Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

888.2553/7–1850: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

secret

London, July 18, 1950—7 p. m.

399. Deptel 225, July 14. Preparatory to my raising question UK attitude AIOC supplemental agreement with Younger,¹ I deemed it was considered desirable for Embassy officer to make preliminary approach Wright² in order that Younger might be briefed re situation and thus contribute to more productive discussion.

Accordingly, Embassy officer saw Wright yesterday afternoon and discussed question along lines Department’s 225, emphasizing particularly situation in Iran and necessity obtaining early and satisfactory solution this problem. Wright recalled UK position at time Foreign Ministers meeting, emphasizing insatiability appetites of Near East states in matters of this kind. He felt position Foreign Office had taken at that time was quite correct and that if AIOC had made concessions with Mansur government and agreement had not gone through before that government’s downfall, Razmara would have found excuse request fresh concessions on acceding power. Nevertheless, Wright agreed present situation in Iran serious and reiterated UK desires early conclusion AIOC problem. Foreign Office had not yet received any information from Sheppard re specific Iranian request mentioned paragraph 3 Department reference telegram. Foreign Office would, however, give careful consideration views we had expressed, but before making up its mind, it would wish views British Embassy Tehran. Wright particularly hoped US and UK Ambassadors Tehran could make joint appraisal present situation re AIOC for information Department and Foreign Office. He would instruct UK Ambassador to this effect and hoped Department would similarly instruct US Ambassador.

During conversation, Wright, while expressing understanding our interest in problem, said he hoped we had not given Iranians encouragement re their desire modification. We assured him this not case and that we were sure Department and Embassy Tehran had been most correct in any conversations with Iranian Government. Wright also asked whether in event AIOC made some gesture which Razmara considered satisfactory at time but later regarded as insufficient to secure passage, we would again urge further modification. We replied we felt sure that if Razmara showed signs resorting tactics which we considered unfair, Department would endeavor dissuade him.

Subsequent to foregoing conversation, Wright telephoned Embassy officer to say letter had just been received from Sheppard giving his appraisal of situation. Wright said he was not yet aware contents of letter, which Foreign Office has not yet had opportunity to study. Despite receipt Sheppard’s appraisal and concurrent with its consideration, Wright reiterated hope US and UK Ambassadors would make joint appraisal referred to above.³

Comments:

1. We recommend Department agree to Wright’s suggestion re joint appraisal which we feel would further reinforce our efforts here.

2. We also feel we would strengthen our case if we gave undertaking to use our influence with Razmara, in event AIOC agrees make further concessions, to counsel moderation and to restrict face-saving gesture to minimum necessary to secure ratification.

3. We question advisability our raising matter contained penultimate paragraph Tehran’s 261, July 15⁴ with either company or Foreign Office at this time in view status talks described above. In light Wright’s suggestion re joint appraisal, we feel it would be more effective and appropriate if Grady endeavored incorporate in such appraisal his suggestions made in Tehran’s telegram under reference.⁵

Sent Department 399, repeated info Tehran 4.

Douglas

1. Kenneth G. Younger, British Minister of State.
2. Michael R. Wright, British Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
3. On July 20 Douglas reported that Sheppard’s communication had relayed Razmara’s request for advance oil royalties, and had asked what could be done to avoid further delay on passage of the supplemental agreement or having to consider the request for advance royalties. Douglas also reported that his conversation with Wright had alerted the Foreign Office to the United States views, and in view of this fact he suggested postponing raising the Iranian question at higher levels until he saw which way the wind was blowing. (Telegram 435; 888.2553/7–2050).
4. Same as telegram 111, July 13, p. 566.
5. On July 20 Ambassador Grady expressed his agreement with most of the views expressed in this telegram, but felt any joint appraisal of the AIOC situation should be postponed until he had a clearer picture of the Iranian reaction to the United States injecting itself into the negotiations. (Telegram 176;888.2553–AIOC/7–2050).