Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

788.5–MAP/12–550

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Ferguson)¹

secret

Washington, December 8, 1950.

Subject: Military Assistance to Iran

Participants:	Ambassador Grady2
	S/MDA—Messrs. Ohly and Emery
	GTI—Messrs. Dorsz and Ferguson
	Defense—General Scott3 and Lieut. Col. Osborn
	ECA—Mr. Paul

The Problem:

Ambassador Grady’s desire for an increased allocation to Iran under the Supplemental MDAP appropriation for the Fiscal Year 1951.

Action Required:

To explore the possibilities of meeting Mr. Grady’s desires.

Action Assigned to: S/MDA and GTI.

Discussion:

Ambassador Grady began the discussion by stressing the strategic position of Iran, particularly as regards petroleum, pointing out that (1) the USSR and satellites furnish 8% of oil production with Iran currently producing as much oil as the USSR or about 6%, and (2) the Persian Gulf area contains 46% of the world’s known oil resources. The Ambassador said that Iran should not be allowed to go by default and that in his opinion the United States should provide military equipment sufficient at least to slow down any Soviet aggression in that country. He pointed out that the Soviets were now rather popular in Iran in the wake of the recent commercial agreement and while this would probably not be permanent, it was essential that the United States show a real interest in Iran. Territorial factors inhibit the Russians from exploiting Iranian oil resources but they could be neutralized to our detriment. If Iran goes, Mr. Grady said, so does Iraq and probably Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Grady said that while he did not wish to be placed in the position of a special pleader for the country of his assignment, he felt very strongly that the allocation of Title II funds were out of balance to the detriment of Iran. As an example of this, the Ambassador cited the building up of Greece on strategic considerations which are primarily geographic while Iran with its resources has received meagre assistance. Furthermore, Mr. Grady said, the great effort we have made, to arm Turkey without a strong program in Iran may very well result in the Soviets seeing a “detour” sign pointing in the direction of Iran.

The Ambassador said it was dangerous to assume that the Iranians would not fight and that the amount of aid proposed to Iran under the supplemental appropriation virtually serves to write Iran off. As matters now stand, he said, it is the old story we saw in Korea of tanks vs. rifles. He said the Iranians were eager to learn and he did not see how we could proceed on the assumption that the Iranian Army would not fight if properly equipped. He added that our training program, for Iranian officers was quite inadequate and out of balance in that we were training 500 Turkish officers to 100 Iranians.

Mr. Ohly replied that he was delighted Mr. Grady was here to consult with the Department and the Department of Defense since Mr. Grady was conversant with the problems of the whole GTI area, rather than merely one particular country. He said there were certain questions in connection with the tentative Title II allocations which he thought should be mentioned:

1. The outbreak of the Korean War had made necessary a change in our policy towards Greece. Before Korea, a reduction in the Greek armed forces to 95,000 had been planned but once the international situation became more serious, it had been necessary to readjust our thinking to the point that armed forces of 165,000 are now considered desirable.

2. While there had been no basic change in the Turkish situation, certain unforeseen difficulties arising out of the strain on the Turkish economy of supporting armed forces in the strength we believe necessary had materialized. He referred in this connection to the need for a corps of non-commissioned officers.

3. In the case of Iran, the Department’s original objectives when military aid was planned a year ago had been largely political and designed to fill in deficiencies to a point where the Iranian armed forces could maintain internal security. Mr. Ohly said that our thinking had changed as a result of General Collins’ visit to Iran last spring.⁴ General Collins, he said, had been impressed by the possibilities for a delaying action and the 1950 program therefore had been altered to include a certain amount of equipment to this end. Mr. Ohly added that there had been no change in our Iranian objective since General Collins’ visit but he would like Ambassador Grady’s opinion as to what our objectives there should be. Mr. Ohly said that objectives in Iran are probably sound to which Ambassador Grady agreed. Mr. Ohly then asked what additional equipment is needed taking into consideration political, psychological, and morale factors.

Mr. Grady said that the high morale in the Greek Army created by the arrival of modern heavy equipment from the United States had enabled them to clean up the war there. He said the morale factor was equally important in the case of Iran and that General Collins had been impressed by that fact. He referred to the fifty medium tanks originally requested by Ambassador Wiley as an example of the type of military assistance which would be of great morale building power not only as regards the army, but the Iranian people as well.

The Ambassador said that we must assume that something can be done with our military assistance and we must show the Iranians that we are really behind them. The Iranians, he said, are intelligent and realize that in the event of a general war, we could not give them much direct help and it is therefore essential we give them the tools with which to help themselves. He said that our total aid to Iran so far had consisted of the $500,000 Point Four allocation and the delivery of one million dollars worth of FY 1950 military aid out of the total FY 1950 allocation of $11,500,000 with the result that the Iranians looked on our aid program as little more than meaningless promises. Mr. Grady said that the cold fact of the matter is we must “buy” such countries to our side and either show them something tangible or get out completely.

Mr. Ohly said that from purely military objectives, the tentative allocation to Iran was probably sound but that the real issue is how much additional equipment is needed for political and psychological reasons. It would be extremely difficult, he said, to justify a larger program on purely military grounds.

Ambassador Grady said recent events in Korea show that time is running against us and we must act fast where the need is greatest. He said that Greece has been receiving military aid from us since 1947 and should be pretty well equipped by now. The Iranians, he said, will know the approximate amount they as well as the Greeks and Turks will receive and that it will be extraordinarily difficult to explain the disparities to them.

General Scott said that percentagewise, the request for Iran submitted by General Evans had fared better than either of the programs for Greece and Turkey. Iran was tentatively scheduled to receive about 50 percent of the amount requested while the percentage figures for Greece and Turkey were 45 and 20 percent respectively.

Ambassador Grady then referred to the Air Force allocation of $500,000 which he said had shocked him and that he and his staff had at first assumed the figure was a mistake. He said that our failure to provide air force items was resulting in the Iranians looking to the British to the point where they were actively engaged in the purchase of jet aircraft. He said he found it extraordinary that we should be providing military aid to both Great Britain and Iran on one hand and finding the two of them engaged in buying and selling equipment of the type we are furnishing.

Colonel Osborn said that the small air force allocation was due to a number of factors including the non-arrival of the requests in time for a decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the fact that it is extremely difficult for a country the size of Iran to maintain a modern air force, and the lack of trained personnel. He pointed out that when consideration is given to the fact that the Greek and Turkish programs contain heavy allocations for their navies and air forces which the Iranian program does not, the discrepancy between the three does not look so pronounced. Furthermore, both Greece and Turkey have a terrific maintenance problem not present in Iran since they must take care of the equipment they have been receiving since 1947. Colonel Osborn said that the tentative Iranian program included 42 medium tanks (M 36) which in part at least meet the Ambassador’s political requirements. These, he said, would have to come largely from new procurement.

Colonel Osborn said that all of General Evans’ priorities #1 and #2 would be met and some of #3 but that it would be impossible to include anything under priority #4 and that General Evans himself had recommended that priorities #5 and 6 not be furnished at this time.⁵

General Scott asked what the difficulties were in arranging a training program for Iranian officers in this country since he had understood there were no major obstacles in this program. Mr. Ohly added that the Iranians had received every training space they had requested. Ambassador Grady replied that the Iranians had received no encouragement to seek more places and probably had been reluctant to request more in view of the arguments they had heard about space limitations, etc. He said he would look into the matter on his return to Iran.

In reply to Mr. Ohly’s question about the ability of the Iranian Army to absorb military equipment in the amount Mr. Grady and General Evans had recommended, the Ambassador replied that this can be done.

General Scott said he realized that the Iranians will fight if properly led and equipped but that in view of the fact that they were starting at the bottom, the equipment should be as simple and uncomplicated as possible.

1. The conversation took place on December 5.
2. Ambassador Grady had returned to Washington for consultations.
3. Maj. Gen. Stanley L. Scott, Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
4. Regarding General Collins’ visit to Iran at the end of March, see Annex 5 to the memorandum by Collins, April 10, p. 507.
5. The priorities under reference in this paragraph have not been identified further.