787.00/2–1450
Memorandum by Mr. Francis O. Allen, Second Secretary of the Embassy in Iraq 1
A Summary Analysis of Basic Political Forces in Iraq as Background for the Formulation of United States Policy
[Here follow the first two sections of this memorandum which provide a general survey of the main political groups within Iraq.]
iii. conclusions relevant to the formulation of united states policy in iraq
Our basic policy objective is to secure economic and social development in Iraq and to raise the standard of living of the masses of the population, both through increased productivity and a more equitable distribution of national income.2
In view of the political structure of the country as analyzed above, I suggest that the only way we can get the Iraqis to take the steps we believe they should take is to work through and with the conservative political forces which are now in control and will be in control for as far ahead as we can see. Because these forces are so firmly in the saddle it would be impossible by backing more progressive elements to make basic changes of which they did not approve. Therefore, the method by which we should attempt to implement our policy must be to convince the dominant conservative elements that in their own best interests they themselves should strongly back a general movement for social and economic development. If they can be convinced, and actually embark on such a program, they would be forced to use the services of the progressive Western-educated officials and give this element far more backing than they now receive.
[The next paragraph discusses various Conservative personalities and their attitudes towards social and economic development.]
Because of the paramount position of Great Britain in Iraq and its special relations with the Palace, the dominant Conservatives and the tribes, the most effective instrument of persuasion would be to bring the force of British Government policy to bear upon the Regent. Since any British Government, at the London level, would no doubt be in sympathy with such a program I believe that there is a good chance that basic steps in the sense outlined above could be taken as a result of high level Anglo-American consultations regarding policy in Iraq.
- Transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 141 from Baghdad, February 14, not printed. (787.00/2–1450)↩
- For documentation concerning the formulation of a joint Anglo-American policy regarding economic and social development in the Near East, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, pp. 485 ff., and ibid., 1948, vol. v, Part 1, pp. 69 ff.↩