740.5/8–2350: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State
457. Deptel 302, August 17 received August 21.1 Shah and Iranian Government would certainly react most unfavorably inclusion Turkey in NAT, if clear commitment in form of promise of immediate assistance in event attack not made Iran at same time. Iranians would undoubtedly believe they were being militarily abandoned by US with no assurances of security beyond whatever action UN might take in emergency; opportunity for Soviets to propagandize theme of complete abandonment Iran by US obvious. There are already strong influences in Iran pressing view that rapprochement with USSR and adoption policy neutrality is only hope for country’s survival. These forces would gain in vigor and public acceptance, if, as in case of large scale and effective MDAP and ECA assistance, US defense commitment again stopped at Iran-Turkish border. One of tasks of Chief of Mission here is continuous stiffening of Iranian will vis-à-vis Soviets, and any action along lines being contemplated would destroy larger part of whatever will to resist has been created and up to present sustained here.
On the other hand I do not believe that NAT should be extended to Iran. Neither do I believe that it should be extended to Turkey. (Presumably if Turkish pressure is not acceded to Greece will not press to be included). The UN charter sanctions the establishment of regional defense pacts, and I believe NAT should be maintained as a North Atlantic regional pact and not extended into an encircling coalition against the USSR. To do the latter would play into Soviet hands to some extent without any apparent advantages to US, especially when it is considered that the principle of concerted UN action against aggression seems to have been established in Korea. That principle certainly could again be applied in the case of aggression against either Iran or Turkey, and it would be more advantageous for US than to act under cover of UN rather than under cover of a treaty which basically not related to region.
[Page 587]Further, I believe question extending any US defense commitment to Iran should be very cautiously approached. There are too many intangibles in situation here. Soviets might occupy part or all of Iran under treaty of 1921, throwing incident into legal mill of UN, in which event, based upon informal discussions of early 1949, it might be that British would not support our contention that appropriate provisions that treaty no longer applicable. The instability of Iranian politics, with possibility always present of change in policy toward USSR, must be considered. Also, commitment to defend Iran might prove to be an undertaking which could not be properly balanced with force available to US.2
- Not printed; it advised Ambassador Grady that the United States was under pressure from Turkey for inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) and asked for his analysis of the reaction of Iran to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the pact without some clear commitment, connected with NAT or not, to Iran. (740.5/8–1750) For further documentation on the question of Greek and Turkish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.↩
- Subsequent to the transmission of this telegram Ambassador Grady lunched with the Shah who expressed his opinion that “it was not in any sense appropriate for any or all of the GTI countries to be members of the NAT.” The Shah stated many of the views which Grady outlined in telegram 457 and thought Turkey should be given no encouragement in her campaign for membership. Grady reported on his lunch with the Shah in telegram 467 from Tehran, August 24, not printed. (740.5/8–2450)↩