888.2553–AIOC/8–1250: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

secret

888. Embtel 839, August 10. I saw Bevin this morning and discussed with him AIOC problem. I stressed critical political and economic situation in Iran, hazardous consequences of prolonged delays etc. in resolving AIOC supplemental agreement, need for supporting Razmara, inflexibility of company re further concessions without renegotiating contract and need for early solution problem in order that Iran may get on with seven year plan. I took line that I thought nature of action should be left to UK to work out and that I merely wanted at this point to make clear our concern and to urge the UK to use its influence with the company to promote a more flexible attitude with the Iranian Government. I suggested Jackson might go Iran immediately to explore solution with Iranian Government on spot.

Bevin indicated awareness problem, recalling prominent role he had played in assisting supplemental agreement negotiations. He felt generous offer had been made Iranian Government, but seemed appreciate seriousness present situation. He said at one point UK does [Page 581] not want Iranian Government run out of money and indicated willingness consider some form of assistance. He was concerned, however, with Iranian propensity keep opening their mouths wider and seemed particularly concerned lest Iranians play off US vs. UK. As very tentative and nebulous thought, he said he had been turning over in his mind whether, in view Iranians seeking dollars from US, it might not be possible for both US and UK, in a coordinated way, to make Razmara generous but realistic offer of assistance to furnish him with funds to get on with solving his problems. He was not making this as suggestion at this point, but merely thinking it over. He would give whole matter further consideration, talk to company and discuss matter with me again soon.

I consider Bevin’s thought re joint US–UK action in question assistance worthy close consideration in order assure most efficient application funds and obviate an Iranian tendency play off one of us against other.1

In discussions Iran re Exim Bank credit,2 suggest we ask attitude towards AIOC supplemental agreement. So far, according to British, Razmara has not indicated support for agreement even if 25 million pounds were advanced and other non-financial concessions made.

Sent Department 888, repeated Tehran 17.

Douglas
  1. On August 22 Douglas was informed that the Department of State was unable to comment on Bevin’s idea of joint assistance pending receipt of further details, but it did not believe the linking of United States aid with the AIOC concession would be in the best interest of any of the countries involved. At the same time the Ambassador was told that he could assure the British that the United States was not adopting a one-sided approach and would continue to urge moderation on Iran. (Telegram 978 to London; 888.2553–AIOC/8–1250)
  2. On July 14 Ambassador Grady had reported that he had received from Prime Minister Razmara a formal request for credits from the Export-Import Bank for irrigation, road building, rehabilitation of industry, and agricultural improvements. The text of Razmara’s request, dated August 13, was transmitted in telegram 118 from Tehran, July 14, not printed (888.10/7–1450).