Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

788.5–MAP/8–350: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State

secret

Tehran, August 3, 1950—3 p. m.

300. Department inform Army, Navy, Air. In informal conversation with Richards last evening Shah displayed familiarity with and great interest in President’s message to Congress in which additional military aid requested for Iran.¹ Shah stated he was gratified to see in President’s message evidence of increased awareness strategic importance Iran and of realization military aid to Iran hitherto inadequate.

Shah discussed a parallel with what might occur in Iran “at any time”. In reply to question Shah stated he had no indication of any immediate threat to Iran from north, but added it should be apparent to any strategist Iran probably weakest link in containment Russian expansion and it not unreasonable expect Soviets would strike where they considered possibilities success greatest.

Shah reviewed recent history US policy in Korea and commented especially on fact that South Koreans were encouraged build up armed forces for internal security only and that these forces were equipped with light arms only. Shah attributed great initial successes of North Koreans to the fact that ROK had not been supplied with more heavy equipment and from this he indicated that decision supply Iran with military equipment useful primarily maintain internal security would be, as in Korea, completely inadequate withstand any armed Soviet aggression.

Shah stated in event of armed invasion or in event establishment puppet regime or regimes in northern provinces he and his army would resist to utmost. He stated, however, he was not so foolish as to think that with present equipment and size of army he could keep Russians from overrunning a good part of country should they choose to do so. He stated his hope was that he could retreat slowly to south central part of Iran and to southern provinces and that there Russians could be held until outside aid arrived.

At this point Shah remarked outside aid would take longer arrive in Iran than in Korea because of geographic factors.

Shah was not specific regarding nature additional heavy equipment he feels is essential. He did, however, make following points:

1. He is convinced that with proper US guidance and assistance Iran Army could absorb much additional heavy equipment.

2. He spoke at length of his great interest arrange for more Iranian officers train in the US.

Shah stated he had at first thought of addressing personal letter to President Truman along foregoing lines but later decided request Embassy transmit message.

Grady

1. For the text of President Truman’s letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, August 1, transmitting a supplemental estimate of appropriations for military assistance, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, pp. 564–566. The estimate for Greece, Turkey, and Iran was $193,000,000.