily, the US and other like-minded western democracies should urgently explore every practicable means of improving the defenses of Iraq and of the Near Eastern area as a whole.
- Department of State Policy [Information] Statements were concise documents summarizing the current United States policy toward, the relations of principal powers with, and the issues and trends in a particular country or region. The Statements were intended to provide information and guidance for officers in missions abroad. They were generally prepared by ad hoc working groups in the responsible geographic offices of the Department of State and were referred to appropriate diplomatic missions abroad, under cover of formal instructions from the Secretary of State, for comment and criticism. The Policy Statements were periodically revised.↩