888.00/9–1450: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State 1
702. Tehran telegram to Department 631, September 12.2
In past we have expressed view that strongest ally of Soviets in implementation their aim of transforming Iran into role of satellite is long-term continuation of disaffection resulting inter alia from economic backwardness and poverty (Embtel 2701, October 28, 1949). We have also been of opinion that for strategic and other reasons Iran occupies vital point in defense of free world against Soviet aggression (Embtel 601, February 20) and that we should exercise the initiative we retain by means of economic aid implemented through flexible system of grants and loans (Embtel 833, March 13).3
We believe that basic reason for Soviet opening trade discussions with Iranians, and manifesting what on surface appears to be disposition to settle frontier-guard problem and impounding of Iranian gold and foreign exchange stems from their realistic evaluation of potential strength of Razmara regime. In this sense, Soviet offer of trade pact may be regarded as attempt to counteract expected alleviation of Iranian politico-economic situation, and alignment of Razmara government on side of west.
We take it that successful conclusion trade pact, in absence some real measure economic assistance from west (principally US) would be calculated to strengthen Iranian elements favoring pro-Soviet orientation of country. It is perhaps typical of Soviet policy that friendly overtures can be made at same time as Tudeh party is fostered in Azerbaijan, and Iranian Kurds are urged to revolt by radio station located Soviet territory.
For reasons indicated above, we have felt that Ambassador Grady’s recommendation that appreciable US loan or grant-in-aid, to be made available to Iran near future, would be important step in bolstering of Iranian economy, at same time offsetting Soviet efforts to draw Iran into position in which active support west would be to some degree inhibited.
[Page 589]Prompt offer of such loan also would serve to strengthen Iranian Government’s bargaining position when firm Soviet trade offer made (Tehran telegram to Department 630, September 124), allowing time for exploration alternative trade possibilities.
Re this last point, third numbered paragraph Tehran’s telegram to Department 631, September 12 suggests possibility that export-import agreement with Iran might be made either with West Germany or Italy, or with both. Imports desired by Iran presumably could be supplied by either these nations (thereby easing their unemployment situation and utilizing idle plant capacity), while products available for export from Iran should be marketable in European area without undue difficulty. Another possibility would be purchase certain of export items, particularly foodstuffs, by US for use for relief in Korea.
Along longer term, settlement of AIOC agreement with Iran would, we believe, immeasurably assist Razmara in establishment economically-stable regime, and thereby would strengthen his hand in resisting Soviet blandishments. If, as we understand to be the case, UK Government-controlled AIOC is withholding badly needed “advance” against Iranian concessions in final agreement, US loan might convince British that bait has lost some of its efficacy. Certainly British should be aware of broad implications of oil settlement, and dangers to Iran (and thus to free world generally) of permitting this matter to drag on indefinitely. Early agreement between AIOC and Iran would be major obstacle to expansion Soviet influence in Near East and hence should, we feel, occupy joint attention of US and UK Governments.
Department pass Tehran, London, sent Department 702, repeated information Tehran 14, London 133.
- Secretary Acheson was in New York for meetings with Foreign Ministers Bevin and Schuman; for documentation on these meetings, see vol. iii, pp. 1108 ff.↩
- Not printed; in it Grady emphasized that the proposed Soviet trade agreement “would be of substantial and immediate economic importance to Iran and would offset appreciably significance of pending US aid.” Grady stressed that it would be “extremely important” if the United States “could promptly suggest Iran Government realistic prospects of export alternatives to Russia and US good offices in developing them.” (461.8831/9–1250)↩
- None of the telegrams under reference in this paragraph is printed.↩
- Not printed; in it Grady reported that the Soviet Ambassador would present to Razmara at the end of the week a reply concerning the trade negotiations. (461.8831/9–1250) On September 14 Grady reported further that the Soviet reply indicated that they would take unlimited quantities of rice and large amounts of wool, tobacco, oil seeds, dried fruits, and raw cotton; and he concluded “Am confident Department will appreciate propaganda victory which would be gained by Russians by conclusion agreement before any US aid received by Iran.” (Telegram 656 from Tehran, not printed; 461.8831/9–1450)↩