Editorial Note
At the end of October representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, led respectively by Ambassador Jessup and General Bradley and Ambassador Franks and Marshal Tedder, held a series of political-military discussions at Washington. On October 26 they reached the following conclusions with regard to the Middle East and Iran:
[Page 611]“Item 4—Middle East, particularly Iran
- (a)
- The U.S. will continue vigorous cold war action in Middle East. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, while agreeing that the Middle East in war is of importance second only to Western Europe, consider the area to be a British Commonwealth responsibility and will be unable to commit forces to that area during, at least, the first two years of war. U.K. understand this U.S. view but hope developing circumstances may enable U.S. to alter it.
- (b)
- The U.S. and U.K. Chiefs of Staff will instruct their representatives in the Mediterranean-Middle East, and specifically in Turkey and Iran, to undertake jointly a fact-finding review of present and projected capabilities for the defence of the outer ring, with specific reference to the fighting value of the Turkish and Persian forces. Decision in regard to a similar review in Greece should await the results of that in Turkey and Iran.
- (c)
- Despatch of British forces to Iran, on invitation of Iranian Government, would be useful in case of entry of Soviet troops into Iran or in case of seizure, or clearly imminent seizure of power in Tehran by Communists. U.S. is doubtful whether despatch of British force would be useful in case of uprising in Azerbaijan without overt Soviet involvement. U.K. and U.S., on the political level, will jointly reexamine this particular point. Despatch of British force to Iraq in event of Azerbaijan uprising would certainly be useful. Periodic visits of U.S. carrier to Persian Gulf or appearance of carrier there in case of crisis in Iran will be considered.
- (d)
- U.S. representatives urged U.K. to expedite, as important cold war measure, favorable AIOC settlement.
- (e)
- U.S. and U.K. should give further study after conclusion of review mentioned in (b) above to question whether or not it would be desirable, in case of war, to demolish Iranian and other Middle East oil installations. In view of unlikelihood Soviets could utilize Middle East oil on large scale, more might be lost during cold war period by knowledge we contemplated evacuation and demolition than would be gained by demolition. There is growing evidence pointing toward the requirement for at least a portion of the Middle East oil throughout the war. Further study should also be given to this question. As prospective NATO forces become more firmly established, a stronger base will be found on which the study can be completed.”
For further documentation on the discussions, see volume III, pages 1686 ff. For a record of the talks as they applied to the Near East, see pages 217 ff.