661.88/7–2150
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State 1
Subject: The United States Position in the Event of a Soviet Attack on Iran
Background
Although the Department has no information to support recent press speculation that an overt Soviet invasion of Iran is imminent, it is possible that the Soviets, using the 1921 Treaty with Iran as justification, will invade Iran on the grounds that it is being turned into a United States base directed against the Soviet Union. It is known that the Soviet Union is militarily prepared for an Iranian adventure at any time.
Alternate forms of Soviet aggression in Iran are also possible, including internal revolution and the use of “free Iranians” in the Soviet Union.
Discussion
The 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty of Friendship gives the Soviet Union, under certain conditions, the right to introduce troops into Iran if that country is used by the armed forces of a third power as a base for aggression against the Soviet Union. It is the opinion of the Legal Adviser that Article 6 of the Treaty which gave the Soviet Union this [Page 573] alleged right has been superseded by the United Nations Charter which provides machinery for the amicable settlement of disputes. The Soviets, however, in their protests to the Iranian Government in 1948 against the presence of two US military missions, and again last month over the alleged petroleum drilling and aerial surveys of border regions by American companies, have obliquely referred to the Treaty with the statement that the alleged American activities were not consistent with the friendship between Iran and the Soviet Union envisaged by the Treaty. It seems reasonably certain that should the Soviets decide on overt aggression in Iran, they would use the Treaty as justification in the eyes of the world.
Of the alternate forms of Soviet aggression, that of internal revolution still seems the most likely although the installation of the strong Razmara Government has greatly lessened any chances for success. The use of “free Iranians” would appear difficult since they are few in number and would have to be logistically supported and led by the Soviet Army to such an extent that it would lose its “free” character.
Since a Soviet aggression in Iran under the cloak of alleged treaty rights is definitely a possibility, it is considered desirable that the Government decide now on the course of action it would follow in such a contingency.
Action Taken
1—We have prepared for consideration by the National Security Council a suggested revision of NSC 542 dealing with a number of contingencies which might arise in Iran short of open Soviet aggression.
2—We are initiating action within the Department looking toward NSC consideration and approval of a specific course of action in the event of a Soviet attack on Iran. In this connection we shall consider the advisability of participating in a United Nations police action similar to that in Korea. In any consideration of this point it must be borne in mind that an action of this type would bring troops of the United States and the United Nations in direct conflict with the armed forces of the Soviet Union since there is no convenient satellite, and it would therefore not be an easy task to keep the conflict localized.
3—We are exploring with the appropriate authorities the question of responsibility as between the United States and the United Kingdom in their relationship with Iran (as well as other Near East countries) in the event of hostilities, to make certain that there is a complete [Page 574] meeting of the minds on this subject. In this connection, it is understood that the British already have plans relating to Iranian oil fields and that our military authorities consider that they have the capacity at least to neutralize the fields in the event of hostilities.
4—We and the Department of Defense have examined the strategic Iranian war plan…. At the request of the Iranian Government, the Chief of our Military Mission in Iran, General Vernon Evans, has been authorized to advise the Iranians on these plans and we have, under the cover of our Military Assistance Group, sent military experts to assist the General in this work.
5—The Department of Defense has authorized General Evans and his group to remain with the Iranian Army in the event of a Soviet invasion and to retire with it to the southwest. Another Government agency however has been unable to prepare full “stay behind” plans inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed them not to discuss this with the British indicating that the question of primary military responsibility mentioned in paragraph 3 above has not been settled. Final determination of this problem will enable another Government agency to proceed with its plan for “stay behind” operations.
6—We have obtained the opinion of the Legal Adviser on the applicability of the 1921 Treaty and are now coordinating our views with the British.
7—We are initiating action to make certain that we are receiving all available intelligence on Soviet activities in Iran and along the frontier and to coordinate all United States intelligence activities in the area.
- The memorandum was drafted by Ferguson. The source text was initialed by Secretary Acheson and bears the handwritten notation “Sec[retary] saw L[ucius] D. B[attle]”.↩
- NSC 54, “Report of the National Security Council on the Position of the United States with Respect to Iran”, dated July 21, 1949, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vi, p. 545.↩