Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

611.41/9–1850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Palmer)¹

top secret

London, September 18, 1950.

Subject: Security of Middle East and Iran

Participants:	Mr. Michael Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State
	Mr. D. P. Reilly, Assistant Under-Secretary of State2
	Lt. Col. C. S. Godwin, British Chiefs of Staff Secretariat
	Mr. G. W. Furlonge, Counsellor, Commonwealth Liaison Dept.3
	Honorable George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State
	Joseph Palmer 2nd, First Secretary of Embassy

Mr. Wright opened the meeting by stating that the Foreign Office was anxious to take advantage of the current conversations with Mr. McGhee to discuss certain strategic aspects of the Near Eastern situation. In particular, the Foreign Office wished to inform Mr. McGhee of the politico-military papers on Iran and the Middle East area which had been prepared by the Foreign Office and the British Chiefs of Staff for the Bradley–Tedder conversations in Washington.⁴ The Chiefs of Staff have already approved the papers, which are now being reviewed in New York by Mr. Bevin. Mr. Wright hoped that the Department would agree with the Foreign Office that there should be political as well as military discussion of the two documents. Mr. McGhee expressed his agreement with this principle and promised to recommend this course to the Department.

At Mr. Wright’s request, Mr. Furlonge gave the following outline of the paper on Iran:

1. The paper first emphasizes the importance of Iran to the allies and the adverse results of the loss of Iran.

2. The paper then proceeds to analyze alternative threats to Iran which it enumerates as follows:

I. A direct Soviet invasion.

II. The establishment of a Communist regime in Azerbaijan, by subversion, with the result that Azerbaijan became in effect a Soviet satellite.

III. The establishment of a Communist regime in the whole of Iran. Under this heading, the paper considers two possibilities:

a. That the Shah and Government were unable to escape.

b. That the Shah and the Government were able to escape long enough to lodge an appeal for assistance with the United Nations or the allies.

IV. The fomentation of serious trouble in the oil fields, with the result that the Government lost control of the situation and the oil was thereby denied to the Allies.

3. The paper then considers four courses of action which might be taken in the foregoing contingencies:

A. That no counter measures should be taken, which the paper dismisses as an unacceptable course of action.

B. That troops be stationed in Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi Government.

C. That troops be stationed in Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi Government and that troops also be moved into Southern Iran to protect the oil fields.

D. That the US and UK should go to war with the Soviet Union.

4. The paper then proceeds to relate courses of action to threats as follows:

A. Case I does not exclude course D, which, however, is not militarily essential and represents a major decision which only be taken in the light of the world circumstances pertaining at the time. Consideration meanwhile should be given to the desirability of giving a prior indication to the USSR that an attack on the USSR will mean war by means of a unilateral guarantee of frontiers or a statement going further in the case of Iran than the US and UK declarations regarding the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece, Turkey and Iran.

Failing Course D to meet Case I, the paper recommends Course C, provided the consent of the Iraqi and Iranian Governments were obtained. The paper also considers the possibility of Security Council action and concludes that if it is found impossible to obtain a resolution on the Korean line, it would be possible for the US and UK to take action under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The paper also makes the point that if the Soviet Union adheres to its present intention not to permit its own troops to come into combat with those of the allies, Course C might be an effective deterrent to Soviet occupation of the oil fields.

B. In Case II, there could be no recourse to Course D, but action should be taken along the lines of Course C.

C. In Case III, Course C should be adopted if the Shah and his Government were still free to make an appeal. If the Shah and his Government were captured, Course C would probably be inexpedient and it would be necessary to have recourse to Course B.

D. Regarding Case IV, recourse should be made to Course C.

5. The paper dismisses the argument that recourses to Course C in Case I would constitute provocation to the Soviet Union by concluding that this is an acceptable risk.

In the ensuing discussion, Mr. McGhee stated that he found the British study most interesting, especially the possibility of stationing troops in Iraq.

[Here follows a discussion of the British paper on the defense of the Middle East. For the record of this discussion, see page 193.]

1. Assistant Secretary of State McGhee and a small party of advisers visited London, September 16–23, en route to the North African Diplomatic and Consular Conference at Tangier, Morocco, October 2–7. While in London, McGhee and his party held discussions with British officials on a lengthy, previously-agreed-upon agenda of topics covering South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. This conversation was among the earliest of these discussions. For additional information on the McGhee trip, see the editorial note, p. 1550.
2. D’Arcy Patrick Reilly was Superintending Under-Secretary of the Security Department, British Foreign Office.
3. Geoffrey Warren Furlonge, Head of the Eastern Department, British Foreign Office.
4. Regarding the Bradley–Tedder conversations at Washington, July 20–24, under reference here, see the editorial note, p. 572. The two documents mentioned here, both dated October 2 as completed, are not printed.